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Arkansas Law Review’s 75th Anniversary Remarks
University of Arkansas School of Law
Fayetteville, Arkansas
March 2022
Steve Caple*
It is an exciting time for the Arkansas Law Review, the
School of Law, and the University of Arkansas. The journal is
celebrating its 75th anniversary, the law school is approaching its
100th year of existence, and the university recently celebrated its
150th birthday.
I would be remiss if I did not also acknowledge that we are
in the midst of Women’s History Month, and the law school
recently named its fourth consecutive female leader, Dean Alena
Allen. Congratulations. Dean Cynthia Nance started that trend
in 2006, and I am delighted that she is here today.
As for the Arkansas Law Review, it is especially close to my
heart.1 When I was a law student, I somehow pulled the wool
over the eyes of the prior editorial board and was afforded the
opportunity to help produce the journal.2 That experience brought
with it all of the things that you might expect—it instilled
discipline, it improved my editing and writing abilities, it
expanded my appreciation for research and scholarship, and it
furthered my love of history and the law. However, it also
brought with it something that I did not expect—a shared
experience that fostered lifetime friendships. To this day, some

*
Steve Caple is the president of Unity Hunt, Inc. in Dallas, Texas, a member of the
board of directors of the National Archives Foundation, and a law school committee member
for Campaign Arkansas. He earned his B.A. from the University of Texas at Dallas in 1989
and his Juris Doctor, cum laude, from the University of Arkansas School of Law in 1993.
1. Tracey and Steve Caple recently provided a generous gift to the University of
Arkansas School of Law to renovate the Arkansas Law Review office space.
2. Steve Caple served as the Managing Editor for the Arkansas Law Review from 1992
to 1993.
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of my closest friends are former classmates from the editorial
board.
As I was preparing my remarks for today, I re-read Allen W.
Bird II’s work, The History of the Arkansas Law Review, which
was included in the celebration of the journal’s 50th anniversary
in 1997.3 For those who support this institution, I highly
recommend reading it. Mr. Bird’s article led me to several other
works, which collectively serve as a reminder of the debt of
gratitude we owe to Dean Robert A. Leflar, not only for his role
in legal education and the law school, but also his commitment to
the law review.4
I had the good fortune of meeting Dean Leflar. Although his
reputation preceded him, I did not fully appreciate his
contributions to the Arkansas Law Review while I was a student
in Fayetteville. To this day, he still holds the record for the most
works contributed to the journal, at 38.5 Many others have
contributed to the law review, and some of those authors may
surprise you. The journal has published pieces with a wide range
of perspectives, from John F. Kennedy6 to Antonin Scalia7 to Kurt
Vonnegut, Jr.,8 just to name a few.
The evolution of the Arkansas Law Review over the years is
impressive. When it began in 1947, it was a practical publication
to address the issues that Arkansas lawyers faced in their day-today legal practices. By the 1990s, the journal had cultivated a
more theoretical dimension. Dean Leonard Strickman noted in
1994 that the law review should have national relevance.9 The
journal has certainly fulfilled that objective today, with its works
3. 50 ARK. L. REV. 5 (1997).
4. Dean Robert A. Leflar served as the law school dean from 1943 to 1954. His
commitment to the Arkansas Law Review is widely commemorated. See e.g., Warren E.
Burger, Leflar Testimonial, 25 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1971); Roger J. Traynor, The Sterling Leflar
of Arkansas, 25 ARK. L. REV. 3 (1971); J. William Fulbright, Tribute to Robert A. Leflar, 25
ARK. L. REV. 70 (1971); Joe C. Barrett, Vignette of Robert A. Leflar, 25 ARK. L. REV. 143
(1971); Richard B. McCulloch, The Founder of the Arkansas Law Review, 25 ARK. L. REV.
154 (1971).
5. All research on file with the Arkansas Law Review.
6. John F. Kennedy, The World Around Us, 11 ARK. L. REV. 288 (1957).
7. Antonin Scalia, A Tribute to Chief Judge Richard Arnold, 58 ARK. L. REV. 541
(2005).
8. Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, 44 ARK. L. REV. 927 (1991).
9. See Bird, supra note 3, at 21.
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having now been cited by the United States Supreme Court and
every United States Circuit Court of Appeals, other than the
Federal Circuit.
I think we can all agree that the law review has an
extraordinarily rich history, and it has accomplished much in its
first 75 years. I am not sure if I will be around to see how much
more it has achieved 75 years from now, but I am looking forward
to celebrating its 100th anniversary.
In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to
everyone who supports the Arkansas Law Review. Among others,
that list includes the people in this room, the members and
editorial board of the journal, the professors, administrators, and
staff of the law school and the university, the bar membership and
judiciary of this great state, and those who appreciate good legal
scholarship throughout the country. Finally, I would like to
specifically thank Erron and Libby Smith for establishing the
Arkansas Law Review Endowment, which will take the support
for the journal to a whole new level.
It is an honor to be with you today.
Erron Smith*
As we assemble today to celebrate the Arkansas Law Review
and the Arkansas Law Review Academy, I would like to start by
expressing some gratitude. First, thank you, Steve Caple, for your
generosity to the law school and the law review—and for a
reminder of our law review’s proud history. And thank you to the
law school administration and the current editorial board for
making today possible. It is great to see you all here today; I see
some friends I have known for years, and I see the faces of many
I hope will become friends for years to come.

*
Erron Smith is the Corporate Secretary and Associate General Counsel of Walton
Enterprises in Bentonville, Arkansas. Mr. Smith earned his B.A. in Political Science and
Journalism, with a French minor, from the University of Arkansas in 1999. He later earned
his Juris Doctor from the University of Arkansas School of Law in 2002, where he graduated
first in his class and served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Arkansas Law Review from 20012002. He currently serves on the Arkansas Bar Association’s Legal-Related Education
Super-Committee and Law School Sub-Committee.
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Those of us who have served on the editorial board know
that in addition to being a great academic and scholarly honor,
being a law review editor is a tremendous amount of work.
Consistently producing quality content would not be possible
without the support of a number of people: our distinguished
faculty who provide the members of the board with hours of
advice and guidance, while respecting the editorial board’s
independence; the law school staff who, in often unheralded
ways, provide the law review with the tools that make the
publication of an issue feasible; and the members of our alumni
community and the Arkansas Bar Association, who generously
give their time and resources to empower the editorial board to
make the Arkansas Law Review an integral part of the Arkansas
legal community.
I am, indeed, proud of the role the Arkansas Law Review has
established over the last 75 years. Not only does the law review
publish scholarship on pressing domestic and international issues,
generate intriguing intellectual discussions on some of the most
interesting and provocative legal topics of the day, and provide
practical assistance to members of the legal community, but it
also contributes to furthering the mission of the University of
Arkansas by leveraging research, discovery, and creative activity
to help develop solutions to the challenges we face in this State
and in our nation.
I know that all of us as former members of the Arkansas Law
Review editorial board are honored to be a part of its rich history.
For me personally, my experience as Editor-in-Chief of the law
review from 2001 to 2002 has proven invaluable in my journey
as a lawyer, as a writer, as a leader, and as a person. Among other
things, my term as Editor-in-Chief gave me an opportunity to
practice one of the most difficult tasks in the legal profession:
good writing in the face of often unreasonable deadlines and high
expectations. It taught me about the challenges of leading a
diverse team of talented women and men who work tirelessly in
the pursuit of a common goal but who can inevitably find
themselves in conflict; and it taught me about the challenges and
importance of owning the consequences—sometimes publicly—
of the decisions that leaders make.
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In establishing the Arkansas Law Review Endowment and
through subsequent membership in the Arkansas Law Review
Academy10, my wife Libby and I hoped our contribution might
encourage other alumni who have benefited from their law review
experience and who care deeply about the law review, the law
school, and the Arkansas legal community—and their respective
missions—to join us in supporting future editorial boards by
providing the resources they need to make the Arkansas Law
Review one of the most respected and useful law journals in the
country.
Now, upon the 75th anniversary of the law review, I look
back on the reflections of Dean Robert A. Leflar—the person
most responsible for the establishment of the law review—upon
the law review’s 50th anniversary. On that occasion, Dean Leflar
reminded us that a good law school needs a good law review. And
he expressed pride in the work of the past editors of the law
review during its first half-century of existence, especially to the
extent that they advanced the law itself.
I am pleased to see where the law review is today on its 75th
anniversary. I am even more excited to see where the law review
will be as it reaches its centennial. Through support of the law
review endowment and this Arkansas Law Review Academy, I
have no doubt that we will all play a role in continuing to advance
the law—and that when we reach that 100th year, this law review
will continue to make us, and Dean Leflar, proud.

10. Libby and Erron Smith established the endowment in late 2019 to fully fund the
general operations of the law review and to provide current members with law review alumni
readily available to answer questions and consult as needed.
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CAN’T WE JUST TALK ABOUT THIS FIRST?:
MAKING THE CASE FOR THE USE OF
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS IN ARKANSAS
CRIMINAL CASES
Bryan Altman*
INTRODUCTION
“[T]he quest for better justice is a ceaseless quest, that the
single constant for our profession is the need for continuous
examination and reexamination of our premises as to what law
should do to achieve better justice.”1 From time to time, it is
important that we take stock of our legal surroundings and ask
ourselves if our procedures are still properly serving us, or if there
is need for change and improvement. In this Article, I argue that
the time has come for Arkansas to provide the criminal defense
bar with the affirmative power to conduct discovery depositions.
Arkansas criminal defendants currently proceed largely in the
dark with light only being shed on the case as the prosecutor
chooses to provide material to the defense.2
A fair trial is a search for the truth,3 and discovery is how we
get to that truth.4 Expanding our tools of discovery expands our
*

The author thanks colleague attorney Shane Wilkinson, Wilkinson Law Firm, for his
mentorship and encouragement. Additional thanks to Tiffany Murphy, Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs and Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law and Matthew
Bender, Clinical Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law for always being available
to provide feedback and critiques and helping identify the scope of this discussion.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279 (1963).
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (“The function of a criminal trial
is to seek out and determine the truth or falsity of the charges brought against the
defendant.”); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (“Court proceedings are held for the
solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair
trial.”).
4. Brennan, supra note 1, at 291 (“We must remember that society’s interest is equally
that the innocent shall not suffer and not alone that the guilty shall not escape. Discovery,
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ability to find the truth. Currently, Arkansas does not require that
the State disclose witness statements, expected testimony, or
police reports.5 Rather, the law currently holds that such
disclosures are made merely at the benevolence of the
prosecutor.6 The result is that criminal defendants are the only
litigants in Arkansas who are forced to proceed to trial in the dark
subject to surprise testimony.7 Allowing for depositions in
criminal cases will allow defense attorneys to affirmatively turn
on the light and go and find the truth for themselves rather than
wait for the prosecution to trickle out pieces of its investigation.
If the truth is the truth, then there should be no harm in expanding
the ways we can find the truth by allowing defense attorneys to
be a part of the discovery process.
Part I of this Article discusses the limited federal
constitutional requirements for criminal discovery. Part II
provides an overview of the current Arkansas criminal discovery
rules as related to the discovery of witness statements and police
reports. Part III takes a brief look at the historical origins of both
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Arkansas Rules
of Criminal Procedure and how those histories can inform our
modern review of the rules. Part IV examines discovery practices
of other states, including the thirteen states which currently allow
for discovery depositions in criminal cases. Part V addresses
policy arguments both in favor of and in opposition to criminal
discovery depositions. Finally, Part VI provides a list of goals
and objectives for what any proposed rule or legislation in
Arkansas regarding criminal discovery depositions should
address.

basically a tool for truth, is the most effective device yet fashioned for the reduction of the
aspect of the adversary element to a minimum.”).
5. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; Section II.A.
6. See infra Section II.A.
7. See infra Section II.A.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR FOR
DISCOVERY—OR LACK THEREOF
“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in
criminal cases . . . .”8 The United States Supreme Court has only
recognized two express rights to criminal discovery. The first
being that a defendant is entitled to receive all material
exculpatory and impeachment evidence.9 The second being that
when the State permits discovery against the defendant, the
defendant must be given reciprocal discovery rights against the
State.10 Otherwise, the “right” to pretrial discovery in criminal
cases has been left to the states to “experiment[]” with as they see
fit.11 Thus, with few federal guidelines, the question becomes,
what discovery rights does Arkansas currently provide?
II. THE RESTRICTED STATE OF CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY IN ARKANSAS
Arkansas’s written discovery rules have been categorized as
existing somewhere in between the most restrictive models of
“closed-file” discovery and the most liberal models of “open-file”
discovery.12 The most restrictive, textualist reading of the
8. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,
474 (1973) (“[T]he Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery
which the parties must be afforded . . . .”).
9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154 (1972) (holding material evidence relating to the credibility of a witness falls under the
scope of Brady).
10. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 472, 474 n.6, 479 (holding an Oregon law requiring the
defendant to disclose his alibi witnesses without requiring the State to provide reciprocal
discovery of its rebuttal witnesses to be unconstitutional and noting the “Court has [] been
particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to the State
when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial”);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 n.11 (1970) (suggesting that the constitutionality of a
state’s alibi-notice rule will depend on “an inquiry . . . into whether the defendant enjoys
reciprocal discovery against the State”).
11. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474. For a comprehensive, empirical analysis of the
differences among state discovery schemes as relates to plea bargaining, see generally Jenia
I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An
Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016).
12. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 303-06, app. B at 400. Professors Turner
and Redlich categorized jurisdictions that do not require disclosure of witness names, witness
statements, or police reports as “closed-file” systems and jurisdictions that do require
disclosure of such materials as “open-file” systems. Id. at 303-06. Jurisdictions like
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Arkansas discovery rules and statutes provides a criminal
defendant with limited access to a select few pieces of the State’s
file.13 Defense counsel in Arkansas does not have any “right” to
receive either witness statements14 or police reports,15 nor does it
have the power to depose witnesses to discover such information
independently.16
A. Limited Mandatory Disclosures
Currently, the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
require that a prosecutor disclose witness statements or expected
testimony before trial.17 However, by statute, a defendant has the
right to demand the State produce “any statement” of a witness
once the witness has testified on direct examination at trial.18 The
effect being that the defendant has no pre-trial discovery right to
witness statements, but merely a mid-trial discovery right
requiring cross-examinations to be concocted in the hallways of
the courthouse during a recess.19 However, if that handicapping
Arkansas that require disclosure of some but not all of these materials were categorized as
“intermediate” systems. Id. at app. B at 400. As noted by Turner and Redlich, Arkansas
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1 requires discovery of witness names but not witness
statements (other than those of co-defendants) or police reports. Id.
13. See infra Sections II.A.-B.
14. Thompson v. State, 322 Ark. 586, 588, 910 S.W.2d 694, 696 (1995) (holding the
State is under no obligation to provide non-expert, non-exculpatory witness statements
before trial).
15. While it would seem unfathomable that a defense attorney could adequately
investigate his client’s case without access to the relevant police reports and equally
suspicious that a prosecutor would refuse to disclose such reports, it must be acknowledged
that Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1 very plainly does not mandate discovery of
police reports. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1; see, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856, 86768, 568 S.W.2d 3, 10 (1978) (holding the defendant was not entitled to receive nonexculpatory reports from a detective). Because the Arkansas courts routinely engage in a
narrow reading of Rule 17.1, I include police reports in this discussion as another
commonsense piece of discovery withheld from defense counsel with no legitimate policy
justification.
16. See infra Section II.B.
17. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.
18. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-115(b) (2005) (so long as the statement relates to the
subject matter of the witness’s testimony).
19. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-115(c)(5) (“Whenever any statement is delivered to
a defendant pursuant to this section, the court, in its discretion and upon application of the
defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be
reasonably required for the examination of the statement by the defendant and his or her
preparation for its use in the trial.”).
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of defense counsel were not enough, then one could take comfort
from the fact that not every “statement” from a witness is subject
to disclosure under the statute. A witness “statement” is narrowly
defined as “[a] written statement made by the witness and signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by him” or a “substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the witness to an
agent of the state and recorded contemporaneously with the
making of the oral statement.”20 In determining whether a
statement is “substantially verbatim,” the courts look to “the
extent to which it conforms to the language of the witness, the
length of the written statement in comparison to the length of the
interview, whether quotations may be out of context, and the lapse
of time between the interview and the transcription[.]”21 The
result is that witness statements are not subject to disclosure if the
prosecutor or police officer interviewing the witness does not take
sufficiently detailed notes.22
For example, in Harper v. State, the defendant was charged
with raping and sexually assaulting his stepdaughter, K.S.23
According to the defendant, K.S. recanted her allegations on four
separate occasions to multiple individuals, including law
enforcement.24 The defendant then asked that the prosecutor
produce his notes from an interview with K.S. held shortly before
trial.25 The defendant wanted the notes “to determine ‘[w]hat was
said to make K.S. change her story, and what K.S. said prior to
changing her story.’”26 Ultimately, despite the fact that the notes
included remarks outlined in quotation marks, the Arkansas Court
of Appeals held that the notes were not subject to disclosure
because: (1) “[t]he prosecutor stated that she ‘did not write down
verbatim what [K.S.] said[]’”;27 (2) there was no guarantee that
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-115(e).
21. Harper v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 6, 592 S.W.3d 708, 712 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 345, 738 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1987)).
22. See id. at 6-7, 592 S.W.3d at 712-13.
23. 2019 Ark. App. 163, at 1-2, 573 S.W.3d 596, 598.
24. Harper, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 3, 592 S.W.3d at 711.
25. Id. at 3, 3 n.1, 592 S.W.3d at 711 (Harper’s first trial ended in a mistrial and the
interview in question occurred before the first trial).
26. Id. at 3, 592 S.W.3d at 711 (quoting Harper, 2019 Ark. App. 163, at 10, 573 S.W.3d
at 602).
27. Id. at 4, 592 S.W.3d at 711 (quoting Harper, 2019 Ark. App. 163, at 10, 573 S.W.3d
at 603).
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the portions in quotation marks were accurate or in context;28 and
(3) the prosecutor only took three pages of notes for a two-hour
interview.29 While the holding in Harper may fit the specific
facts of that particular case, the ultimate import of the case is that
the State’s burden is lessened by poor investigative work. If a
prosecutor or police officer takes very thorough notes of a witness
interview, then those notes should qualify as a statement under
the statute.30 However, as Harper illustrates, where a prosecutor
or police officer fails to take notes or takes only incomplete notes
of a witness interview, the defendant is left without a remedy.31
This scheme incentivizes the State to not memorialize witness
statements lest they be discoverable at trial.32
Alternatively, many Arkansas prosecutors elect to forego the
rigid text of the codified discovery provisions and engage in openfile discovery.33 The Arkansas Supreme Court has outlined a
simple black-letter rule for open-file discovery:
If a prosecutor’s office intends to fulfill its discovery
obligations by relying upon an open-file policy, it must make
every practicable effort to ensure that the information and
records contained in the file are complete and that the
documents employed at trial are identical to the material
available to the defense in the open file.34

28. Id. at 6-7, 592 S.W.3d at 713. Despite the fact that the court did not address the
inverse proposition that there is no guarantee that the quoted portions were inaccurate, this
reasoning leads to the conclusion that statements may be withheld on the basis of poor
investigative work by the State.
29. Harper, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 7, 592 S.W.3d at 713.
30. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
31. See Harper, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 5-7, 592 S.W.3d at 712-13.
32. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield
to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 586, 601 (2006) (noting that open-file policies can
also incentivize police and prosecutors “to not reduce their knowledge to writing[,]”
therefore excluding it from what must be disclosed).
33. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 107, 98 S.W.3d 433, 442 (2003); Rogers v.
State, 2014 Ark. App. 133, at 4, 6, 2014 WL 668207, at *2-3. Arkansas Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17.2 gives prosecutors the choice to comply with discovery through an “openfile” policy by notifying defense counsel that material held by the prosecutor may be
inspected. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(b). Open-file policies are often carried out by the
prosecutor simply delivering his entire file to defense counsel. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT,
EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2007). Note that the
Arkansas courts and practitioners use a different set of definitions for “open-file” and
“closed-file” than do Turner and Redlich. See supra note 12.
34. Smith, 352 Ark. at 107, 98 S.W.3d at 442.
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Furthermore, “[m]erely because the prosecutor declares that the
files in the case are open, it cannot be taken to mean that he has
fulfilled his discovery obligations.”35 For example, a prosecutor
may not cite an open file but also direct defense counsel to seek
discoverable materials from other government agencies or
personnel.36
Thus, while the black-letter rules of discovery provide for a
narrow list of discoverable materials, prosecutors may relieve
themselves of the burden of sifting through their files and picking
which materials are actually responsive to a discovery request by
simply allowing full disclosure of their case files to defense
counsel.37 Unfortunately for defense counsel in Arkansas, the
Arkansas courts have seemed to reject the spirit and plain
language of the rule that open-file discovery be “complete.”
While not yet explicitly stated, the Arkansas courts have provided
dicta or holdings that lend support to the proposition that even
under an “open-file policy,” the State is merely obligated to make
sure the open file contains the specifically enumerated materials
listed in Rule 17.1 rather than actually be “complete” with all
materials held by the State.38
For example, in Hathcock v. State, when presented with
defense complaints of “surprise” testimony in a case where the
State provided an open file, the State argued it “was not obligated
to outline the exact course of potential testimony of its
witnesses.”39 The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed and cited case
law stating Rule 17.1 only obligates disclosure of witness names
and not witness statements.40 Similarly, in Woods v. State, the
35. Bussard v. State, 295 Ark. 72, 79-80, 747 S.W.2d 71, 75 (1988); see also Earl v.
State, 272 Ark. 5, 13, 612 S.W.2d 98, 102 (1981) (discussing how the prosecution’s openfile policy “may be a time saver for both the State and the defense; however, [] it often results
in the court being unable to determine whether discovery has been complied with under the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal procedure [sic].”).
36. Dever v. State, 14 Ark. App. 107, 112, 685 S.W.2d 518, 520-21 (1985).
37. See Rogers, 2014 Ark. App. 133, at 5-6, 2014 WL 668207, at *3-4 (finding the
defendant did not show that he was prejudiced by the State’s failure to list a witness on the
witness list as required under Rule 17.1 where the witness’s name and statement were
provided to the defendant in the State’s open file).
38. See Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 573-74, 182 S.W.3d 152, 159 (2004); Woods
v. State, 323 Ark. 605, 609-10, 609 n.3, 916 S.W.2d 728, 730-31 (1996).
39. 357 Ark. at 573, 182 S.W.3d at 159.
40. Id.
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State sought to introduce opinion testimony from a detective
regarding bullet holes.41 The State argued it had an open file but
conceded that the testimony was based on conversations between
the prosecutor and the detective and not contained in a police
report in the “open” file.42 Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme
Court did not reach the merits of the objection, holding it was not
properly made at trial; however, the court did provide a footnote
citation stating the “[s]ubstance of testimony by witnesses is not
required under Rule 17.1.”43
Again, while neither Hathcock, Woods, nor another case has
yet to explicitly hold that an “open” file need not actually be
“complete” and include witness statements, there is clearly a
common thread demonstrating that the courts dismiss complaints
about the adequacy of “open” files by relying on the narrow
language of Rule 17.1. Because the Arkansas Appellate Courts
have not yet fully articulated what it means for a file to be “open”
in regard to witness statements, police reports, or surprise
testimony in general, defense counsel access to witness
statements and police reports may be a mere courtesy extended
by the benevolence of our local prosecutors.44
B. Statutorily Permitted Depositions in Criminal Cases
If defense counsel does not have a firm procedural or
statutory claim to discover witness statements or police reports,
the question then becomes to what extent may defense counsel
independently discover such material? As a threshold matter,
unfortunately, one of the Arkansas defense bar’s most invaluable
tools, the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),45
cannot aid in the discovery of police reports or witness statements

41. 323 Ark. at 609-10, 916 S.W.2d at 730-31.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 609 n.3, 610, 916 S.W.2d at 730-31.
44. See generally Prosser, supra note 32, at 606-07 (noting how open-file policies do
not solve problems related to discovery of information not “reduced to writing”).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101—112.
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included therein.46 Police reports relating to open and ongoing
criminal investigations are not discoverable under FOIA.47
Now, a defense attorney obviously has the freedom to
contact any potential witness or police officer to see if she is
willing to discuss the case. However, two problems still exist.
First, we have to acknowledge that defense attorneys do not
always represent popular clients, and in many cases, the most vital
witnesses are actually the victims of the defendant. Witnesses
may have legitimate reasons to be unwilling to talk with defense
counsel.48 Second, even if a witness does talk with defense
counsel, a preservation problem arises. If the witness changes her
testimony at trial from what she initially told defense counsel,
how does the attorney address the discrepancy without making
himself a witness in the case? While a diligent defense attorney’s
investigation of a case should routinely involve contacting
witnesses, there is still the sober reality that witnesses are not
always as free to discuss the case with defense attorneys as they
are with prosecutors,49 and an effective cross-examination is not
built on a line of impeachment where the attorney is forced to pit
his credibility against the witness’s in front of the jury.
Then, if a defense attorney cannot obtain witness statements
or police reports in a discovery request to the prosecutor, and he
cannot obtain them through a FOIA request, and the witnesses are
reluctant to talk with the defense attorney, can he possibly depose
them to obtain their statements? To be blunt, no.
“In Arkansas, ‘the right to take depositions rests upon
statutory authority and in no case can the right be exercised unless

46. In criminal investigations, witness statements in the government’s possession are
primarily going to have been made to law enforcement officers and therefore included in
police reports.
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(6) (2021) (exempting from public inspection
“[u]ndisclosed investigations by law enforcement agencies of suspected criminal activity”);
Martin v. Musteen, 303 Ark. 656, 660, 799 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1990) (“[I]f a law enforcement
investigation remains open and ongoing it is one meant to be protected as ‘undisclosed’ under
the act.”).
48. Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2014) (noting defense counsel is free to conduct informal
discovery requests of witnesses but “there is also no right to a response”).
49. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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the authority therefor exists.’”50 Arkansas law currently only
provides for two types of perpetuation depositions, as opposed to
general discovery depositions.51
1. Depositions of Child Sex Offense Victims
First, prosecutors are allowed to petition the court for leave
to take a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim of a sexual
offense or attempted sexual offense under the age of seventeen.52
This limited manner of deposition requires both the physical
presence of the defendant and his attorney and cross-examination
of the witness.53 It is a limited tool to preserve and present the
testimony of a child sex crime victim without requiring the child
to testify live in a courtroom full of strangers.54 However, this is
a one-sided tool allowing the State to request the deposition in
lieu of live testimony at trial—it does not give the defendant or
his attorney any greater advantage in preparation as to what the
testimony of the witness may be until it is already being taken on
the record.
2. Depositions of Absent Material Witnesses
Second, both parties may move for permission to take a
deposition of a material witness who is anticipated to be unable
to testify at trial.55 Again, this type of deposition is of no use as
a discovery tool because it merely allows a defendant to preserve
already known testimony from a witness. A defendant would
seemingly only use this tool to depose one of his own witnesses.
Although, perhaps, there may be the rare circumstance where this
manner of deposition is invoked by the State for one of its
50. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 399, 6 S.W.3d 74, 79 (1999) (quoting Russell v.
State, 269 Ark. 44, 47, 598 S.W.2d 96, 97 (1980)).
51. Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND.
L.J. 845, 856 n.82 (1995) (“Perpetuation depositions are allowed to preserve the testimony
of witnesses who may be unavailable for trial.”); William Ortman, Confrontation in the Age
of Plea Bargaining, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 451, 487 (2021) (“Discovery depositions, as their
name suggests, are tools for discovering new information from or about the deponent.”).
52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(b) (1983).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(b).
54. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(c)-(d).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-44-201(a), 202(a) (1979 & 2005).
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witnesses, allowing the defendant to discover the witness’s
testimony before trial. However, even though the testimony
would be discovered before trial, it would still be discovered
“live” to the defense attorney during the deposition, and therefore,
still fraught with all the burdens of fashioning a defense in the
middle of trial.
Accordingly, Arkansas currently only allows for
preservation depositions of child sex offense victims and absent
material witnesses—neither of which is generally of any
investigative use to the defense bar.
C. Discretionary Authority to Order Depositions Under
Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.4
Although there is no mandatory authority to compel a
witness deposition, the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide a discretionary catch-all provision allowing the court to
order additional discovery of “other relevant material and
information upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of
the defense.”56 Thus far, the Arkansas appellate courts have
hinted that depositions fall under this authority but have
ultimately been reluctant to accept arguments that depositions are
ever actually appropriate under Rule 17.4.57 The decisions
discussing the discretionary grant of depositions are plagued by
vagueness and lack any guidance to trial courts or defense counsel
as to when—if ever—a deposition may be appropriate under Rule
17.4.
In Sanders v. State, the defense attorney requested
permission to depose two out-of-state witnesses who refused to
speak with him.58 He naturally claimed their refusal to speak with
him inhibited his ability to prepare for trial.59 However, the
Arkansas Supreme Court summarily rejected his argument,
noting that he was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses at trial
56. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a).
57. See Sanders v. State, 276 Ark. 342, 344-45, 635 S.W.2d 222, 223 (1982); Hoggard
v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 120-21, 640 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (1982); Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark.
243, 247-48, 891 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1995); Spencer v. State, 285 Ark. 339, 339-40, 686 S.W.2d
436, 437 (1985); Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 472-73, 915 S.W.2d 702, 714 (1996).
58. 276 Ark. at 344, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
59. Id.
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and that he did not argue that he was not provided with their
statements after they testified on direct examination, pursuant to
statute.60 The court simply stated, “neither the statutes nor the
rule [17.4] provides for the taking of a deposition under the
circumstances present in this case.”61
Noticeably missing from the court’s analysis is what
circumstances would warrant the taking of a deposition—
especially considering the facts present of non-cooperative outof-state witnesses.62 Unfortunately, this theme has continued
through the limited body of cases denying defense requests to
conduct discovery depositions. The Arkansas Supreme Court has
indirectly acknowledged this lack of clarity noting, “we said there
might be some case in which a deposition might be required, but
we have never been presented with such a case.”63
However, perhaps the most egregious example of the lack of
guidance from the Arkansas courts on this point comes from
Misskelley v. State.64 The defendant wanted to depose the officers
who interrogated him as part of a broader defense strategy to
suppress statements made during his interrogation.65 The trial
court “offered to make the officers available for questioning, but
would not require them to submit to depositions.”66 The Arkansas
Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion
with this proposal,67 and in a vacuum, or as a matter of
pragmatism, this conclusion is likely sound. If the goal is to
obtain information from a witness through compulsory discovery
processes, the additional procedural dressings of a stenographer
and an oath at an interview to elevate it to a deposition may have

60. Id. at 344-45, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
61. Id. at 345, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
62. See id. at 344-45, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
63. Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 248, 891 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1995); see also Hoggard
v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 120-21, 640 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (1982) (“We prefer to leave the
decision . . . to the trial judges to be exercised on a case-by-case basis . . . .”); Spencer v.
State, 285 Ark. 339, 339-40, 686 S.W.2d 436, 437 (1985) (citing Hoggard and failing to
articulate any standard for when a deposition may be warranted).
64. 323 Ark. 449, 472-73, 915 S.W.2d 702, 714 (1996).
65. The defendant in Misskelley raised a detailed and multi-faceted argument about the
voluntariness of his confession. Id. at 464-72, 915 S.W.2d at 710-14.
66. Id. at 472, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
67. Id. at 472-73, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
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little extra value.68 However, the grave problem with Misskelley
is not the conclusion but, once again, the analysis—or lack
thereof. The Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
We have never held that a defendant should be allowed to
depose interrogating officers. The public policy
considerations alone dictate that depositions of police
officers should not be taken as a matter of routine, but only
in rare cases, subject to the trial court’s discretion. A
defendant’s discovery needs are ordinarily met by the broad
access given to him by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.69

The court readily cited “public policy considerations” as
justification alone to make deposing police officers
presumptively unreasonable.70 Yet, the court failed to explain
what public policy considerations it is referring to. This
conclusion is completely devoid of any support. The court
presents what appears to read as a black-letter rule without any
supporting analysis or discussion.71 The opinion nakedly cites
“public policy considerations” and ends the conversation.
Fortunately, this passage may simply be one of those obscure
lines of dicta present in our case law without any real consequence
because this language does not appear to have been cited or
repeated in the twenty-five years since it was first published.
Thus, while Rule 17.4 theoretically supports a trial court
permitting defense discovery depositions, there is no clear
guidance as to what circumstances would warrant such an
exercise of discretion.
D. Prosecutor’s Subpoenas (read: Depositions)
Of course, criminal discovery in Arkansas is not a balanced
system, as the State currently enjoys the power to conduct
discovery depositions of prospective witnesses. Arkansas
prosecutors are afforded the privilege of issuing what are

68. But see ARK. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (allowing the use of prior statements given at a
deposition as substantive evidence for the truth of the matter asserted rather than merely as
impeachment material).
69. Misskelley, 323 Ark. at 472-73, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
70. See id. at 472, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
71. See id. at 472-73, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
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colloquially referred to as “prosecutor’s subpoenas.”72 Since
Arkansas allows for charge by information73 or indictment,74 a
prosecutor’s subpoena is designed as an investigative procedural
equivalent to examining a witness before a grand jury.75
However, this power to examine witnesses is actually greater than
that inherent in examining a witness before a grand jury because
a prosecutor may subpoena and examine a witness not only in the
initial investigation of a case, but also in preparation for trial after
charges have been filed.76 Perhaps the most unbalanced aspect of
this investigative power is that prosecutors are free to subpoena
and question defense witnesses before trial.77 In fact, doing so
would actually be the most natural use of the prosecutor’s
subpoena—to examine the defense’s witnesses—because a
prosecutor ordinarily would have little need to use the formal
process to question the State’s witnesses.78 Indeed, the
prosecutor’s subpoena is a powerful tool allowing the State to
unilaterally discover the details of the defendant’s defense.79
Although not titled as “depositions,” the prosecutor’s subpoena
allows the prosecutor to compel a witness to attend at a certain
time and place and give testimony under oath.80 That checks all

72. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-212(a) (2005); Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 467,
182 S.W.3d 112, 120 (2004).
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-302 (1947).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-401 (1947).
75. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-212(a) (“Such oath when administered by the
prosecuting attorney or his or her deputy shall have the same effect as if administered by the
foreman of the grand jury.”); Holt, 357 Ark. at 467, 182 S.W.3d at 120 (noting the
prosecutor’s subpoena is a functional equivalent to questioning before a grand jury).
76. Todd v. State, 283 Ark. 492, 493, 678 S.W.2d 345, 346 (1984).
77. See Neal v. State, 320 Ark. 489, 495, 898 S.W.2d 440, 444 (1995) (no error to
allow the State to subpoena and examine defense witnesses one month before trial).
78. David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L.
REV. 56, 87, 89-90 (1961) (discussing the psychological advantage enjoyed by the State with
regard to witness cooperation and how “[l]ikely the reason that one does not hear proposals
to allow the [S]tate to take discovery depositions of witnesses other than defendant is that
realistically there is no need of such depositions because the informal availability of
witnesses to the [S]tate’s interrogation is generally satisfactory”).
79. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1191-92 (1960) (“Fairly clearly, pretrial discovery
by the prosecution is far-reaching. And it cannot in any sense be said to be matched by what
is available to the defendant or by what he can keep from the prosecution . . . .”).
80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-212(a) (2005).
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the boxes of a deposition,81 and is in essence, a de facto
deposition.
Simply put, in Arkansas, prosecutors can conduct discovery
depositions, but defense attorneys cannot.
Let’s reset the table here to collect our rules. First, the
United States Constitution only mandates the discovery of
exculpatory and impeachment material82 and that the State’s
discovery rules be reciprocal in favor of the defendant.83 Second,
Arkansas defendants are only entitled to discover witness names
and addresses but not witness statements or police reports,84 and
voluntary disclosure under open-file discovery may not
necessarily broaden these requirements.85 Third, Arkansas
defendants are only entitled to receive “substantially verbatim”
prior statements of witnesses in the middle of trial.86 Fourth,
Arkansas defendants are only entitled to take perpetuation
depositions under narrow circumstances.87 Fifth, Arkansas
defendants may seek discretionary permission to engage in
witness depositions, but the only guidance ever provided on the
propriety of such depositions states that as a matter of “public
policy,” police officers should rarely be deposed.88 Sixth,
Arkansas prosecutors are allowed to subpoena (effectively
depose) any witness, including the defendant’s witnesses, and
thereby discover the nature of the defense before trial.89 Bottom
line, an Arkansas defense attorney has no right to see a witness
statement before trial or compel a witness to speak with him,
whereas an Arkansas prosecutor can compel defense witnesses to
appear for questioning and discover the nature of their
prospective testimony. But wait, how does the prosecutor
subpoena comply with the first rule about reciprocity?
81. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 30 (a), (c) (setting out the procedures and requirements for a
deposition).
82. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
153-54 (1972).
83. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
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In Wardius v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court held
that an Oregon notice-of-alibi statute was unconstitutional in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it did not provide for reciprocal discovery
rights for the defendant.90 The Oregon statute required the
defendant to give the State notice of the nature of his alibi defense
and the names and addresses of witnesses who would testify in
support of the alibi without requiring the State to disclose rebuttal
witnesses.91 Because the defendant did not properly give the
State notice of his alibi pursuant to the statue, both he and another
witness were not permitted to testify as to the defendant’s
whereabouts, and the defendant was ultimately convicted.92
The Court recognized notice-of-alibi rules “are based on the
proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a system
of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum
possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases
and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.”93 The
Court also acknowledged that “increasing the evidence available
to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system.”94
Yet, this principle is currently absent from the Arkansas scheme
of criminal discovery. The Court then readily distinguished the
nature of the Oregon statute with the notice-of-alibi rule upheld
in Williams v. Florida, explaining that the Florida rule was
“carefully hedged with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure
to the defendant.”95 Unlike the Florida rule, the Oregon statute
required the defendant to disclose the names and addresses of his
alibi witnesses, but did not require the State to disclose the names
and addresses of witnesses it planned to use in rebuttal.96
The Court’s holding in Wardius is founded on a simple idea
of reciprocity and “balance”:
Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding
the amount of discovery which the parties must be

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
Id. at 471-72, 472 n.3.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.
Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970)).
Id. at 470, 472 n.3.
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afforded, it does speak to the balance of forces between the
accused and his accuser . . . . [I]n the absence of a strong
showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be
a two-way street. The State may not insist that trials be run
as a “search for truth” so far as defense witnesses are
concerned, while maintaining “poker game” secrecy for its
own witnesses. It is fundamentally unfair to require a
defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the
same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise
concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which
he disclosed to the State.97

The Supreme Court’s language is clear and simple. Where a state
imposes discovery obligations to the detriment of the defendant,
due process demands he receive a reciprocal benefit from
discovery against the State. The Court’s reasoning is founded in
both common sense and the practical reality of the logistical
disparity between the State and the individual:98 “Indeed, the
State’s inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that if
there is to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in
the defendant’s favor.”99
Accordingly, Wardius says in plain language that it is
“fundamentally unfair” for a defendant to be required to disclose
the details of his defense without reciprocal discovery of the
State’s rebuttal.100 How then, may a prosecutor subpoena and
examine defense witnesses under oath, but a defense attorney may
not subpoena and examine state witnesses under oath? The short
answer is that the Arkansas courts have grievously erred on this
point and failed to properly apply the import of Wardius.
The Arkansas Supreme Court first examined a complaint
that the unilateral prosecutor’s subpoena power violated due
process under Wardius in Alford v. State.101 The defendant in
Alford argued it was unfair that the State was able to subpoena a
witness and obtain his statement before trial whereas the
defendant could only obtain a prior statement of the witness after

97. Id. at 474-76 (internal citation omitted).
98. See id. at 475 n.9.
99. Id.
100. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 476.
101. 291 Ark. 243, 250, 724 S.W.2d 151, 155 (1987).
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he testified on direct.102 Because the witness in question was
called in the defense’s case-in-chief, the defendant argued the
prosecutor’s subpoena enhanced the State’s cross-examination
capabilities.103 The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the
defendant’s challenge stating that the State did not abuse its
subpoena power “in an effort to obtain witnesses against the
appellant or to secrete their testimony from him before trial.”104
The court summarily rejected the defendant’s citation to Wardius
by stating that the witness in question was a defense witness, and
therefore, not a witness “against the appellant.”105
The Arkansas Supreme Court next revisited this topic in
Parker v. State, decided just a few months after Alford.106 The
defendant in Parker raised the same argument that he was denied
reciprocal subpoena power over the State’s witnesses when the
State subpoenaed and examined his expert witness.107 The court
again summarily rejected the argument stating, “[a]s in Alford, the
only witness subpoenaed by the [S]tate was called by the defense
to testify, rather than by the prosecution, and there is no indication
of abuse by the prosecutor of the subpoena power or that any
testimony was hidden from Parker.”108 Again, the Arkansas
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal to Wardius because the only
witness subpoenaed was a defense witness.
A more unique claim was presented in Armstrong v. State,
where the defendant argued that because he was not given
reciprocal subpoena power, the charges against him should have
been dismissed.109 Aside from rejecting this claim based on a lack
of authority for the proposition that the appropriate remedy for
such a violation would be a dismissal of the charges, the Arkansas
Court of Appeals went on to rely on the familiar reasoning from
Alford and Parker.110 The Court of Appeals noted that “all but
one” of the subpoenaed witnesses were called by the defense
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 251, 724 S.W.2d at 155.
Id. at 250-51, 724 S.W.2d at 155.
292 Ark. 421, 430-31, 731 S.W.2d 756, 761 (1987).
Id. at 430-31, 731 S.W.2d at 761.
Id. at 432, 731 S.W.2d at 761.
45 Ark. App. 72, 81, 871 S.W.2d 420, 426 (1994).
Id. at 82, 871 S.W.2d at 426.
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rather than the State and the defendant did not claim any surprise
as to the testimony of the one witness called by the State.111
In all three instances when the Arkansas courts have
examined this issue regarding Wardius and the prosecutor’s
subpoena, the courts have failed to address both the actual
substance of Wardius and the claims of the respective
defendants.112 The overriding theme in each opinion’s brief
analysis is that Wardius has no application when it is the
defense’s witnesses that are subpoenaed.113 This emphasis on the
fact that defense witnesses were subpoenaed is absolutely
contradictory to the plain reading of Wardius. Wardius held it
was unfair for the State to require a defendant to disclose the
names of his alibi witnesses, so that the State may then interview
those witnesses and prepare a rebuttal, without requiring the State
to disclose the names of its rebuttal witnesses.114 The Wardius
Court held it was unfair to require the defendant to give up his
case but remain subjected to surprise refutation by the State.115
This is the entire point that has yet to be squarely addressed by
the Arkansas courts. It is unfair for the State to have a deposition
power over the defense’s witnesses, to question them and learn
the nature and details of the defense, while requiring the
defendant to remain blind as to the State’s case-in-chief.116
By deposing defense witnesses, a prosecutor gains not only
knowledge of the defensive strategy, but also invaluable crossexamination material. If a defense witness’s testimony deviates
however slightly from what he previously stated under oath to the
prosecutor, the prosecutor has free ammunition to shoot down the
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
114. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973).
115. Id.
116. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated its agreement on this point. In Gutierrez
v. Medley, the Utah Supreme Court held that under Utah’s parallel “Subpoena Powers Act,”
a prosecutor could only issue subpoenas prior to charges formally being filed but not after,
as is allowed in Arkansas. 972 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1988). Citing to Wardius, the court
noted that if the prosecutor could issue such subpoenas, the act would be constitutionally
suspect: “Furthermore, we note that had the legislature clearly stated that the Act applied
after the filing of charges without adding other substantive provisions permitting a defendant
to present evidence, confront the witness, and engage in reciprocal discovery, the Act might
have then been of questionable constitutional validity.” Id. at 917 n.3.
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defense. More importantly, the prosecutor will likely have this
information well in advance of trial, giving him plenty of time to
outline and strategize his attack. Conversely, the best a defense
attorney can hope for is that someone wrote down a “substantially
verbatim” record of a previous statement by the witness and that
he can cobble together an effective line of questioning in the halls
of the courthouse before the trial resumes.117
While not explicitly outlined in Alford, Parker, or
Armstrong, each opinion’s reference to surprise and the
subpoenaing of defense witnesses seems to suggest a
misapplication of Wardius. The Arkansas courts seem to have
rejected the Wardius challenges to prosecutor’s subpoenas based
on an improper framing of the nature of the challenges. The
courts seem to frame the challenge not as a complaint that the
State is able to subpoena defense witnesses, but rather, as a
complaint that the defendant is unable to also subpoena his own
witnesses. There is an implied reasoning in the cases that the
defendant does not also need the ability to subpoena his own
witnesses because he can avoid surprise by talking to his
witnesses and asking them about what happened during their
depositions with the prosecutor or by receiving a copy of their
recorded statements. However, this misses the point. The real
Wardius challenge is not that it is unfair for a prosecutor to
subpoena a defense alibi witness without allowing the defendant
to depose that same witness. The true application of Wardius is
to say that it is unfair for the prosecutor to subpoena a defense
alibi witness without allowing the defendant to equally depose the
State’s witnesses.118 Wardius, at its simplest reading, holds that
when the defendant has to turn over his witnesses’ names, the
State has to turn over its witnesses’ names too.119 Currently, the
Arkansas courts have not yet squarely addressed how, under
Wardius, the defense has to turn over its witnesses’ testimony, but
the State is allowed to conceal its witnesses’ testimony.
Accordingly, it is my position that Arkansas’s current law,
which essentially allows prosecutors to conduct discovery
117. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
118. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72.
119. Id. at 475-76.
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depositions of defense witnesses without allowing defense
attorneys to conduct discovery depositions of State witnesses, is
unjust, unfair, and unconstitutional under Wardius.
E. McDole v. State and a Failed Constitutional Challenge to
Arkansas Criminal Discovery
The leading case in Arkansas discussing the disparity
between civil litigants and criminal litigants and the use of
discovery depositions is McDole v. State.120 In McDole, the
Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the argument that it violates a
criminal defendant’s rights to provide compulsory depositions in
civil cases but not in criminal cases.121 The court rejected the
defendant’s attack on multiple fronts. The court began its
analysis by noting that Arkansas law only allows for depositions
to preserve material testimony “but does not allow a criminal
defendant to simply set up depositions at will and compel
attendance as in a civil case.”122 The court emphasized the
historical underpinning of this scheme, stating, “[a]pparently, this
has always been the law in Arkansas.”123 The court then turned
to the Compulsory Process Clause of the Arkansas Constitution124
and provided a line of citations for three seemingly inapposite
propositions: (1) that the Compulsory Process Clause does not
require that every witness testify at trial; (2) that specific
witnesses do not have to testify if the same facts can be
established through other witnesses; and (3) that witnesses
without relevant testimony are not required to testify.125 The
court then turned to “the federal side” and cited Wardius for the
familiar proposition that there is no general constitutional right to
pretrial discovery.126 Lastly, and most relevantly, the court
examined the claim that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

339 Ark. 391, 398, 6 S.W.3d 74, 79 (1999).
Id. at 400-01, 6 S.W.3d at 80-81.
Id. at 398-99, 6 S.W.3d at 79.
Id. at 399, 6 S.W.3d at 79.
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
McDole, 339 Ark. at 400, 6 S.W.3d at 80.
Id.
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allow depositions in civil cases but not in criminal cases.127 In
rejecting this claim, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
Equal protection does not require that persons be dealt with
identically; it only requires that classification rest on real and
not feigned differences, that the distinctions have some
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made,
and that their treatment be not so disparate as to be
arbitrary. The issue of equal protection involves “whether
people in the same situation are being treated differently
. . . .” While both criminal and civil defendants may be
called litigants, they are far from similarly situated.128

What is missing from the court’s holding is the reasoning as
to exactly why and how civil and criminal litigants are differently
situated to justify the disparate treatment.129 To forego lofty
metaphors or analogies about the principles of justice, it is easier
to just imagine a simple hypothetical case. A man is accused of
getting into a drunken brawl at a bar. He is simultaneously
charged by the State with criminal battery and served a civil
complaint by the alleged victim for tortious battery. The
defendant is the same in both cases. Although the “plaintiff” is a
separate entity in both matters, the complaining and chief witness
is the same. The relevant facts and witnesses will be the same.
Indeed, the testimony produced at each trial should be identical.
What then, is the justification for allowing the defendant to
depose the alleged victim and any bystander witnesses in the civil
suit but not in the criminal case? This is the question McDole
fails to satisfy. McDole reaches a conclusion but fails to explain
exactly what legal alchemy takes place that presents a real and
substantial policy justification to allow the same person to depose
the same witnesses over the same matter to retrieve the same
testimony, possibly even in the same court130 and in front of the
127. Id. at 401, 6 S.W.3d at 80.
128. Id. at 401, 6 S.W.3d at 80-81 (internal citations omitted).
129. See id.
130. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order 14 directs the circuit courts to
establish separate divisions for criminal, civil, juvenile, probate, and domestic relations
cases. Order 14. Administration of Circuit Courts, (2012). However, “[t]he designation of
divisions is for the purpose of judicial administration and caseload management and is not
for the purpose of subject-matter jurisdiction. The creation of divisions shall in no way limit
the powers and duties of the judges to hear all matters within the jurisdiction of the circuit
court.” Id. Accordingly, civil and criminal cases may be heard in the same circuit court.
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same judge,131 for his civil suit but not his criminal suit. How
does the man in our hypothetical example become “far from
similarly situated” from himself?132
We might stereotypically imagine civil litigation as “whitecollar” contract disputes between businesses and criminal
litigation as “blue-collar” disputes about acts of violence.
However, as a general proposition, victim-oriented behavior is
equally tortious and criminal. Battery and assault are both torts
and crimes.133 Trespass is a tort and a crime.134 Theft is a tort
and a crime.135 In fact, Arkansas law currently provides for a
catch-all cause of action for any felonious behavior.136 Under the
catch-all statute, not only is the relevant evidence the same, the
elements of the cause of action would also be the same, as the
civil plaintiff has to prove the elements of the underlying
felony.137 So what justification is there that if a homeowner
alleges residential burglary and seeks to take the defendant’s
money, the defendant is allowed to depose the homeowner and
any other potential witnesses, but if the local prosecutor alleges
residential burglary and seeks to take the defendant’s liberty, the
defendant must not be permitted to compel witnesses to speak
with him?

131. Administrative Order 14 states, “[c]ases in a subject-matter division may be
exclusively assigned to particular judges, but such assignment shall not preclude judges from
hearing cases of any other subject-matter division.” Id. Indeed, in rural circuits with only
one judge, every type of case would have to go in front of the same judge.
132. There is an inherent paradox when comparing the scope of civil and criminal
discovery and the respective stakes of each proceeding. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“If the civil plaintiff, who seeks primarily the payment of
money, must share his evidence in advance of a trial, then surely the prosecutor, who seeks
the defendant’s loss of liberty or life, ought to suffer the same obligations.”).
133. Ark. Model Jury Instr., Civil AMI 418 (tort of battery); Ark. Model Jury Instr.,
Civil AMI 417 (tort of assault); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-13-201—207 (crimes of battery and
assault).
134. Barrows/Thompson, LLC v. HB Ven II, LP, 2020 Ark. App. 208, at 20, 599
S.W.3d 637, 649 (listing elements of tort of trespass); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-203 (2021)
(crime of trespass).
135. Ark. Model Jury Instr., Civil AMI 425 (tort of conversion); ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-36-103 (2021) (crime of theft).
136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107(a)(1) (2011) (“Any person injured or damaged
by reason of conduct of another person that would constitute a felony under Arkansas law
may file a civil action to recover damages based on the conduct.”).
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107(a)(1)-(2).
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Underlying the conclusion in McDole is the recognition that
“this has always been the law in Arkansas.”138 McDole reaches a
conclusion that civil and criminal litigants are different because
we say they are, but it does not answer the question—why do we
say they are different? The reality is that the historical support
for denying criminal discovery depositions in Arkansas rests on
shaky ground and reluctance to change rather than concrete
policy.
III. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
In our modern legal landscape, we accept as a matter of
course, the distinction between civil procedure and criminal
procedure. This unquestionable tenet surely led to the conclusion
in McDole that civil litigants and criminal litigants are “far from
similarly situated.”139 However, while it may be the natural
position today that criminal discovery and civil discovery are
different, there is no satisfactory answer as to “why” they must be
so different. As this section explores, criminal discovery is only
in the limited position it is in today because of a historical desire
to favor efficient prosecution of the guilty rather than protection
of the innocent, a lack of organized input from the defense bar
during the drafting of the modern rules, and a lasting reluctance
to update our shared standards of justice.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been largely
influential on the states,140 and prior to the adoption of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Arkansas courts often
turned to the federal rules for guidance.141 For that reason, I begin
with a discussion of the history of the Federal Rules of Criminal
138. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 399, 6 S.W.3d 74, 79 (1999).
139. Id. at 401, 6 S.W.3d at 81.
140. Meyn, supra note 48, at 1103-04; Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 303
(categorizing jurisdictions that restrict criminal discovery as following the federal discovery
scheme).
141. See, e.g., Lane v. State, 217 Ark. 428, 429, 230 S.W.2d 480, 480 (1950) (citing
Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a)(2) “as illustrative of the reason of our conclusion” in a case involving
bail on appeal); Cabbiness v. State, 241 Ark. 898, 900-02, 410 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (1967)
(citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) in holding it was reversible error for a trial court to hear a
suppression motion in the presence of the jury).
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Procedure and then turn to a corollary discussion of the history of
the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A. Reformation of Common Law Criminal Procedure in
Federal Courts
For centuries, under the common law, civil and criminal
procedure operated in parallel to each other, judged by the same
standards.142 However, as Professor Ion Meyn reports in his
detailed account of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the modern schism between civil and criminal
procedure was a concerted effort driven in part by ineloquent
prejudices and a lack of representation from defense counsel.143
In the early part of the twentieth century, civil procedure
underwent a fundamental transformation from the two-stage
process of formulaic, technical pleading and a subsequent trial by
surprise to an entirely new phase of litigation called discovery in
search of factual transparency.144 The United States Supreme
Court heaped praise upon the “innovations” of the expanded
discovery procedures stating:
Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be
carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with
recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.
...
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure
simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be

142. Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten
History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 701 (2017).
143. Id. at 727-34. Professor Meyn identifies the forces that he contends influenced
the ultimate rejection of the civil reforms for federal criminal procedure as: (1) the strong
pro-prosecutor agenda represented by certain members of the committee and a lack of any
balancing concerted representation from the defense bar and (2) a historical resistance to
change and progressivism in favor of the accused. Id. at 727-32.
144. Id. at 705-06.
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compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility of surprise.145

The reforms were widely accepted and praised, and initially,
scholars noted their expectations that the same procedural rules
could apply in criminal cases.146
In fact, when the United States Supreme Court and Congress
turned their attention to promulgating a counterpart set of rules
for criminal procedure, the first draft of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure adopted the civil discovery rules almost
entirely.147 For instance, the first draft included “depositions,
document requests, physical and mental examinations, and
requests for admission.”148 Unfortunately, such proposals were
met with skepticism, seemingly born not out of reason, but rather,
out of the antiquated notion that because we have never done this
before, we should not do it now.149 Professor Meyn’s accounting
provides a familiar but disappointing line of argument among the
committee members: one member argued that depositions make
sense in a civil case because you want to find out what the other
side is going to say at trial, and another member replied, “that is
the trouble. I think you have the idea of civil practice injected
into the criminal procedure. To . . . go into the other side’s case
to examine anybody . . . before trial . . . is a thing you would never
think of in a criminal case.”150 This reasoning persists today and
is just as unsatisfying. The objection to depositions was merely
“that is not the way we do it.” If that same logic carried the day
when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were being considered,
then nothing would have ever changed. While we once did not
have depositions in civil cases, we eventually saw the wisdom in
the better practice of revealing all relevant information during
discovery.151
145. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947).
146. Meyn, supra note 142, at 709.
147. Id. at 706, 720.
148. Id. at 720.
149. See id. at 712-13.
150. Id. at 721.
151. Professor Meyn notes, “Over 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court
stated, ‘[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation.’ [Yet, c]riminal law has been spared of this wisdom.” Meyn, supra note
48, at 1140 (emphasis added) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
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As Professor Meyn accounts, the ultimate decision to leave
criminal procedure steeped in vestiges of the common law rather
than adopt the wisdom of the civil procedure reform is due largely
to one pro-prosecutor committee member’s “force of personality”
shoving the conversation in one direction152 and the lack of
representation from the defense bar during the discussions to
effectively push back.153 The committee members with criminal
litigation experience were almost exclusively prosecutors.154
With a strong prosecutorial-centered agenda represented at the
meetings without an equally concerted agenda on behalf of the
defense, the resulting rules skewed heavily in favor of the
prosecution.155 The resulting “reform” was merely to adopt the
civil reforms that eased the prosecution’s burden, such as relaxed
pleading standards, and reject the civil reforms meant to protect
the defendant and improve transparency and accuracy, such as
formalized discovery procedures.156
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected the
committee’s first request to distribute a draft to the public because
the committee failed to provide a clear rationale for the rules.157
The truth was, many members of the committee operated under
the belief that “criminal law was just different.”158 It was not until
later that the leading personality of the committee elaborated that
152. Meyn, supra note 142, at 736. Professor Meyn’s article is full of many examples
of untenable positions of the Committee’s Secretary, Alexander Holtzoff, an Assistant
Attorney General. Id. at 707-08. Meyn’s article repeatedly provides accounts of Holtzoff
doing his best to preserve prosecutorial discretion and power and voicing stern opposition to
any proposed rules that would slow the criminal justice system. Id. at 714-17, 719, 727, 73435. For example, one of the more egregious positions held by Holtzoff was his approval of
three-day dockets in rural courts where, essentially, indictments are on Mondays, pleas are
on Tuesdays, and trials are on Wednesdays. Id. at 716-17. Holtzoff incredulously argued
that it was to a defendant’s benefit to be indicted on a Monday and convicted on a Tuesday.
Id. at 717. Meyn notes, “even today, reading from a flat transcript, Holtzoff flies off the page
as relentless.” Id. at 727.
153. Id. at 728-29 (only two members of the committee noted any experience in
criminal defense).
154. Id. at 728.
155. Id. at 724.
156. Meyn, supra note 142, at 725-26, 734 (“Led by Holtzoff, the reform of criminal
procedure integrated civil rules that increased efficiency, like notice pleading and liberalized
joinder, but rejected countermeasures designed to ensure accuracy, like judicial intervention
and discovery tools.”).
157. Id. at 732-33.
158. Id. at 733.
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the rules were driven by his “tough on crime” philosophy159 rather
than a search for efficiency and truth, as was the rationale for civil
procedure reform.
Accordingly, when first up for consideration, the starting
point for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was to largely
mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially with
regard to a robust, formal phase of discovery.160 However,
resistance to change and ineloquent fears of “delay” carried the
moment and largely preserved the status quo for criminal
litigants, except where benefits for the prosecution could be
gained.161 It cannot be emphasized enough that the affirmative
decision to leave criminal trials in the dark was not born out of
reasoned policy, but rather, tough on crime sentiments and
intuitions that criminal trials are “just different.”
B. Origins of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
There are also lessons to be learned from the history of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mainly, we should
remind ourselves what standards guided our initial drafting of the
rules and what interests were most represented during the process.
In 1971, three workshops were engaged to study the
American Bar Association’s “Minimum Standards for the
Administration of Criminal Justice” and criminal procedure in
Arkansas.162 The procedural committee of the Arkansas Criminal
Code Revision Commission set out to draft a codified set of rules

159. Id. at 733-34 (quoting Alexander Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal
Procedure, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 121 (1944)) (Holtzoff believed formulating the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[i]n a larger sense . . . must necessarily crystallize a
philosophy of administration of criminal justice . . . . [I]t must be conducive to a simple,
effective, and expeditious prosecution of crimes. Perpetrators of crimes must be detected,
apprehended and punished. The conviction of the guilty must not be unduly delayed.
Criminals should not go unwhipped of justice because of technicalities having no connection
with the merits of the accusation. The protection of the law-abiding citizen from the ravages
of the criminal is one of the principal functions of government. Any form of criminal
procedure that unnecessarily hampers and unduly hinders the successful fulfillment of this
duty must be discarded or radically changed.”).
160. Id. at 698, 705, 720.
161. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
162. In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863, 863, 530 S.W.2d 672,
672 (1975).
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of criminal procedure for the state.163 The procedural committee
was guided by four goals:
“(1) substitution of simple
comprehensible language for archaic, verbose phraseology; (2)
elimination of procedural practices which are redundant, needless
or inconsistent; (3) realignment of procedural rules with
constitutional requirements; and (4) development of a fairer, more
efficient criminal justice process.”164 While worded differently,
these original cornerstones are also reflected in the text of the
rules.165
In 1971, as this work was first being undertaken, we turned
to the American Bar Association’s Standards as our guiding
light.166 In 1970, the ABA Standards did not recommend
discovery depositions concluding that, on balance, the costs of
depositions outweighed what were thought to be marginal
benefits.167 However, the ABA’s position has evolved, and today,
the ABA’s “Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery” currently
calls for allowing both parties to conduct discovery depositions
upon leave of court “to prevent unjust surprise at trial.”168 The
ABA currently recommends that depositions be allowed upon a
showing that the current information or materials disclosed do not
adequately apprise the party of the witness’s knowledge to
prevent surprise at trial and the witness has refused to cooperate
in giving a voluntary statement to the moving party.169 Although,
as argued in Part VI infra, discovery standards should go even
further,170 the ABA Standards at least recognize some use of
discovery depositions in criminal cases. Nothing has changed in
Arkansas’s personal experience as a state since 1971 that says we
163. Id. at 863, 530 S.W.2d at 673.
164. Petition for Promulgation of Rules of Criminal Procedure at 1, In re Ark. Crim.
Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863, 530 S.W.2d 672 (No. 74-345).
165. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 1.3 (“These rules are intended to provide for a just, speedy
determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, the elimination of unnecessary delay and expense, and
to protect the fundamental rights of the individual while preserving the public interest.”).
166. In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. at 863, 530 S.W.2d at 672.
167. John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions in Florida Criminal Proceedings: Should
They Survive?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 675, 678-79 (1988).
168. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: DISCOVERY, STANDARD 11-5.2 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020).
169. Id. at 11-5.2(a)(ii)-(iii).
170. See infra Part VI.
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should no longer pay any heed to the suggestions of the ABA.
The ABA’s Standards served us in 1971, and they can still serve
us today.
Moreover, similar to the circumstances of the drafting of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it appears that prosecutorial
interests were more zealously represented than the interests of the
defense bar in crafting the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure,
at least as public comment was involved. While the Arkansas
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association (“APAA”) filed various
petitions and briefs offering suggestions to the rules, there were
no corresponding petitions from any organizations representing
the Arkansas defense bar.171 Most notable is the now flipped
position once held by Arkansas prosecutors. In 1975, the United
States Supreme Court decided United States v. Nobles, which
gave a somewhat unremarkable holding that a federal trial court
did not abuse its discretion by requiring the defense to provide the
prosecution with limited portions of a private investigator’s report
for specific impeachment material regarding the investigator’s
conversations with key prosecution witnesses.172 However, the
APAA took that case-specific holding and argued it led to a
broader proposition: “It is clear as a matter of federal
constitutional law, defendants can constitutionally be compelled
to disclose their defenses, their witnesses and expected
testimony.”173 In 1975, the Arkansas prosecution bar was arguing
that the defense should have to disclose the expected testimony of
their witnesses. However, any cursory review of contemporary
discovery litigation will reveal the prosecution’s current
vehement objections to revealing the expected testimony of its
witnesses.174 Of course, the APAA’s lobbying for defense
witness statements was unnecessary because prosecutors have

171. See Case Docket, In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863, 530
S.W.2d 672 (No. 74-345).
172. Supplemental Brief at 1, In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863,
530 S.W.2d 672 (No. 74-345).
173. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
174. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 322 Ark. 586, 588, 910 S.W.2d 694, 696 (1995)
(agreeing with the State that the State is under no obligation to provide non-expert witness
statements before trial).
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long enjoyed the ability to essentially depose defense
witnesses.175
Looking at the formulation of our discovery rules in
Arkansas tells us a couple of things. It reminds us of the goals of
fairness and protection of the individual we ought to seek in our
ongoing refinement of the rules. It reminds us that we once
looked to the ABA Standards for guidance, and we would be well
served to keep those same standards in mind today. It reminds us
that there was not an equal organized effort to shape the rules by
the defense bar as there was by the prosecution, so we should be
mindful of what agendas may have tilted the scales at inception.
Lastly, it reminds us that there has long been a shared interest by
both sides of criminal litigation for valid reasons to discover the
anticipated testimony of witnesses. Neither the prosecution nor
the defense stands to benefit from surprise at trial, but currently,
our rules only seek to protect the prosecution.
IV. PRACTICES AND LESSONS IN OTHER STATES
Because criminal discovery is largely left to the states,176 it
is helpful to see what other jurisdictions are doing in their
experiments and what practices might be adopted here in
Arkansas.
A. States that Allow Passive Discovery of Witness
Statements and Police Reports
A nationwide survey of criminal discovery rules found that
currently thirty-four states allow for discovery of witness
statements and eighteen states allow for discovery of police
reports.177 However, the list is actually broader than the blackletter rules would indicate. For instance, Iowa and Nebraska do
not provide for discovery of witness statements or police reports,
and Missouri, Vermont, Indiana, North Dakota, Montana, and
Washington all do not provide for discovery of police reports.178
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra Section II.D.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at app. B at 400-08.
Id. at app. B at 401-08.
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However, as discussed further below, these eight states all allow
for defense discovery depositions, which would presumptively
allow for discovery of the same information.179 Similarly, Iowa
also requires that when the prosecutor proceeds by information,
the defense be given “a full and fair statement of [a witness’s]
expected testimony.”180 Conversely, while Louisiana allows for
discovery of witness statements, it only compels disclosure
“immediately prior to the opening statement at trial,”181 which is
only marginally better than the Arkansas mid-trial statute,182 and
therefore, easily discounted. By including the deposition states
and excluding Louisiana because of the insufficient timing, it can
be said that thirty-five states effectively allow for discovery of
witness statements and twenty-six states effectively allow for
discovery of police reports.183 Accordingly, a super-majority of
the states require discovery of witness statements, and slightly
more than a simple majority require discovery of police reports.
Arkansas’s restrictive criminal discovery scheme is in the
minority on both counts.
B. States that Allow Affirmative Defense Discovery
Depositions
In total, thirteen states currently allow for discovery
depositions in criminal cases.184 Seven states allow for
depositions as a matter of right and six states require court
approval.185 Vermont, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Iowa, North
Dakota, and New Mexico all allow defense attorneys to conduct
discovery depositions as a matter of right without prior court
179. See infra Section IV.B.
180. Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at app. B at 402 n.412 (quoting IOWA R. CRIM.
P. 2.5(3)).
181. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 716(D)(2) (2014) (stating that the “[S]tate
need not provide the defendant any written or recorded statement of its witnesses until
immediately prior to the opening statement at trial”).
182. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
183. In 1990, Justice William Brennan reported that only fourteen states permitted
discovery of witness statements as of right, and another eight states permitted such discovery
upon leave of court. Brennan, supra note 1, at 10-11. This illustrates the reality that across
America there has been a trend to increase criminal discovery.
184. See infra notes 186-89.
185. See infra notes 186-87.
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approval.186
New Hampshire, Texas, Arizona, Nebraska,
Montana, and Washington all allow for discovery depositions
upon leave of the court for good cause.187 These jurisdictions
generally allow for depositions when a defendant can show a
deposition is necessary to avoid surprise testimony188 or because
the witness refuses to voluntarily speak with defense counsel.189
While Indiana has the broadest rule, stating in its entirety,
“[t]he [S]tate and the defendant may take and use depositions of
witnesses in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial
Procedure,”190 the other jurisdictions contain various restrictions
on the use of depositions, even when available as of right. For
example, Vermont and Florida both limit the use of depositions
as of right to felony prosecutions and require the defendant to
show “good cause” for a deposition in a misdemeanor
prosecution.191 Florida even provides for further categorization,
186. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3
(1981); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12(a); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.13(1); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); N.M.
R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-503(B). Technically, the New Mexico rule only allows for
depositions if the parties agree or upon court order “to prevent injustice,” and the
commentary to the rule indicates the right is therefore “limited to the situation where the
person will be unable or unwilling to attend the trial or a hearing.” N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST.
CT. 5-503(B)(2), commentary. However, a separate portion of the same rule allows for
defendants to subpoena witnesses to give “[s]tatements.” N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5503(A). One scholar has noted that the rule effectively allows for a less formal version of a
deposition: “In New Mexico, parties may issue a pretrial subpoena and take a recorded
statement—an affordable ‘dirty deposition’ subject to wide use, more cost-effective than a
traditional deposition, and a tool that demonstrates how innovations to formal investigatory
tools might respond to concerns particular to the criminal justice system.” Meyn, supra note
48, at 1110. New Mexico also gives defendants the same ability to subpoena witnesses for
interviews for low-level offenses in front of metropolitan or magistrate courts. N.M. R.
CRIM. P. METRO. CT. 7-504(C)(1); N.M. R. CRIM. P. MAGIS. CT. 6-504(D). For these
reasons, I include New Mexico among the jurisdictions that allows for discovery depositions
as a matter of right.
187. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(II)(b) (2004); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
39.02 (West 2005); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1917(1) (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-15-201(1)(c) (1993); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.6(a).
188. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(II)(b) (allowing depositions “[t]o
ensure a fair trial, avoid surprise or for other good cause shown”).
189. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(2) (allowing a deposition where a witness’s
testimony is material or necessary for preparation of the defense, the witness was not
previously examined at a preliminary hearing, and the witness “will not cooperate in granting
a personal interview”); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.6(a)(2) (allowing depositions where
“a witness refuses to discuss the case with either counsel and the witness’s testimony is
material and necessary”).
190. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3.
191. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(4); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(D).
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allowing for unilateral depositions of certain types of witnesses,
such as eyewitnesses, investigating officers, or expert witnesses,
but requires leave of court to depose other, less substantial
witnesses.192 However, Vermont and Florida both prohibit
deposing law enforcement officers who engage in only minor
“ministerial” roles or whom the prosecution does not intend to
call at trial.193
Also, in an effort to curb witness intimidation, Vermont,
Florida, Missouri, and Arizona all place restrictions on the
physical presence of the defendant at the deposition.194
Conversely, North Dakota allows defendants to be present except
when they are in custody, where they must obtain leave of
court.195 Relatedly, while many of the states have broad catch-all
language regarding protective orders to prevent embarrassment or
harassment,196 Vermont, Florida, and New Hampshire all have
explicit provisions concerning the depositions of children or other
sensitive witnesses. Vermont creates a presumption that children

192. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(A) (allowing for unilateral deposition of “Category
A” witnesses); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(B) (requiring leave of court to depose “Category
B” witnesses). Category A witnesses include:
(1) eye witnesses, (2) alibi witnesses and rebuttal to alibi witnesses, (3)
witnesses who were present when a recorded or unrecorded statement was
taken from or made by a defendant or codefendant, which shall be separately
identified within this category, (4) investigating officers, (5) witnesses known
by the prosecutor to have any material information that tends to negate the
guilt of the defendant as to any offense charged, (6) child hearsay witnesses,
(7) expert witnesses who have not provided a written report and a curriculum
vitae or who are going to testify, and (8) informant witnesses, whether in
custody, who offer testimony concerning the statements of a defendant about
the issues for which the defendant is being tried.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(i).
193. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(3)(A); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(iii) (defining
Category C witnesses as those “who performed only ministerial functions or whom the
prosecutor does not intend to call at trial and whose involvement with and knowledge of the
case is fully set out in a police report or other statement furnished to the defense”); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.220 (h)(1)(C) (prohibiting depositions of Category C witnesses).
194. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(7); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12(c);
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(2), (e) (excluding the defendant’s right to be present at a discovery
deposition of a witness that would not previously cooperate in granting a personal interview).
195. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(f)(1).
196. See, e.g., N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(4) (providing for the court to address concerns
of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or burden to the deponent by disallowing the
deposition or otherwise limiting the scope and manner of the deposition).
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sex-crime victims should not be deposed197 and the depositions of
children and other sensitive witnesses should generally be
reached through careful agreement of the parties or intervention
by the court.198 Florida’s rule offers the simple solution of having
the depositions of children and sensitive witnesses be video
recorded or conducted in front of the trial judge or a special
magistrate,199 presumptively to reduce the odds that a defendant
or his counsel would seek to intimidate the witness. However,
New Hampshire provides the simplest scheme, prohibiting
deposing any person under the age of sixteen.200 Relatedly,
though not limited to children, North Dakota and Arizona give all
alleged victims the right to refuse to submit to a deposition by the
defendant.201
There is plenty of variation among how these states have
chosen to execute criminal discovery depositions, but one
conclusion is clear: these states have all decided that the interest
in increasing fairness and factual transparency in criminal
litigation outweighs the concerns of delay or bad faith on behalf
of defendants.202 Furthermore, the varied schemes adopted by the
states shows us that there are numerous ways to address any
concerns of abuse of the deposition process rather than simply
prohibiting the practice entirely. Most importantly, these states
show us that the fears of doomsday opponents of criminal
depositions are not realistic. These states have all allowed
defense discovery depositions and they have not yet fallen into a
void of chaos and misery. They continue to operate and thrive in
spite of providing criminal defendants a fairer process.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS
For over sixty years, scholars and jurists—no less than
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan—have called for the use
197. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(5).
198. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(f)(2).
199. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(4).
200. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(V) (2003).
201. N.D. R. CRIM. P.15(a)(5); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(b)(12).
202. See H. Morley Swingle, Depositions in Criminal Cases in Missouri, 60 J. MO.
BAR 128, 134 (2004) (noting that despite the financial burdens of depositions, neither Florida
nor Missouri have yet to discard criminal depositions).
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of depositions in criminal cases.203 The use of depositions in
criminal cases would have tremendous benefits. Discovery
depositions would aid the search for truth by bringing relevant
facts to light and they would do so in a more expedient manner.
Depositions would enhance the fairness of our adversarial system
by treating the defense and the prosecution as truly equal
opponents, thereby improving defense counsel’s ability to
provide effective representation and enhancing our faith in the
legitimacy of case outcomes. Lastly, depositions would give
defense counsel an affirmative role to play in pre-trial discovery
rather than his current role as a passive participant receiving
curated disclosures from the prosecution’s investigation.
While opponents to depositions have historically raised
concerns of perjury or witness intimidation as reasons to forego
the practice,204 those concerns are not borne out by any empirical
foundation. More importantly, rather than allowing generalized
fears to control the approach, such concerns of abuse of the
process can and should be readily addressed by the trial court on
a case-by-case basis.
A. Depositions Aid the Search for the Truth
It is a fundamental tenet of the law that the truest, most just
outcomes are best achieved by encouraging rather than restraining
relevant evidence.205 “The admission of every light which reason
and experience can supply for the discovery of truth, and the
rejection of that only which serves not to guide but to bewilder
203. See generally Brennan, supra note 1 (calling for the extension of civil pre-trial
discovery to criminal cases); Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192-93 (1960).
204. See generally discussion infra Sections V.C.-D.
205. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988) (citing United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)) (“We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal
justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in
the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.”).
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and mislead, is the great principle that ought to be the foundation
of every system of evidence.”206 A criminal trial “is a quest for
truth.”207
The Arkansas Supreme Court has already recognized that
essential to the quest for truth is the need for defense counsel to
have access to witnesses with relevant information:
A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for
truth. That quest will more often be successful if both sides
have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who have
the information from which the truth may be determined.
The current tendency in the criminal law is in the direction
of discovery of the facts before trial and elimination of
surprise at trial . . . . In a criminal case, the district attorney
should not hesitate to show his entire file to the defendant.
It is not the primary duty of the district attorney to convict a
defendant. It is his primary duty to see that the defendant
has a fair trial, that justice be done.208

The court’s language originates from the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Gregory v. United States, where the court held that it
was unlawful for the prosecution to instruct witnesses not to speak
with anyone, which obstructed defense counsel.209 The court
noted, “[w]itnesses, particularly eye witnesses, to a crime are the
property of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides
have an equal right, and should have an equal opportunity, to
interview them.”210 Without free access to the witnesses, the
defense could not evaluate what the witnesses would testify to or
206. Heard v. Farmers’ Bank of Hardy, 174 Ark. 194, 206, 295 S.W. 38, 43 (1927)
(“But to exclude relevant evidence by any positive and arbitrary rule must be not only absurd
in a scientific view, but, what is worse, frequently productive of absolute injustice. It may
safely be laid down that the less the process of inquiry is fettered by rules and restraints,
founded on supposed considerations of policy and convenience, the more certain and
efficacious will it be in its operation. Formerly the very means devised for the discovery of
truth and advancement of justice were not unfrequently perverted to the purposes of injustice,
and made the instruments of the most grievous and cruel oppression.”).
207. Birchett v. State, 289 Ark. 16, 20, 708 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1986) (quoting State v.
Manus, 597 P.2d 280, 288 (N.M. 1979)); David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth
Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 469, 494-95 (1992) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (2d ed. 1982)).
208. Birchett, 289 Ark. at 20, 708 S.W.2d at 627 (internal citations omitted).
209. Id.; Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
210. Gregory, 369 F.2d at 188.
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“how firm they were in their testimony.”211 Limiting a
defendant’s access to witnesses is inherently prejudicial because,
as the United States Supreme Court and “[c]ommon sense” tell
us, interviewing potential witnesses is a routine part of criminal
defense.212
Depositions would allow defense counsel to fill in the gaps
of the prosecutor’s file by deposing police officers and witnesses.
Officers and witnesses are human. They are not perfect archivists
and we can blamelessly expect them to omit relevant information
from time to time. An investigating officer could be deposed to
fill in the gaps for what he may have left out of his report, such as
steps in the investigation he did not think were of significance.
Also, to the extent any witness statement is voluntarily provided
in discovery to the defense, a witness can only answer the
questions asked of her. A deposition would allow the defense
attorney to ask follow-up questions to gain a more complete
understanding of the case. Also, oftentimes, police reports
contain merely the officer’s secondhand account of what the
witness told him. Depositions would allow for defense counsel
to test the accuracy of the reporting officer’s information. More
importantly, if the prosecutor fails to disclose any witness
statements, resting on the protections of Rule 17.1,213 then
depositions would allow the defense counsel to learn anything
about the case he is defending aside from the limited facts in the
information.
Additionally, depositions could facilitate the pleabargaining process by more speedily revealing the strengths and
weaknesses of the case.214 Broad pre-plea discovery in general
can reduce disputes among the parties and speed up the
negotiating process.215 Another advantage to be gained is that
211. Id. at 189.
212. Montoya, supra note 51, at 851 (“Common sense would suggest, and trial
advocacy experts agree, that the pretrial interrogation of a potential witness is an essential
prerequisite to calling the witness at trial.”); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415-16 (1988)
(“Routine preparation involves location and interrogation of potential witnesses . . . .”).
213. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.
214. Prosser, supra note 32, at 612-13; see also Meyn, supra note 48, at 1091-92
(noting how civil discovery works to empower both litigants to equally assess liability during
the pre-trial phase).
215. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 290-91.
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providing defense counsel with the ability to depose witnesses
would actually reduce the prosecutor’s burden.216 Arkansas case
law routinely cites the standards that a defendant cannot rely on
the State’s file as a substitution for his own investigation217 and
that under an open-file scheme, the defense attorney bears the
burden of checking the file for new material.218 Allowing the
defense to conduct depositions fits squarely within those
standards. Depositions would allow defense counsel to build his
own file rather than rely on the State’s. Instead of the defendant
crafting specific discovery requests asking about what a witness
did or did not say, the defendant could simply go ask the witness
himself. Allowing defense depositions would reduce the
defendant’s reliance on the prosecutor for information.
Ultimately, the civil practice has long recognized the utility
in deposing adverse witnesses.219 Prosecutors also enjoy that
benefit.220 Currently, the criminal defendant is the only litigant
in Arkansas who does not have the power to conduct discovery
depositions. He is the only litigant who is subjected against his
will to a “quest for truth” but his search must be done blindfolded.
B. Depositions Increase Trust in the Criminal Process
Additionally, investigating and interviewing witnesses falls
squarely under the umbrella of defense counsel’s obligation to
provide “effective” assistance of counsel.221 The Eighth Circuit
216. One criticism of open-file discovery is that it places an administrative burden on
prosecutors and law enforcement to compile the information. Id. at 311.
217. See, e.g., Thomerson v. State, 274 Ark. 17, 20, 621 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1981) (“A
defendant in a criminal case cannot rely upon discovery as a total substitute for his own
investigation.”).
218. See, e.g., Findley v. State, 64 Ark. App. 291, 297, 984 S.W.2d 454, 457 (1998)
(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no discovery violation occurred
when defense counsel and the prosecutor disagreed as to whether and when certain exhibits
offered at trial were contained in the State’s open file because there was no assurance that
the defense attorney had checked the State’s file sixty days before trial).
219. See generally supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Section II.D.
221. Montoya, supra note 51, at 862; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686
(1984). For a discussion of why broad pre-trial discovery should be encouraged and analyzed
under the doctrine of effective assistance of counsel, see generally Jenny Roberts, Too Little,
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2004).
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has squarely rejected the notion that the decision of whether or
not to interview a witness is a matter of trial strategy, instead
stating squarely, “Counsel has ‘a duty . . . to investigate all
witnesses who allegedly possessed knowledge concerning [the
defendant’s] guilt or innocence.’”222 Moreover, the entire
rationale behind requiring “effective” assistance of defense
counsel and adequate pre-trial investigation is to ensure the
legitimacy of the outcome of the case.223 Currently, the defense
bar is confounded by a legal paradox. Defense counsel has a legal
and ethical duty to vigorously investigate his client’s case, but he
has no tools to fulfill this duty.224 A defendant has the right to
subpoena a witness to attend at trial, but he does not have the right
to first subpoena and examine that witness before the trial to
ascertain his testimony.225
Cross-examination is often lauded as a “crucible”226 and
ultimately the greatest truth-seeking device known to our justice
system,227 but such claims are mere rhetoric when viewed in light
of the fact that members of the Arkansas defense bar are being
asked to conduct cross-examinations with one arm tied behind
their backs. Cross-examination is only useful to the extent that
the examining party has access to relevant information with
sufficient time to prepare to properly utilize it.228
222. Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added)
(quoting Lawrence v. Armontrout, 900 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1990)).
223. Roberts, supra note 221, at 1104-05 (“[T]he right to effective assistance advances
the same goal as that of the criminal justice system more generally: fairness within the
adversary process, with the ultimate objective that the guilty are convicted and the innocent
are acquitted.”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”).
224. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 591 (“It would be anomalous to impose a duty to
investigate, on one hand, and on the other to make a real investigation impossible to
conduct.”).
225. See Montoya, supra note 51, at 866-67.
226. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
227. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (“[U]nder our adversary system of
justice, cross-examination has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain
truth.”); id. at 349 n.4 (“As Professor Wigmore put it, ‘[cross-examination] is beyond any
doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”) (quoting 5 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (rev. 1974)).
228. Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in
Criminal Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L.
REV. 465, 472 (1998); Prosser, supra note 32, at 579 (“[R]ules that do not allow discovery

2 ALTMAN.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/13/22 10:14 AM

2022 CAN’T WE JUST TALK ABOUT THIS FIRST

47

Cross-examination is designed to cement, not uncover, a
narrative. Trial does not provide the optimum forum to
refresh a witness’ recollection, a process that can result in
long periods of silence as a witness reviews documents.
Trial is in part a public spectacle, roles have already been
assigned, the script finalized. If a defendant has not
adequately investigated the incident by the eve of trial, it is
too late for defendant. He will lose.229

As far as crucibles go, a system of cross-examination where the
examiner only has a short time to prepare immediately after the
witness testifies on direct examination and where the examiner
has no power to submit the witness to an interview of any sort
prior to trial to glean any information about the boundaries of her
testimony seems like a pretty comfortable “crucible.”
Furthermore, it should not be a controversial claim to point
out that limited discovery encourages wrongful convictions and
unfair punishments.230 More specifically, because we currently
operate in a system of plea bargaining,231 we have to acknowledge
that the defense bar’s ability to provide effective representation
and advice during the negotiation process is directly restricted by
limited discovery.232 The criminal defense bar currently assumes
the daunting task of negotiating with the State under a system of
“information asymmetry”—meaning the defense is forced to
of the prior statements of government witnesses until after the direct examination of those
witnesses curtail the ability of counsel to conduct an investigation based on the contents of
the statements, and to effectively impeach the witnesses with inconsistencies.”); see also J.
Thomas Sullivan, Brady-Based Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims, Buckley, and the
Arkansas Coram Nobis Remedy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 561, 562-563 (2011) (“Often missed in
the Brady analysis is the impact that suppression of favorable evidence can have on trial
counsel’s ability to effectively represent the defendant at trial, yet Brady claims are not
analyzed in terms of the Sixth Amendment effective-assistance guarantee. Defense counsel
can hardly develop appropriate strategic or tactical options without having access to
favorable evidence.”).
229. Meyn, supra note 48, at 1134.
230. Prosser, supra note 32, at 549-50.
231. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“[Plea bargaining] is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”) (quoting Scott &
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)); Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156, 157 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials.”).
232. Prosser, supra note 32, at 558-61; Baer, supra note 132, at 25 (“[C]riminal
discovery’s information asymmetry severely undermines the integrity and reliability of the
plea-bargaining process.”).
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negotiate based on what facts the prosecutor chooses to reveal and
what he chooses to conceal.233 Most importantly, asymmetrical
plea-bargaining encourages factually innocent defendants to
accept plea offers.234 Innocent defendants, being generally more
risk averse than guilty defendants, are much more susceptible to
the pressures of the plea bargaining process where they are faced
with the impossible choice between pleading guilty to a crime
they did not commit or risking the steeper penalties if found guilty
at a trial.235
One of the justifications given for limiting the scope of
Brady litigation and overall criminal discovery is a focus on the
adversarial nature between the prosecution and the defense.236
However, this reasoning is self-defeating. After all, if we want
the criminal justice system to be “adversarial” and we want crossexaminations to be “crucibles” designed to elicit the truth, should
we not enhance the armaments of each side?237 This is the
reasoning in civil discovery. Civil procedure allows for broad
discovery through a multitude of different mechanisms, including
subpoenas, depositions, interrogatories, and requests for
production.238 The reason for enhancing and broadening civil
discovery was the recognition that proper litigation is best served
by full revelation of all relevant facts and not by surprise and
ambush at trial.239 Again, if we want the criminal justice system
to be adversarial and we believe that such adversariality is our
best means of ensuring that the truth is ferreted out, the guilty are
convicted, and the innocent go free, then why are we asking
members of the defense bar to rise to the fight with one arm tied
233. See Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 39, 40-41 (2014); Meyn, supra note 48, at 1091-92 (“A criminal defendant, having no
discretion to compel pretrial discovery and permitted but a keyhole view of the State’s
evidence, is the only litigant relegated to darkness.”).
234. Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, 289-90.
235. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2495 (2004).
236. Prosser, supra note 32, at 564; Montoya, supra note 51, at 876.
237. See Montoya, supra note 51, at 874-78 (arguing empowering defense factgathering powers under the Compulsory Process Clause will enhance the adversarial nature
of criminal litigation).
238. ARK. R. CIV. P. 26-36.
239. Prosser, supra note 32, at 581 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507
(1947)).
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behind their backs?240 Allowing defense depositions would
increase the amount of relevant information available to both
sides before trial, therefore enhancing the fairness and
functionality of our adversarial trial system.241 If we can trust that
a defense attorney had all the necessary tools at his disposal, his
client’s guilt can more confidently be viewed as the result of the
truth rather than the result of the weight of the system.
C. Fears of Perjury
One of the historic arguments against allowing depositions
as well as broadening criminal discovery in general is that it will
lead to perjury.242 The argument goes that if the defendant is
aware of the nature of the prosecution’s case, he will fabricate
evidence to conjure a defense.243 However, this argument is
essentially outdated fearmongering, as the exact same concerns
of perjury were raised and ultimately proven unfounded when
civil discovery was reformed and broadened in the early twentieth
century.244 Moreover, this argument erroneously assumes that all
criminal defendants are corrupt bad guys245 and all prosecutors
and police are honest good guys.246 It is flawed to assume that
depositions will lead defendants to commit perjury while ignoring

240. See Meyn, supra note 48, at 1095 (“These asymmetrical privileges to information
create a dynamic unique to criminal law. The prosecutor assesses the particular facts that
executive agents forward to her, releases facts she determines a defendant should view, and
adjudicates the dispute through a plea offer that is supported by facts she selects. Though a
criminal defendant has no structurally assigned role in the investigation, he is subjected to
an adversarial process. If the integrity of the adversarial system depends on testing the
pretrial conclusion made by the executive in its investigation, the failure to create the
conditions for a counter-investigation undermines that integrity.”).
241. See Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 69-70 (2017) (arguing broad discovery in general improves the
adversary system).
242. Brennan, supra note 1, at 289; Roberts, supra note 221, at 1151.
243. Brennan, supra note 1, at 289.
244. See Roberts, supra note 221, at 1151; Brennan, supra note 1, at 291.
245. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 583 (“While those who object to broad discovery
rarely openly acknowledge that they presume that the accused are guilty, the reasons that
have been advanced for denying, delaying, or limiting discovery clearly reflect that
presumption.”); see also Brennan, supra note 1, at 287 (arguing limiting pre-trial discovery
disregards and jeopardizes the presumption of innocence).
246. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 583-84.

2 ALTMAN.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

50

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

4/13/22 10:14 AM

Vol. 75:1

a recorded history of police and prosecutors committing or
suborning perjury.247
More importantly, this argument does a disservice to
members of our defense bar who are bound by the same rules of
ethics as any other lawyer.248 It is a baseless and insulting
conclusion that implies these members are inherently dishonest
and untrustworthy. If the fear that defense attorneys would allow
their clients to fabricate evidence and present perjury holds any
weight, then it must also be said that the defense bar in its entirety
must immediately be disbarred. If defense attorneys present such
a dangerous risk to the inherent fairness of our justice system,
they have no right to continue practicing law lest they wreak more
havoc and fraud on the courts.

247. Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling
of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 221 (2000) (“Police
perjury has become very common in brutality cases, primarily because of the pressures an
officer receives from his colleagues. Police perjury is a widely known problem in the legal
system, but it is almost impossible to define the scope and depth to which it occurs.”); Gabriel
J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie:
A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 234 (1998) (“[I]n New York,
‘the practice of police falsification . . . is so common in certain precincts that it has spawned
its own word: “testilying.”’”) (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE
POLICE DEPARTMENT 36 (1994)); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way:
The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 358 (1994) (“In criminal
cases, the proclivity of prosecutors to tolerate police perjury is widely acknowledged.”);
Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 348 (2005) (“The anecdotal evidence suggests that prosecutors
often ignore manifestations of police corruption.”); Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue:
Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44
PEPP. L. REV. 245, 272-77 (2017) (providing several anecdotal examples of reported police
perjury). Recently, here in Arkansas, the Little Rock Police Department has been caught
filing false affidavits to obtain search warrants. Hannah Grabenstein, Lawsuit: Little Rock
Police Lied to Conduct Drug Raids, AP NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4AASHJUW]. One affidavit stated that three officers saw an informant walk up to the door of an
apartment and make a controlled purchase of cocaine. Id. However, the resident’s security
footage showed that he was not even home at the time, and nobody ever opened the door for
the informant. Id. Nevertheless, the Little Rock Police filed the affidavit (committing
perjury) and violently executed the search warrant using explosives to gain entry into the
apartment. Id.
248. Brennan, supra note 1, at 291-92.
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D. Fears of Witness Intimidation
Another common argument against criminal depositions is
the concern that they may be used to intimidate or harass victims
and witnesses, especially the vulnerable ones, such as children.249
However, this overgeneralized fear is likely the result of circular
logic or a “feedback loop” rather than actual experiences of such
abuse.250 In a traditionally restrictive jurisdiction, denying a
criminal defendant discovery tools reinforces a perception of the
defendant as dangerous, lawless, and untrustworthy.251 A survey
of Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors provides an excellent
example of this process. In Virginia, a restrictive closed-file
discovery state, roughly forty-seven percent of prosecutors were
concerned that open-file discovery encourages witness
intimidation or manipulation.252 Conversely, in North Carolina,
a state with broader open-file discovery, only ten percent of
prosecutors shared this concern.253 This is the feedback loop. The
rules of the system inform our expectations of what a “just”
system should look like and thereby undermines the legitimacy of
alternatives.254
Yet, notably, fears of witness intimidation and manipulation
are not unique to the criminal case. If a rape victim also sues her
rapist, she can be deposed in the civil suit, and the experience is
surely just as nerve-wracking. There is nothing per se in the law
that says certain subject matters excuse a witness from a
deposition. There is no legal alchemy that makes a witness
immune to pressures from the deposition process simply because
the case title on the transcript designates the matter as civil rather
than criminal. After all, in our example, the defendant is an
249. Id. at 289; Ortman, supra note 51, at 501-02.
250. See Meyn, supra note 48, at 1822-23 (describing how criminal discovery rules
create feedback loops of expectations based on what the rules say is permissible).
251. Id.
252. Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 297, 359.
253. Id. at 359.
254. See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a CoConstitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1413-14 (2000) (“[T]he power exerted
by a legal regime consists less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its
rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live.”) (quoting
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984)).
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alleged rapist either way. There is no logical explanation as to
how our hypothetical rapist presents such a generalized fear of
intimidation in the criminal case to bar depositions, yet he retains
the right to depose the victim in the civil suit. Case stylings do
not impact human emotion.
E. Fears of High Costs
Perhaps the most salient objection to criminal discovery
depositions is the concern that they will simply present too great
of a financial and administrative burden.255 After all, subpoenas
will have to be served, witnesses will need to be compensated for
their time, police officers will have to take time away from regular
duties, stenographers will need to be paid, and transcripts will
need to be prepared. However, there are two problems with this
concern.
First, we cannot be so prideful to think that Arkansas is the
only state with an interest in balancing the budget. The thirteen
aforementioned states have all made the policy decision that the
benefits of discovery depositions justify the accompanying
costs.256 For example, on two occasions, the Florida deposition
practice came under heavy attack for its costs, but both times the
system prevailed with the recognition that the depositions provide
too great of a contribution to the fairness and efficacy of the
criminal justice system as a whole.257
Relatedly, “[t]hat something isn’t free tells us virtually
nothing about whether it is worthwhile.”258 The issue here is
whether depositions will increase the accuracy and fairness of our
criminal system. If better justice is the benefit of the bargain, then
the incident costs are wholly justified.259 Over sixty years ago,
the United States Supreme Court recognized, “[t]here can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the

255. Ortman, supra note 51, at 496-97.
256. See discussion supra Section IV.B.; see, e.g., Swingle, supra note 202, at 134
(noting that despite the financial burdens, neither Florida nor Missouri have yet to discard
criminal depositions).
257. Ortman, supra note 51, at 497-98.
258. Id. at 496.
259. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 613.
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amount of money he has.”260 There is certainly room
pragmatism, and it is incontrovertible that resources are
infinite. However, we cannot let money entirely dictate
justice we merit out. Otherwise, we have to ask if we
comfortable assigning a dollar value to a person’s liberty.

for
not
the
are

F. Any Fears Should Govern Exceptions, Not the Rule
Fears of perjury, witness intimidation, or other misconduct
should guide how we handle exceptions and not the rule. Rather
than closing off the discovery of the truth to the innocent
defendant and honest defense counsel because of perceived fears
of the guilty and the unethical, we should reframe the procedure.
Rather than have the defendant plead why he should be allowed
to investigate his case, we should open the doors to discovery and
put the burden on the prosecution to articulate specific concerns
as to why the doors should be closed or left only ajar.261 As
discussed above, other states have already found numerous
mechanisms, ranging from detailed to broad, to handle casespecific restrictions on depositions to curb case-specific concerns
of abuse.262 This is the pattern in civil procedure where we allow
discovery but reserve the court’s authority to issue protective
orders to maintain the integrity of the process.263 There is no
reason such a system cannot be expected to work just as well in
criminal cases. “The possibility that a dishonest accused will
misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing the
injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing
himself.”264
VI. PROPOSALS FOR NEW LEGISLATION/RULES
Based on the foregoing arguments in favor of allowing
defense discovery depositions in criminal cases and the lack of
260. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
261. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 595-96 (arguing the State should carry the burden
of showing the need for a protective order to limit discovery).
262. See supra Section IV.B.
263. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
264. Brennan, supra note 1, at 291 (quoting 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940)).
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any empirical-based policy rationale to keep Arkansas in the
minority of jurisdictions favoring criminal trials by surprise, I
recommend that the Arkansas Supreme Court amend the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide for defense
discovery depositions.265 The burden of drafting a properly
worded amendment to the rules is best left to the Arkansas
Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice. Therefore, I
will simply provide a list of goals I believe any proposed rule
should aim to achieve.
First, depositions should be permitted to be conducted as a
matter of right rather than by leave of court. Any concerns of
abuse of the process and delay caused by unnecessary depositions
ignores the fact that defense attorneys have their own schedules
to keep. The defense bar is no more interested in wasting time
than the State is. This is particularly true of our overburdened
public defenders who do not have the luxury of time to waste on
needless inquisitions. Because a defense attorney should only be
expected to resort to a deposition when it is truly needed,
requiring prior court approval would only serve to delay the
proceedings.
Second, defendants not in custody should be permitted to be
present at the deposition absent a showing of good cause by the
State as to why the defendant’s presence would be prejudicial to
the State or the witness. Our criminal justice system operates on
a right to confront one’s accusers.266 It admittedly takes courage
to stand in front of one’s abuser, but it also takes courage to lie
while staring a man in the eye.267 A witness will have to give his
testimony in front of the defendant at trial anyway, so absent
particularized concerns raised by the State, the defendant’s
presence at the deposition should be permitted. Relatedly,
defendants in custody should be permitted to appear via video or
telephone. Just because an individual cannot afford bail does not
mean that should be held against him for depositions.

265. The same reforms could also be achieved through the Arkansas Legislature.
266. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 5.
267. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (“It is always more difficult to tell a lie
about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’ In the former context, even if the lie is
told, it will often be told less convincingly.”).
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Third, depositions of children should be permitted with leave
of court. Rather than a whole cloth prohibition of depositions of
children, defendants should have to first establish a particularized
need to depose the child, for example, by providing what
information is being sought and explaining how the current
discovery materials fail to cover such information. Of course,
children should be permitted to have parents or an ad litem
present. By having the trial court approve the deposition, the
court can address any concerns for the child’s best interests and
impose any restrictions necessary as to the scope and manner of
the deposition.
Fourth, alleged victims should not be given a right to refuse
a deposition. While it may be harrowing for a victim to be
deposed by his abuser, confrontation takes courage. Any
legitimate concerns of intimidation, harassment, or
embarrassment could easily be remedied by a motion from the
State to restrict or remove the defendant’s presence at the
deposition rather than disallowing the deposition altogether.
Victims should certainly be allowed to be accompanied by the
prosecutor and an advocate for emotional support. Victims
should also be allowed to have independent counsel present.
Fifth, subpoenaed witnesses should be compensated for their
time in the same manner as currently done under Arkansas Rule
of Civil Procedure 45(e).268 However, any witness should only
be subjected to being deposed one time. In the case of
codefendants, the examination time of any individual witness
should be shared amongst the codefendants.269 The State should
bear the expenses for indigent defendants, including
compensation for witnesses, the costs of having a stenographer or
videographer present, and the costs of having transcripts
prepared.
Sixth, aside from alleged victims, prosecutors should not be
permitted as a matter of right to sit in on depositions unless a
reciprocal right is given to defense counsel to sit in on prosecutor
subpoenas. If the goal is to truly open up criminal discovery, then
268. ARK. R. CIV. P. 45(e) (providing that witnesses shall be paid $30 a day for their
attendance and $0.25 per mile for travel from the witness’s residence to the place of the
deposition).
269. See, e.g., VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(1)-(2).
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depositions could certainly be conducted similar to civil
depositions with both parties present.270 However, unless
prosecutors are willing to invite defense attorneys to sit in on their
depositions, it is unfair to ask defense attorneys to save a seat for
prosecutors.
Seventh, any witness deposed should be permitted to be
represented by independent counsel.271
Such counsel’s
interference with the deposition should be restricted to the same
manner of opposition and witness counseling currently permitted
in civil depositions.272
Eighth, depositions should be permitted in both felony and
misdemeanor cases. While we might think of misdemeanors as
“petty” and therefore deserving of less procedure, the reality is
that the vast majority (roughly eighty percent) of our criminal
dockets are misdemeanor offenses.273
More importantly,
although misdemeanors are “petty” compared to felonies,
misdemeanor convictions still carry many of the same collateral
consequences as felony convictions, ranging from employment
discrimination, restricted voting rights, loss of public benefits,
and other general stigmatization.274 The need to protect innocents
and increase transparency to promote the legitimacy of the
process is just as significant for misdemeanor cases as with felony
cases.

270. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 30.
271. See Ortman, supra note 51, at 488 (noting prosecutors do not represent witnesses
or victims, so independent counsel may be warranted in some circumstances).
272. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 30(d).
273. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1063 (2015) (noting there are approximately ten million misdemeanor cases filed every year
in the U.S. compared to 2.3 million felony cases, misdemeanors make up roughly eighty
percent of state dockets, and they are typically the entry point into the criminal justice system
for most Americans); see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM.
DEF. LAWS., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), [https://perma.cc/2Q4Y-D92X] (estimating
approximately 10.5 million misdemeanors were prosecuted in 2006); Mahoney v. Derrick,
2022 Ark. 27, at 10, 2022 WL 404182, at *5 (Hudson, J., concurring) (“Moreover, our district
courts are often the only interaction that the public has with the judiciary. Therefore, it is
critical that we are mindful of the practices and procedures in district courts that may
undermine public confidence in the administration of fair and impartial justice.”).
274. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1323-27 (2012);
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297-303 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
The law and our notions of what justice and fairness require
evolve over time. The history of criminal procedure is a clear
picture of a slow but steady march toward equity and protection
of the accused.275 Not everything in the law is as it always was.
The right to appointed counsel, now the cornerstone of criminal
defense, once had to be fought for.276 The right to be informed of
Miranda warnings before being interrogated once had to be
fought for.277 The right to not have phone calls eavesdropped on
by the government once had to be fought for.278 Arkansas has its
own specific history of recognizing additional protections against
the State beyond what the Federal Constitution requires.
Arkansas has recognized the right to be informed of the right to
refuse consent to entry into the home,279 the right to be protected
from nighttime knock-and-talks by officers,280 the right to be free
from pre-textual arrests,281 and the right to not have a vehicle on
private property searched without a warrant absent exigent
circumstances.282 These few examples illustrate that Arkansas is

275. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy
in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1642 (2005).
276. Id.; see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
277. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
278. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
279. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 474, 156 S.W.3d 722, 732 (2004).
280. See Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 800, 67 S.W.3d 582, 590 (2002) (finding an
illegal search occurred when officers stealthily approached a defendant’s basement door in
the nighttime with flashlights and inspected the premises, noting there is “no authority for a
‘knock and search’ doctrine holding that after knocking, it is permissible to begin a
warrantless search before anyone comes to the door”); Rikard v. State, 354 Ark. 345, 353,
123 S.W.3d 114, 118 (2003) (citing Griffin with a parenthetical explanation stating
“nighttime incursions on a defendant’s curtilage [are] illegal under Art. 2, § 15, of [the]
Arkansas Constitution”); see also Keenom v. State, 349 Ark. 381, 396-97, 80 S.W.3d 743,
753 (2002) (Brown, J., dissenting) (differentiating the protections afforded by the Arkansas
Constitution and caselaw from those afforded under the Fourth Amendment, noting that the
Arkansas Supreme Court “has shown a sensitivity to abuses caused by nighttime searches,”
yet “federal jurisprudence does not require the exigent circumstances for a nighttime search
warrant set out in [Arkansas] Rule 13.2, much less that those exigent circumstances be
required for a nighttime knock-and-talk”).
281. State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 652, 74 S.W.3d 215, 218 (2002).
282. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 14.1(a)(iii). The United States Supreme Court has only ever
stated in a plurality opinion that officers may not search an automobile on private property
without a warrant absent exigent circumstances beyond the inherent mobility of the vehicle
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no stranger to redefining the boundaries of criminal process as our
shared understanding of fairness and justice evolves. “Law’s
evolution is never done, and for every improvement made there
is another reform that is overdue.”283
There is no reason our criminal procedure has to be written
in stone, forever unyielding to progress. The time has come to
ask if our current procedures are still the best means of achieving
our guiding principles of increasing transparency and fairness and
protecting the individual against the awesome power of the State.
If we truly aim to discover the truth, then let Arkansas defense
attorneys do just that—discover it. Let us achieve “better
justice.”284

itself. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1971). The Arkansas Rules
clearly agree with the plurality and provide Arkansans with this additional protection.
283. Brennan, supra note 183, at 2.
284. Brennan, supra note 1, at 279.
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TIMING LEGAL PARENTHOOD
Noy Naaman*
INTRODUCTION
When does a parent become a parent? While the literature
on Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) has explored the
question, who is a parent? scholars in the field have paid less
attention to the question “when should the parental status be
formalized?”1 Is it at birth? Is it when a judicial order confers
that legal status on an individual? Or, has the legal status of
parenthood begun to develop during the time the individual has
spent initiating the parental process and consolidated at the
child’s birth? Yet, these questions have critical legal and practical
implications. The following scenarios illustrate how lacunae in
the legal frameworks that govern the formalization of the parental
relationship leave individuals, whose self-identity as parents (or
parents-to-be) is established, but whose parental status is legally
inchoate, vulnerable to conflicts arising in the law’s blind-spots.
Judith and Barbara, a same-sex couple, conceived through
an anonymous sperm donation. While Judith, the birth mother,
was legally recognized as such in the delivery room, Barbara had
to apply for a post-birth judicial order. Only after a court hearing
and an inspection process conducted by welfare officers, which
was expected to take a few months, would the law—assuming a
*
SJD Candidate at University of Toronto Faculty of Law. I wish to thank Brenda
Cossman for her supervision and endless support in conducting this research. This article
benefited greatly from comments made by Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Kerry Rittich, Courtney
G. Joslin, Sean H Williams, Daniel Gobbo, Luke Taylor, Joshua Sealy-Harrington, Ido Katri,
Mercedes Cavallo, Emily Schaffer, Megan Ross, Lotem Naaman, Eliran Oziel, Anat Tsur,
Yaron Covo, and by participants in the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association,
the Annual Family Law Scholars and Teachers Conference, and the Annual Conference of
McGill Graduate Law Students Association, at various stages of this project. Finally, I thank
the editors of the Arkansas Law Review.
1. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PY7P-6HDC] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021); see
infra notes 37-38.
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favorable outcome—recognize Barbara as the child’s mother.
Shortly after the birth, however, Judith and Barbara separated.
What parental rights, if any, can Barbara claim?
Ben, a single man and a senior associate at a law firm,
decided to become a parent through transnational surrogacy.
When Ben told his employer about his decision and the pre-birth
arrangements involved in the process, including that he might
need to take some time away from work, Ben’s employer told him
that his promotion to a junior partner might be deferred. What
legal recourse, if any, does Ben have against his employer?
Jessica and David, a different-sex couple, conceived with the
assistance of Kelly, a surrogate. During week thirty-two of her
pregnancy, Kelly suffered a stillbirth as a result of medical
malpractice. While the hospital compensated Kelly for her loss,
it denied recovery to Jessica and David for their emotional
distress, simply because neither of them carried the fetus. What
damages, if any, can Jessica and David seek?
A common theme that emerges from these hypothetical
scenarios is uncertainty about what it means to become a parent.
Although each of the individuals has embarked upon the journey
toward parenthood, they have very different statuses in the eyes
of the law.2 In this Article, I examine the question of how the
process of becoming a parent is counted by the law.
To pursue this inquiry, I theorize and problematize the
tension between the construction of the self and legal
identification.3 This tension, termed here “temporal discrepancy,”
refers to the gap between how a person identifies himself and how
the law accounts for that identification in the context of becoming
a parent.4 I argue that this gap places certain individuals in a
vulnerable position within the family and beyond. I focus on two
forms of temporal discrepancy: the first concerns a scenario
occurring after a child is born, when an individual self-identifies
as a parent, but the law has yet to formalize the parental status,
such as in the first hypothetical above.5 The second, illustrated
2.
3.
4.
5.
may be

Infra Section II.A.
See infra text accompanying notes 52-64.
See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
See infra text accompanying notes 76-86. There are circumstances in which a person
considered a parent as a matter of law before a court has declared him as such. In
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by the second and third hypotheticals above, involves a scenario
occurring before a child’s birth, when an individual self-identifies
as a parent-to-be—a status of becoming that may be rich in
meaning and laden with practical and emotional implications but
that is legally overlooked.6 After analyzing this gap, I consider
how the law could be restructured to alleviate the effects of
temporal discrepancy on parents and parents-to-be.7
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I develops this
Article’s theoretical framework by looking to queer literature on
time, which elucidates how time orients our embodiments in
accordance with (hetero)normative logic and considers what
alternatives to this operation (and understanding) of time might
look or feel like.8 Inspired by this literature, I develop the concept
of temporal discrepancy and mobilize it for analyzing the research
question of this Article.9
Part II focuses on the first form of temporal discrepancy,
represented by the first gap occurring after birth.10 I review the
contingency of this tension in the context of parental
identification,11 mostly involving same-sex couples, in which the
parental status is formalized at a remote moment in time after
birth, but especially in relation to the biological parent’s partner
in cases of ART.12 Then, I set out a taxonomy for understanding
the crippling effects of that tension.13 Finally, I evaluate
regulatory avenues for ensuring that parental status vests as close
this scenario, the judicial order issued after the child’s birth will become effective
retroactively from the child’s birth. Such a person, nonetheless, may be placed in a
vulnerable position. See infra note 134.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 214-27.
7. See discussion infra Sections II.C, III.B.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 71-85. The term “contingency” is used to
express how certain tension becomes to be what it is. For the use of this term, see VALERIE
ROHY, CHANCES ARE: CONTINGENCY, QUEER THEORY, AND AMERICAN LITERATURE 2-8
(2019).
12. See generally Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting
Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to
Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 76-82 (2017) (discussing
marital presumption, consent to a spouse’s use of ART, and adoption as options for
formalizing after-birth legal parentage for nonbiological parents).
13. See infra Section II.B.
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as possible to the child’s birth and conclude with a set of
considerations for lawmakers.14 While this Article is not the first
to advocate for at-birth parental determination, it offers a novel
theoretical underpinning for the position grounded in the
individual’s evolving self-identification—and thus new support
for the findings of other scholars. Indeed, the justifications
underlying the recognition or denial of rights are significant, as
“different frameworks of analysis cannot reach the ‘same
result.’”15
Part III focuses on the second form of temporal discrepancy,
represented by the second gap occurring before birth.16 I assess
whether and how the law should recognize the process of
becoming a parent.17 This part is divided into two sections to
address the separate components of this inquiry. Section A
discusses whether the law can recognize the indeterminate selfidentification as a parent-to-be.18 Conferring parent-to-be legal
status before birth is in tension with the notion that parental status
comes into existence at the moment of the child’s birth.19 I show
that it is eminently possible for the law to recognize the fluid
status of parent-to-be, and that several of the concerns that might
explain its failure to do so are misguided.20 Section B then
explores how the law should recognize the process of becoming a
parent.21 I consider the kinds of conflicts that may arise during
the process of becoming a parent and show that while the law
addresses certain implications of becoming a parent, its reach is
underinclusive.22 Indeed, I show that by reducing the concept of
becoming a parent to its purely biological (and chiefly
gestational) elements, the law leaves anticipated parents in a
peculiarly vulnerable position.23
Accordingly, I suggest
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to a Relational
Right, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 36 (2009) (citing Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1878-87 (1987)).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See discussion infra Sections III.A, III.B.
18. See infra Section III.A.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 181-94.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 197-213.
21. See infra Section III.B.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 228-43.
23. See infra Section III.B.2.
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cultivating a more inclusive legal understanding that embraces the
construction, rather than merely the (post-birth) existence, of the
parental status and incorporates the relational elements of
becoming a parent, such as social burdens, emotional
involvement, and human investments.
Two notes before presenting the Article’s theoretical basis.
The first relates to methodology. This Article assesses the broadscale occurrence of temporal discrepancy by engaging with three
terrains: family, employment, and medical malpractice.24 While
articulating detailed policy proposals in each of these domains is
beyond the Article’s scope, I discuss how the law could be
restructured and subsequently developed by policymakers in
accordance with the doctrines of each.25 To render my analysis
more concrete, I glean support from existing laws in different
jurisdictions, including U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and
Israel.26 While I do not purport to offer a traditional comparative
legal analysis, I hope that the comparative nature of this Article
can assist policymakers across the globe in making laws more
attentive to the needs of various individuals in their process of
becoming parents.
The second note is on terminology. I use the term
“anticipated parent” in lieu of the common terms “intended
parent” and “prospective parent.” The term “anticipated parent”
designates becoming a parent that this Article offers to elucidate.
I use the term “social parent” in lieu of “non-biological parent” to
avoid affirming terms derived from the bio-normative positions
that I seek to de-naturalize.27 Finally, I use the term “gestational
party” instead of “pregnant mother” to reflect that transgender
men and non-binary people also give birth.28

24. See infra Section III.B.1, III.B.2.
25. See infra Section II.C and notes 247-54, 283-301 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 73-86, 103-14,124, 132-179, 228-9, 238-48, 258, 283-300, and
accompanying text.
27. See Joanna Radbord, Same-Sex Parents and the Law, 33 WINDSOR REV.
LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 1, 6 (2013).
28. Id. at 1; Preparing for Pregnancy as a Non-Binary Person, FAM. EQUAL.,
[https://perma.cc/5HNK-WPJ9] (last visited Nov. 18, 2021).
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I. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
This part lays down the theoretical framework of temporal
discrepancy that will accompany us throughout the Article. After
situating this Article’s contribution within the legal scholarship,29
I will turn specifically to queer literature on time and explain how
this body of work informs my theoretical framework.30 Finally, I
discuss how my framework both rests on and enriches the current
writing on legal identities.31
Legal scholars have ventured into the territory of time.
While some scholars have considered generally how the law
shapes perceptions of time as a historical, cultural, or political
construct,32 or how temporal logics are utilized to allocate
rights,33 others have considered the construction of time in
specific fields, e.g., human rights,34 criminal law,35 and private
law.36 Despite these growing conversations about time and the
law, the relation between time and the formation of legal
identities, specifically the legal status of parenthood, remains
largely unexamined.37 Further, though most of the legal literature
29. See infra text accompanying notes 32-39.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 40-48.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 49-64.
32. E.g., Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and Cultural Legitimation of
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1631 (1989); Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L.
REV. 663, 664-72 (2001).
33. Liaquat Ali Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 55, 56-57 (2009);
Frederic Bloom, The Law’s Clock, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2015).
34. See Orna Ben-Naftali et al., Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 554-55 (2005); Yofi Tirosh, The Right to Be Fat,
12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 264, 301-02 (2012); Kathryn McNeilly, Are Rights
Out of Time?: International Human Rights Law, Temporality, and Radical Social Change,
28 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 817, 817 (2019).
35. See Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller & David T. Johnson, Time and Punishment, 31
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 621, 622 (2013).
36. See Emily Grabham, Doing Things with Time: Flexibility, Adaptability, and
Elasticity in UK Equality Cases, 26 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 485, 485-86 (2011); see also Sarah
Keenan, Making Land Liquid: On Time and Title Registration, in LAW AND TIME 145, 157
(Siân M. Beynon-Jones & Emily Grabham, eds., 2019).
37. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991) (“[T]he parental
rights of the intended parents should be legally recognized from the time of conception.”);
Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM
210, 211-12, 229-30 (2012) [hereinafter Purvis, Intended Parents] (discussing how parental
intent is used in determining at what point in time parents are legally identified); Courtney
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on ART focuses on “who is a parent?” less attention is paid to
when the parental status should be formalized38 and how the
process of becoming a parent is influenced by a particular logic
of time.39 This Article aims to fill that academic gap by giving
these questions much-needed theoretical attention. The value of
queer theory on time to our conversation will become clear below.
Queer scholarship on time calls attention to how time is
organized in accordance with the logic of (hetero)normativity,
which features principles such as linearity, capitalist
accumulation, and productivity, and is represented by
(hetero)normative models of lives.40 In so doing, this scholarship
prompts us (1) to consider how non-normative embodiments that
are out of social sync are marginalized and oppressed, and (2) to
assess how self-identifications or embodiments that move beyond
and against the normative and ostensibly objective and universal
G. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, 109 CAL L. REV. 401, 439-442 (2021) [hereinafter Joslin,
(Not) Just Surrogacy] (assessing the option of establishing the parental status before the
child’s birth in surrogacy arrangements).
38. Id. at 210, 214-5 (pointing to the gap between the legal principles of parentage
determination that look backward in time and the perception of people undergoing ART who
seek to “manifest their intent to become parents with a forward-looking temporal
perspective, before a child is conceived and born.”). While Purvis’s analysis views the
discrepancy between legal principles and self-perceptions in terms of directions, my analysis
focuses on the discrepancy between the construction of self-identification and legal
identification.
39. For scholarship that theorizes the significance of the period of pregnancy for
women, see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary
Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 329, 331-32 (2010); see also Siân M.
Beynon-Jones, Timing is Everything: The Demarcation of ‘Later’ Abortions in Scotland, 42
SOC. STUD. SCI. 53, 53 (2012). My analysis is distinct from this scholarship in that it focuses
on both the gestational and relational elements of becoming a parent, while these scholars
focus mostly on the former. See also Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75
LA. L. REV. 71, 77, 119 (2014) (assessing why the person’s earlier commitment (the “earlier
self”) does not bind the person’s will at the time of enforcement (the “later self”) in the
context of agreements pertaining to affairs of surrogacy and embryos). While Matsumura’s
analysis focuses on two decisive moments, the earlier and later selves, I focus on a broader
period of time during which the self as a parent develops.
40. This logic has been articulated in similar, though not identical, manners, by
theories, such as Lee Edelman in his concept of “reproductive futurism[,]” Jack Halberstam
in his concept of “repro-time[,]” and Elizabeth Freeman in her concept of
“chrononormativity[.]” LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH
DRIVE 2 (Michèle Aina Barale, et al. eds., 2004); JACK HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME
AND PLACE: TRANSGENDER BODIES, SUBCULTURAL LIVES 5, 10 (José Esteban Muñoz &
Ann Pellegrini eds., 2005) [hereinafter HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME]; ELIZABETH
FREEMAN, TIME BINDS: QUEER TEMPORALITIES, QUEER HISTORIES 3 (2010).
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logic of time offer creative possibilities for understanding and
experiencing time.41
This stance is prominent in Jack Halberstam’s work, which
urges its readers to explore lives that break from heterosexual life
narratives, such as “bourgeois reproduction” and family,42 and
instead evolve from childhood in a trajectory that Kathryn
Stockton describes as “growing sideways.”43 Edelman also
addresses that break, exhorting us to remove ourselves from
political thinking about the future, which he laments as
misleading, and to embrace a nihilistic sensibility that rejects
investment in any future-oriented optimism.44 As opposed to
Edelman, José Muñoz offers a constructive view of time by
presenting the internal mode of “not yet here.”45 This encourages
the subject to think about time in an untimely manner, beyond the
linear relationship between past, present, and future, thus
allowing the subject to liberate himself from the disciplining
effects of time and to engage with a utopian vision that embraces
unpredictable possibilities.46 Viewed as a whole, queer writing
demonstrates how individuals can live beyond, and in spite of, the
rigid boundaries of time, elucidating the concept I term “temporal
discrepancy.”47
41. Elizabeth Freeman, Introduction, 13 GLQ 159, 159-160 (2007).
42. HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME, supra note 40, at 6; JUDITH HALBERSTAM, THE
QUEER ART OF FAILURE 70 (2011).
43. KATHRYN BOND STOCKTON, THE QUEER CHILD, OR GROWING SIDEWAYS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 11 (Michèle Aina Barale, et al. eds., 2009).
44. EDELMAN, supra note 40, at 4, 14, 30-31. This sensibility is further echoed in the
psychoanalytic writing on the practice of barebacking among gay men—which advances a
perspective on the future that health is imperative, resists the desire to live longer, and
expresses a disdain for the institutional rhythm of progress and breeding. See TIM DEAN,
UNLIMITED INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING 66 (2009);
LEO BERSANI & ADAM PHILLIPS, INTIMACIES 45-46, 114, 122 (2008).
45. JOSÉ ESTEBAN MUÑOZ, CRUISING UTOPIA: THE THEN AND THERE OF QUEER
FUTURITY 22 (José Esteban & Ann Perregrini, eds., 2009).
46. Id. at 22-23, 194 n.7.
47. I am mindful that some of the views expressed in these writings, specifically the
disdain for breeding (see generally EDELMAN, NO FUTURE, supra note 40), the utopian
visions of an unpredictable future (MUÑOZ supra note 45, at 21-23) and suicidal ideology
(BERSANI & PHILLIPS, supra note 44, at 35; DEAN, supra note 44, at 66), are at odds with
procreative objectives and concerns for the stability and integrity of non-normative families.
However, I draw on this writing as it explicitly unpacks how non-normative kinships are
repressed by institutional forms of time, exemplifying what I identify as temporal
discrepancy, and because of their potential to exhort us thinking differently on time.
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Temporal discrepancy is the gap between how an individual
identifies or perceives himself (the internal sphere) and how that
identification or embodiment is counted by norms (the
institutional sphere). It occurs at moments in time when an
individual’s lived experience is out of sync with the events that
society perceives—and the law recognizes—as milestones.
Mobilizing this understanding of time as governing certain
embodiments into the context of legal parenthood expands the
assertation that family kinship itself is an instrument of subject
formation that differentiates subjects.48 Careful attention to the
relation between time and subjectification is thus needed to
ensure the law is on track with notions of social justice.
This suggested theoretical framework builds also on the
literature of legal identities. Legal identities are formed by
practices that confer a legal status upon an individual who claims
an identity.49 Practices, such as documentary actions (e.g.,
signing paperwork) or ceremonial actions (e.g., weddings),
effectuate what Jessica Clarke theorizes as the moment of
“formalization.”50 At that moment, the law actualizes the selfidentification of the individual, representing the moment when
people first experience their identities as “real.”51 This Article
concerns moments during which the legal and self-identifications
are out of sync because the construction of the self-identification
in relation to a particular status begins or completes before its
formalization.52 While Clarke comprehensively analyzes the
risks and benefits resulting from the formalization of legal
identities, she does not tackle the period of time that I am
concerned with, namely, the period before the moment of
formalization.53 Viewing Clarke’s observations through the lens
of queer theories on time can enrich her analysis, as they clear
space for thinking about becoming in non-traditional ways, which
are not necessarily inherent in an institutional logic of time.54
48. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, 13 FEM. CULT. STUD. 14,
31-32 (2002).
49. Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 747, 755-56 (2015).
50. Id. at 753, 756 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 806.
52. See infra Parts II-III.
53. See Clarke, supra note 49, at 750-54.
54. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
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I focus on two forms of temporal discrepancy: post-birth
temporal discrepancy and pre-birth temporal discrepancy. The
first refers to a gap in time in which an individual’s selfidentification is established, but the legal identification is still “tobe.”55 That legal status is still “to-be” because the law has yet to
confer a legal status on the individual.56 In the context of
parenthood, such a discrepancy appears at birth and is sustained
afterward when the parental status of the anticipated social parent
is yet to be formalized.57 The second form of temporal
discrepancy refers to the moments at which an individual’s selfidentification is still developing.58 That period can be viewed as
a trajectory of “becoming” throughout which the selfidentification fluctuates, or moves on a spectrum between a
certain starting point and a designated position, which is invisible
from a legal perspective.59
This invisibility produces a
discrepancy between the development of self-identification and
the stagnation of legal identification.60 In the context of
parenthood, such a gap occurs before birth when an individual
perceives himself as a parent-to-be, but his “to-be” status—i.e.,
the dynamic mode of becoming a parent—does not fit neatly into
any legally cognizable category.61 The similarity between the two
scenarios is that both produce a discrepancy between the
temporality of the internal sphere (the self-identification) and that
of the external sphere (the legal identification).62 In the first
scenario, however, the discrepancy is grounded in the difference
between the “already there” self-identification and the “to-be”
legal-identification, while in the second, the discrepancy lies in
the gap between the “to-be” self-identification and the ambiguous
legal identification.63 In other words, in the first scenario, the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See discussion infra Part II.
See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.
See infra notes 181-94, 214-27 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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legal identification is the “to-be,” while in the second, it is the
self-identification itself that is “to-be.”64
II. POST-BIRTH TEMPORAL DISCREPANCY
The birth of a child legally signifies “the birth of a parent.”65
If the child is conceived by sex-based conception, the parental
status of the biological parent(s) is formalized through
registration, which usually occurs immediately after the child’s
birth.66 By contrast, in cases of ART, e.g., sperm donation or
surrogacy, the status may not be formalized until several months
(if not years) after the birth, resulting in a temporal discrepancy
between the self and legal identifications.67 This part analyzes
this discrepancy in three sections: the first outlines its contours;68
the second examines its implications;69 and the third evaluates the
regulatory avenues needed to mitigate these implications.70
A. The Contours of Temporal Discrepancy
When, and to what degree, does a parent experience
temporal discrepancy?
Reviewing the laws in various
jurisdictions illustrates that the answer is contingent on three

64. The forms of temporal discrepancy I discuss here are not exhaustive of all
circumstances in which temporal discrepancy between self and legal identification might
exist. In relation to parenthood, there are two forms of temporal discrepancy that mirror the
forms outlined here. One form occurs after birth. Take, for example, a woman who gives
birth and is legally considered a mother but refuses to embrace motherhood and rejects that
legal identification. The second form happens before birth, as in the example of a pregnant
woman who does not regard herself as an anticipated parent but may be legally recognized
as such and thus entitled to special rights by virtue of her future parental status.
65. See Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 119, 120
(2018) [hereinafter Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents].
66. Shohreh Davoodi, More Than a Piece of Paper: Same-Sex Parents and Their
Adopted Children Are Entitled to Equal Protection in the Realm of Birth Certificates, 90
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 703, 707 (2015) (stating that the birth certificate certifies parenthood);
see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
68. See infra Section II.A.
69. See infra Section II.B.
70. See infra Section II.C.
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factors: the method of conception, the sex of the parents, and their
marital status.71 I survey the operation of these factors.
When a birth results from a sexual union, the default rule
under Anglo-American law is that the woman who bears the child
is the mother.72 The woman’s husband will be considered as the
legal parent already at the birth, either based on marital
presumption,73 or on his genetic relation to the child.74 If the
parties are not married, the parental status of the birth parent’s
partner may be contingent on a written form provided soon after
the birth, if not already at the hospital, declaring that the partner
is the legal parent.75
If the child is conceived through anonymous sperm
donation, the formalization of parental status may depend on the
parties’ sexes and their marital status.76 In the case of married,
71. My purpose is not to provide a comparative analysis of parentage determination,
which is beyond the scope of this Article, but instead to exemplify the various factors that
may determine the occurrence of temporal discrepancy.
72. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMPAR. L. (SUPPLEMENT
ISSUE) 125, 127 (2006) [hereinafter Meyer, Parenthood].
73. In the United States, historically, the woman’s husband has been deemed the
parent, regardless of whether he is the child’s genetic parent, even when proof exists that the
husband is not the biological father, and this presumption remains the most common way of
establishing parentage of the husband. See Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and
Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1658-59 (2015) [hereinafter Baker, Legitimate
Families]; Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 123 YALE L.J. 2260, 2266 (2017)
[hereinafter NeJaime, Nature]. That presumption is also common in Canada and England.
See Wanda Wiegers, Fatherhood and Misattributed Genetic Paternity in Family Law, 36
QUEEN’S L.J. 623, 640 (2011); Gillian R. Chadwick, Legitimating the Transnational Family,
42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 257, 280 (2019).
74. Even in these jurisdictions (like in Israel), in practice, the law infers biological
paternity through marital presumption. Noy Naaman, Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Ruth Zafran,
Parenthood Based on Relationship: Dual Motherhood as a Case Study, 36 TEL-AVIV U. L.
REV. (Iyunei Mishpat) (forthcoming) (Hebrew), available at [https://perma.cc/99QV-2BFC]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2022).
75. In the United States, the unmarried partner of the birth mother can become the legal
father of the child through a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (“VAP”). The VAP
procedure is generally limited to identifying the man alleged to be the child’s genetic father
(though some states’ VAP forms are silent as to the genetic relationship between the male
signatory and the child), and the mother needs to declare that she was not married to anyone
when the child was born or at any time during the 300 days prior to the birth. See Jeffrey A.
Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and Better Paternity
Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 70, 72 (2010); Paternity/Parentage
Establishment, DEL. HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., [https://perma.cc/776S-KJRR] (last visited
Nov. 20, 2021).
76. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 73, at 2296-97.
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different-sex couples, when the wife gives birth to a child
conceived through artificial insemination by an anonymous
sperm donor, in many jurisdictions, the husband is automatically
registered as the father by virtue of the marital presumption.77 If
the parents are unmarried, however, the formalization process
varies; in certain jurisdictions, parentage may be attributed to the
male partner through automatic registration by virtue of his quasimarital relationship with the birth mother78 or consent to raise the
child with the biological mother,79 while in others, the partner
must invoke post-birth judicial procedures to be legally
recognized as the father,80 or live with the newborn for some
amount of time, resulting in temporal discrepancy between the
establishment of the self as a parent and the law’s recognition of
the parent as such.81 In the case of same-sex couples, while in
77. Meyer, Parenthood, supra note 72, at 134.
78. The laws in British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan adopted this scheme. See
Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 27 (Can.); All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and
Related Registrations Statute Law Amendment), S.O. 2016, c 23, § 8 (Can.); The Children’s
Law Act, S.S. 2020, c 2, § 60 (Can.). In these jurisdictions, the statutes apply equally to all
couples regardless of their sexual orientation.
79. In British Columbia, for example, see Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 30(b)
(Can.). In Ontario for example, see All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related
Registrations Statute Law Amendment) S.O. 2016, c 23, § 9 (Can.). In Saskatchewan, see
The Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c 2, § 61 (4)(b) (Can.). In the United States, as a matter
of law, only “[i]n a few states, nonbiological intended parents are authorized to establish
parentage through a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage.” See Douglas NeJaime, Who
Is a Parent?, 43 FAM. ADVOC. 6, 8-9 (2021). In practice, however, the couple can easily
bypass this procedure. Specifically, though the paternity form requires the birth mother and
the putative father to attest that the male partner is the genetic father, and though in certain
jurisdictions they do so under penalty of perjury, the form is not scrutinized, and there is no
practical means for inquiring into the use of sperm donation. For further reading on the place
of biology in establishing legal parenthood through the execution of a VAP, see Baker,
Legitimate Families, supra note 73, at 1686-87; Jeffrey A. Parness, Faithful Parents: Choice
of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L. REV. 325, 345 (2019).
80. As for states in the United States which adopted this scheme, see NeJaime, Nature,
supra note 73, at 2296-97, 2297 n.182, 2370-72. This is also the case in Israel. See Noy
Naaman, Israel: Judicial Parental Order as a Means of Recognizing Same-Sex Parenthood,
in 2021 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 273 (Margaret Brinig ed., 2021)
[hereinafter Naaman, Parental Order]; PROFESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW CRITERIA
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE JUDICIAL PARENTAL ORDER (INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE),
[https://perma.cc/QRW6-Z7R3] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) [hereinafter INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE GUIDELINES]. In practice, however, different-sex couple can
easily bypass this procedure. See supra note 79; cf. Noy Naaman, The Paradox of same-sex
Parentage Equality, 100(1) WASH. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
81. Under the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), for example, a parental status may vest
in the biological parent’s partner after two years of cohabitation, but it also furthers the goal
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some jurisdictions, the marital (or quasi-marital) presumption is
applied to formalize the parental status of the same-sex partner
immediately upon the birth,82 in other jurisdictions, the parentage
is established through post-birth judicial procedures, resulting in
a formalization of the status that occurs remotely in time from the
birth.83
Temporal discrepancy can also occur in the context of
surrogacy. The duration of that discrepancy depends on the
governing legal framework. In some jurisdictions, the parental
status of the anticipated parents is formalized only after the
issuance of a post-birth parental order that may be granted
remotely in time after birth.84 In others, by contrast, the
anticipated parents are already registered as such by the time of
the birth, either through pre-birth (judicial or administrative)
procedure,85 or by marital presumption applied at the birth,86
preventing any temporal discrepancy.

of establishing parentage quickly and with certainty. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017).
82. In the United States, see COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW, § 3:5, at 173 (2021); Nejaime, Nature, supra note 73, at
2294, 2339, 2363-66. In the United States, the UPA revised the VAP process so that it can
be used to establish the parental status of a “presumed parent” other than the “genetic father”
or “intended parent[.]” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L. 2017). Similarly, some states include a gender-neutral VAP system in cases of
ART. Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE J.L &
FEMINISM 589, 604 (2018). While the establishment of the parental status in such cases does
not occur automatically on the moment the child is born, it allows establishing parentage
immediately after the birth without the need to undergo a court proceeding, a process that
could render the discrepancy between the construction of the self and of legal identification
more perceptible. Id. at 605.
83. The law as it exists in Israel is an illustrative example for this scheme. Naaman,
Parental Order, supra note 80, at 273.
84. In Israel, for example, same-sex couples, are subject to post-birth procedures,
which may take several months. If the couple fails to fulfill the criteria for parental orders,
they may be navigated to a second-parent adoption, which can take several years. Id. at 27275.
85. See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
86. The New York appellate court recently applied the marital presumption to the
biological father’s same-sex spouse where the child was born via surrogacy during the
marriage. See In re Maria-Irene D., 153 A.D.3d 1203, 1205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
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B. The Implications of Temporal Discrepancy
In this section, I explore three types of temporal
discrepancies that are created when the formalization of the
parental status occurs remotely in time after the birth. The first,
inner sphere, implicates the self-continuity of the parent;87 the
second, interpersonal sphere, involves the familial dynamic;88
and the third, collective sphere, refers to the relationship among
families.89 By highlighting the crippling effects in each sphere
caused by delays in the formalization of the parental relationship,
I illustrate how the law deploys time to police and oppress the
becoming of non-normative families.
1. The Inner Sphere
The inner sphere refers to the construction of an individual’s
self-identification. Temporal discrepancy affects the inner sphere
by disrupting the development of an individual’s selfidentification as an anticipated parent—that is, the state of a
constant self-continuity beginning at the moment of a mutual
decision to conceive, continuing through fertilization and
impregnation, and becoming complete at the birth.90 The
discontinuity between the self and legal-identifications adversely
affects the individual’s self-determination in a manner that may
be particularly significant given the importance of parental status
in shaping our personhood.91

87. See infra Section II.B.1.
88. See infra Section II.B.2.
89. See infra Section II.B.3.
90. This account does not apply to unplanned or unwanted pregnancies, which are
outside the scope of this Article. This account does not ignore the presumption that after the
birth, the self-identification of a person as a parent constantly shapes throughout his life.
91. John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response
to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 236 (1995); Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift,
Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family, 117 ETHICS 80, 91-95 (2006). For further
reading on identity formation of same-sex families, Kimberly Richman, Lovers, Legal
Strangers, and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family Law, 36 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 285, 286-87 (2002); Irene Padavic & Jonniann Butterfield, Mothers, Fathers,
and “Mathers”: Negotiating a Lesbian Co-parental Identity, 25 GENDER & SOC’Y 176, 18182 (2011). Abbie E. Goldberg et al., Why Parenthood, and Why Now? Gay Men’s
Motivations for Pursuing Parenthood, 61 FAM. RELS. 157, 160 (2012).
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The theory of narrative identity illuminates my argument
regarding the effects of temporal discrepancy. This theory
regards the formation of an individual’s identity as occurring
through narrative: a story about oneself that one tells oneself and
others.92 That story allows the individual to develop a selfperception as a “well-defined character[,]”93 creating a “sense of
meaning[] that unfold[s] in and through time.”94 That is, the
formation of an individual’s identity is suffused with the lifenarrative he builds.
The theory of narrative identity is relevant for its emphasis
on the role of continuity in the process of forming the selfnarrative. Continuity allows an individual to anticipate and
control his narrative95 and facilitates the capability to pursue his
goals and become the person he wishes to be,96 enabling him to
“function as [an] intentional agent[].”97 Psychological scholars
maintain that self-continuity is intertwined with cultural
contingencies, namely that the realization of the self is informed
by how temporality is “represented within the symbolic web of
. . . culture.”98 From that point of view, one can perceive how
delaying the legal recognition of parental status until well after
birth, the moment that culturally signifies the birth of parenthood,
interferes with the organic dynamic of self-continuity and
impedes an individual’s ability to experience his selfidentification as “real[.]”99
Studies of same-sex families offer additional insights into
how temporal discrepancy can interfere with individual narrative
formation. Studies on lesbian couples, for example, reveal that
92. Paul Ricoeur, Narrative Identity, 35 PHIL. TODAY 73, 77 (1991); MARYA
SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 93-95 (1996).
93. Id.; SCHECHTMAN, supra note 92, at 97.
94. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 14 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996).
95. See Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 94, at 33.
96. See DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 80 (2005).
97. Russell Spears, Commenting on Continuity: A View from Social Psychology, in
SELF CONTINUITY: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERSPECTIVES 251, 254 (Fabio Sani ed.,
2008).
98. Romin W. Tafarodi, Toward a Cultural Phenomenology of Personal Identity, in
SELF CONTINUITY: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 97, at 33.
99. Clarke, supra note 49, at 753.
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the lack of official recognition may lead the social mother to
experience high levels of stress and uncertainty while negotiating
her maternal identity with herself.100 This perceived limitation on
self-determination is reinforced in everyday interactions with
third parties in which the social mother is deprived of the right to
operate on behalf of her child.101 Other recent studies illustrate
how impeding the recognition of the social parent forces the
family to operate in an environment marked by “confusion and
social apprehension” and to adopt strategies to anticipate and
defuse potential conflicts.102
2. The Interpersonal Sphere
The interpersonal sphere refers to the dynamic within the
family, namely the relationship between the parents and the child
(the vertical relationship) and the relationship between the parents
(the horizontal relationship). Scholars over the past two decades
have demonstrated that legal recognition allows parents to fulfill
their parental responsibilities without obstruction and ensure the
stability, security, and continuity of the parent-child
relationship,103 which is important for the child’s ability to
achieve self-fulfillment and form other meaningful relationships

100. See, e.g., Michele M. McKelvey, The Other Mother: A Narrative Analysis of the
Postpartum Experiences of Nonbirth Lesbian Mothers, 37 ADVANCES NURSING SCI. 101,
101-02 (2014); Danuta M. Wojnar & Amy Katzenmeyer, Experiences of Preconception,
Pregnancy, and New Motherhood for Lesbian Nonbiological Mothers, 43 J. OBSTETRIC,
GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 50, 59 (2014); ALONA PELEG, LESBIAN
MOTHERHOOD IN ISRAEL 132-34 (Stavit Sinai ed., 2020) (Isr.).
101. See McKelvey, supra note 100, at 112-13; Wojnar & Katzenmeyer, supra note
100, at 53-55, 58-59; PELEG, supra note 100, at 132-34.
102. Alison Gash & Judith Raiskin, Parenting Without Protection: How Legal Status
Ambiguity Affects Lesbian and Gay Parenthood, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 82, 84, 112 (2018).
These strategies include carrying documented proof of parentage or creating a narrative that
children can use when their familial status is questioned. Id.; Emily Kazyak et al., Law and
Family Formation Among LGBQ-Parent Families, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 364, 368 (2018).
103. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW 111–119 (2000) (discussing the benefits of stability in child-parent
relationships); ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 15-20, 45-47 (2004) (discussing benefits of continuity of
care for children and society); Wanda Wiegers, Assisted Conception and Equality of Familial
Status in Parentage Law, 28 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 147, 149 (2012).
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in life.104 Legal recognition also allows both parent and child to
benefit from an array of financial safeguards, such as employment
benefits, insurance, and inheritance.105 Delaying or impeding
parental recognition, therefore, disadvantages parents and
children both emotionally and financially.106
Furthermore, by not recognizing the social parent upon birth,
the law carves out a hierarchy between the biological parent and
the social parent in relation to the child.107 The social parent
experiences the tangible effects of this hierarchy when he or she
is subjected to an inspection process by a multitude of
institutional actors including judges, state attorneys, and,
sometimes, welfare officers.108 The judicial process, especially
when it operates after the birth, inherently treats the social
parental bond as an artificial or inauthentic kinship that is subject
to intrusive scrutiny.109
Some jurisdictions perpetuate that hierarchy even after
official recognition by refusing to correct the birth certificate so
that it lists the social parent’s name.110 As a public record of facts
104. Ya’ir Ronen, Redefining the Child’s Right to Identity, 18 INT’L J. L., POL’Y &
FAM. 147, 154 (2004) (discussing the importance of these relationships to the child’s sense
of belonging); see also Angela Campbell, Conceiving Parents Through Law, 21 INT’L J. L.
POL’Y & FAM. 242, 265 (2007) (emphasizing that the legal recognition of the social parent
fosters the child’s self-awareness, dignity and belonging within his community); Alison Bird,
Legal Parenthood and the Recognition of Alternative Family Forms in Canada, 60 U. N.B.
L. J. 264, 285 (2010) (criticizing Canadian courts for ignoring “the symbolic importance of
legal recognition to a child’s sense of identity”).
105. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 34647 (2002); Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent
Families Across State Lines, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 32 (2010) [hereinafter Joslin,
Travel Insurance].
106. See Jacobs, supra note 105, at 346-47; Joslin, Travel Insurance, supra note 105,
at 32.
107. See also infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
108. See also infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
109. See also infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
110. In Israel, for example, when a same-sex female couple conceives through
anonymous sperm donation, only the biological parent’s name is listed on the birth
certificate. See Ilan Lior, Israel Defies Ruling to Register Same-Sex Parents on Children’s
Birth Certificates, HAARETZ (Apr. 10, 2018), [https://perma.cc/U8V6-XGY6] (last visited
Nov. 22, 2021). By contrast, numerous jurisdictions in the United States and Canada allow
both parents in same-sex families to be listed on the birth certificate. See Elizabeth J.
Samuels, An Immodest Proposal for Birth Registration in Donor-Assisted Reproduction, in
the Interest of Science and Human Rights, 48 N.M. L. REV. 416, 428-29 (2018); Fiona Kelly,
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that define how we present ourselves to the world, the certificate
of birth registration begins the life story of who we are; in that
sense, it is constitutive of our identities and of our family life
narratives, especially insofar as it identifies our parents.111 From
a practical standpoint, the birth certificate is also what most
people rely on to provide evidence of parental status when dealing
with schools, health-care providers, state-provided services,
border crossings, and other third parties.112 The fact that this
document is required for a wide range of activities and services
underscores its importance.113 Therefore, the absence of the
social parent’s name from that public, yet very personal,
document routinely erases that parent in day-to-day interactions.
The omission of a parent from the birth certificate could have
substantial adverse effects. In cases of medical emergencies, for
example, the social parent may be deprived of the right to make
any decision or to be involved in a child’s medical care.114
The derogatory effect of this hierarchy is especially salient
when viewed alongside social research concerning same-sex
families. Studies have reported on maternal jealousy within
lesbian families in which only one parent has a biological link to
the child,115 as well as a power imbalance between the mothers
concerning the ability to make decisions regarding their
children.116 By delaying or impeding the legal recognition of the
social parent, and by creating, through the birth certificate, a
hierarchy with legal and practical significance based on biological
(Re)forming Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal Parentage Within Planned Lesbian
Families, 40 OTTAWA L. REV. 185, 192 (2008).
111. Anna Marie D’Ginto, Comment, The Birth Certificate Solution: Ensuring the
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parentage, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1001-02 (2019).
112. Davoodi, supra note 66, at 708; D’Ginto, supra note 111, at 1002.
113. D’Ginto, supra note 111, at 1002.
114. Id. For further reading on other harms inflicted on families who lack birth
certificates accurately reflecting their child’s legal parentage, see Motion for Leave to File
Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Law Professors in Support of Petitioners and Brief of Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-17, Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (No. 16992).
115. Suzanne Pelka, Sharing Motherhood: Maternal Jealousy Among Lesbian CoMothers, 56 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 195, 196 (2009); Claudia Ciano-Boyce & Lynn ShelleySireci, Who Is Mommy Tonight? Lesbian Parenting Issues, 43 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 10-11
(2002).
116. See McKelvey, supra note 100 at 108; Wojnar & Katzenmeyer, supra note 100,
at 58-59.
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differences, the law entrenches or even exacerbates these internal
conflicts within families. This outcome produces a paradox:
precisely in those families that depart from the heteronormative
model premised on biological kinship, and that rely on alternative
procreative arrangements due to the biological constraints of
same-sex reproduction,117 biology becomes the key factor
shaping their dynamic.118 Rather than perpetuate this negative
dynamic, the law should facilitate familial stability for the benefit
of all family members.
Such a hierarchy between biological and social parenthood
becomes all the more apparent in cases of dissolution that occur
before the social parent’s parental status is formalized. In such
scenarios, temporal discrepancy may situate the social parent in a
vulnerable position by providing an unjust advantage to the
biological parent, who might seek to deny him custodial,
visitation, or other rights with respect to the child.119 In the
absence of a legally recognized parent-child relationship, the
social parent may find himself barred from making decisions
relating to the child.120 Conversely, a social parent may disclaim
responsibility for the child more easily than the biological parent,
leaving the child with the support of only the latter.121 Instead of
facilitating these imbalances, we should expect the law to place
both parents on equal footing as soon as possible after birth.

117. Scholars have long discussed how intent—rather than biology—has a meaningful
role in the family arrangements of same-sex kinship. See, e.g., Tarsh Bates, The Queer
Temporality of CandidaHomo Biotechnocultures, 34 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUDS. 25, 33
(2019). This is not to say that biology plays no role at all in same-sex families, but for samesex couples, biological kinship may be less significant than for different-sex couples. For
the opposite view, see Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS.
L. REV. 1065, 1083 (2016) (discussing the importance for gay people of a genetic parental
bond). This is also the case in Israel, see Noy Naaman, Bordering Legal Parenthood, 33(2)
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. SECTION (forthcoming 2022).
118. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459, 475-76 (1990).
119. As Nancy Polikoff wrote more than three decades ago, without formalizing the
child-parent relationship, a person “may even be found without standing to challenge
parental custody.” Id. at 471-73; Kelly, supra note 110, at 191 nn.17, 20 (referring to
Canadian cases in which, during this waiting period, the biological mother refused to consent
to the social mother adopting her child).
120. See Polikoff, supra note 118, at 471.
121. See id.
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Challenges to the social parent’s relationship to the child
may also arise in the event the biological parent dies before the
social parent’s parental status is formalized.
In such
circumstances, there is no guarantee that the social parent would
be allowed to continue to raise the child.122 “One can . . . readily
envision the potential conflict[s] between” the social parent and
the parents or other kin of the deceased biological parent, who
may feel entitled to take over the parental role and either adopt
the child or become the child’s legal guardians.123
3. The Collective Sphere
The third sphere, the collective, refers to relationships
among different families. Temporal discrepancy in this context
produces systematic differences between different-sex couples
who conceive via sexual intercourse and whose parental status is
characterized by “natural” temporal congruence and same-sex
couples for whom the status of one or both parents is established
remotely in time from the birth.124 Recognizing only biological
parents at the child’s birth puts same-sex couples at a
disadvantage relative to different-sex couples.125 That difference
“countenance[s] a second-class status” for the children of samesex couples whose familial stability, and emotional and financial

122. Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage for Same Sex
Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 468 (2012).
123. Ruth Zafran, More Than One Mother: Determining Maternity for the Biological
Child of a Female Same-Sex Couple—The Israeli View, 9 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115, 137
n.117 (2008). If the biological parent sets up a guardianship clause in his will naming his
partner as caregiver in the event of his death, this may address these concerns.
124. In certain jurisdictions, the conferral of the nonmarital genetic father’s parentage
does not occur automatically. See supra note 82; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting
Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV.
1177, 1187 (2010) [hereinafter Joslin, Protecting Children(?)]. However, in these cases, the
parental recognition occurs via a simple procedure of signing a form at the hospital,
immediately after the child’s birth, and without the need to undergo a court proceeding, a
process that could render the discrepancy between the construction of the self and of legal
identification more perceptible. Parness & Townsend, supra note 75, at 57.
125. See D’Ginto, supra note 111, at 1001-02.
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security are impaired as compared to the children of “traditional
families.”126
As noted above, temporal discrepancy in the context of
procreation through ART does not affect same-sex couples
exclusively.127 Nevertheless, this group is disproportionately
impacted given that most same-sex couples cannot conceive a
child genetically related to both parents.128 In jurisdictions that
limit the marital presumption or VAPs (available for unmarried
couples) to different-sex couples, the law creates systematic
differences between different-sex couples and lesbian couples
who conceive through sperm donation.129 The disadvantageous
treatment of lesbian couples comes sharply into focus by
comparison with either unmarried male partners of biological
mothers, who may be designated as the child’s father without
evidence that he is in fact the biological father,130 or male spouses
of biological mothers who may be designated as the child’s father
through the marital presumption, even in the face of evidence that
he is not in fact the child’s biological father.131
Viewing these three spheres together illustrates that the
moment of formalization affects a parent’s self-authorship as well
as familial stability, emotional bonds, and financial safeguards.
These elements set forth the very conditions under which family
arrangements can be formed, be sustained, and flourish.
Impeding parental recognition, therefore, is particularly harmful
to the becoming of families.
C. Bridging the Gap
Equipped with the foregoing observations about the adverse
implications of temporal discrepancy, we now turn to evaluate the
126. Nancy Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
201, 225-26 (2009).
127. See supra Section II.A.
128. Indeed, in some circumstances, the parties in same-sex couples are both
biologically related to the offspring. Take, for example, female same-sex couples who
conceive a child via reciprocal in-vitro fertilization, in which one woman gestates the embryo
and the other provides the ovum.
129. See Parness & Townsend, supra note 75, at 64, 72, 80.
130. See supra note 79.
131. See supra note 73.
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avenues that can prevent or mitigate them. This section discusses
both judicial132 and non-judicial procedures.133
1. Judicial Involvement134
The first solution is pre-birth legal preparation, which is to
say, to initiate a pre-birth procedure so that the judicial order can
be granted as close as possible to the birth to file the form of VAP
prior to birth.135 This procedure can be invoked starting as early
as the moment of conception, or at a later point, which may be
relevant in situations where the intent is constructed during
pregnancy.136 This process does not confer that status during
pregnancy, nor does it provide authority over the fetus or the
pregnant party’s body.137 Far from doing so, it ensures that the
establishment of legal identification occurs at the same time as,
or as close as possible to, the child’s birth.138
This procedure has several advantages. It ensures clarity and
stability in the childcare relationship that will begin immediately
at birth and acknowledges the emotional involvement of both
parents. It may also be helpful in cases of dissolutions that occur
before the post-birth order is granted by foreclosing disputes
132. See infra Section II.C.1.
133. See infra Section II.C.2.
134. Another avenue for addressing the implications discussed above is to apply the
parental order so that it becomes effective retroactively from the moment the child is born.
The benefit of this avenue is that from the moment the order is applied, the parental status,
and all the benefits and responsibilities derived from that status, is vested on the anticipated
parent. See Naaman, Parental Order, supra note 80, at 281. That solution, however, is by
nature an ex-post facto remedy, and thus does not prevent the occurrence of temporal
discrepancy and its effects, among them the disruption of self-continuity (especially in cases
when the birth certificate is not revised to list the social parent’s name), the impediment of
financial safeguards, and the peculiar vulnerability of the family in the event of tragedy (e.g.,
dissolutions or the death of one of the parents) occurring before the judicial issuance.
135. See Katherine Farese, The Bun’s in the Oven, Now What?: How Pre-Birth Orders
Promote Clarity in Surrogacy Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 25, 59 (2019).
136. Israeli law, for example, recently allows parties conceiving via sperm donation to
submit an application for a parental order sixty days prior to the birth. See FamA 9182/18
John Does v. The General Attorney, Nevo Legal Database (June 6, 2020) (Isr.). In other
jurisdictions, e.g., Florida and Minnesota, the anticipated parents can prepare the paperwork
ahead of time and even file the case before the birth, and the court will grant the actual order
after the birth. See Michelle Keeyes, ART in the Courts: Establishing Parentage of ART
Conceived Children (Part 2), 15 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 189, 192 (2016).
137. Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 250.
138. Id. at 248.
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around the existence or validity of the former couple’s mutual
consent to conceive the child.139 Such a procedure can offer
protections for both the parents and the child. For example, prebirth procedures can offset efforts by a biological parent to deny
her former partner custodial or visitation rights despite their
mutual intent to have a child and their mutual responsibility for
the child’s future.140 Similarly, pre-birth procedures can foreclose
efforts by a social parent to disclaim responsibility for the child
and leave the child with the support of only the biological parent,
contrary to the former couple’s agreement.141 That process can
also be used as a proxy for consent to raise the child together.142
Finally, assigning future parental status to the anticipated parent
in cases of same-sex couples undergoing ART matches the legal
implications applied to sex-based reproduction, in which after the
conception the genetic parent cannot deny responsibilities in
relation to the child.143
The second solution is a pre-birth legal determination of the
parental status, i.e., pre-birth orders, that will be effective at
birth.144 Under this possibility, the parties sign a parenthood
agreement and, after reviewing it, a court issues an order
confirming the anticipated parents as the eventual child’s legal
parents.145 This model, in addition to the advantages of pre-birth
139. The reason for concern is that intent can be imprecise and difficult to express, and
even when there is a written agreement, there may still be disputes concerning the scope or
validity of the agreement. See id. at 249; Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the
Marital Presumption for the Modern Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 274-75 & nn.145-46
(2019) [hereinafter Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal].
140. See Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 251.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 249.
143. See id. at 250.
144. In the United States, several jurisdictions have adopted this model. See, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(2) (West 2019); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/35(a) (2016); ME. STAT. tit.
19-a, § 1934(1)(B) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.720(4) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:12(I) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-67(a), (f)-(g) (2018); N.Y. FAM. LAW §
581-203(b), (d) (McKinney 2020); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8.1-804(a) (2020); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15C, § 804(a)(1) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.750(1)(a) (2018); D.C. CODE
§ 16-408(a), (e) (2017); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 811(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017). For further reading on this model—that is, the date
upon which the order becomes effective, see Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at
439-40.
145. Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders
in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 633-34 & n.3 (2005).
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preparation discussed above, allows the parents to be listed on the
child’s birth certificate immediately after birth and resolves
insurance coverage affairs.146
A pre-birth order, however, raises tangible concerns in
surrogacy because that order may divest the surrogate of parental
rights to the eventual child before the birth.147 This outcome
raises a concern that the surrogate may not be able to truly consent
to relinquish her future parental status before birth.148 However,
this concern can be mitigated by simply subjecting the parental
determination to a waiting period, thereby balancing the certainty
of the anticipated parents and ensuring autonomy for the
surrogate.149 Moreover, a pre-birth order should not interfere
with the gestational party’s autonomy over her body during the
period of pregnancy.150 For example, if the anticipated parents
have second thoughts regarding the pregnancy, they could not
force the surrogate to have an abortion, nor would they have any
right to withdraw their status as parents.151 Conversely, if the
surrogate has second thoughts regarding the pregnancy and
decides to have an abortion, the anticipated parents would be
unable to prevent her from doing so.152 This method can also
benefit the surrogate as it assures her that the anticipated parents,
provided that they comply with the statutory requirements, will
take responsibility for the child after his birth.153
Another potential concern is that the fetus would be legally
understood as a person if parentage is assigned before the child’s
birth.154 However, if the order becomes effective only after the
146. Id. at 634-35; Farese, supra note 135, at 59.
147. Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 235-37.
148. Conor Cory, Note, Access and Exploitation: Can Gay Men and Feminists Agree
on Surrogacy Policy?, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 133, 136, 146-47 (2015).
149. See id. at 148-49. This could be applicable only if the order becomes effective
after the child’s birth. Note that currently there are jurisdictions, such as Illinois, in which
the order is effective immediately even if issued prior the child’s birth. See 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 47/35(a) (2016). The author does not advocate for establishing a status of parentage
before the child’s birth. See, in this regard, infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
150. See Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 441.
151. Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 250.
152. Id.
153. Sara L. Ainsworth, Bearing Children, Bearing Risks: Feminist Leadership for
Progressive Regulation of Compensated Surrogacy in the United States, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1077, 1120-21 (2014).
154. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 459.
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child’s birth, such a concern, to some extent, is alleviated, because
parentage has yet to be established.155 The problem is not with
the option for a pre-birth order per se, but with “what those orders
say and do[.]”156
Pre-birth procedures, either pre-birth preparation or
determination, while laudable, are still inadequate resolutions.
From a procedural aspect, court adjudications can easily become
an invasive and frustrating process involving multiple state actors
such as welfare agencies, state attorneys, and judges.157 These
procedures may also be subject to delays both on behalf of the
administrative agencies reviewing the application for the order
and the courts authorized to issue the order.158 In emergency
scenarios, such as those occurring in the era of COVID-19, this
concern becomes more tangible, as we may anticipate further
delays—either on behalf of the parties who cannot attend hearings
or on behalf of judges—impeding the issuance of the order.159
From a substantive aspect, individuals who are unaware of the
possibility of initiating the process before birth (or who do not
have sufficient resources for attaining this knowledge) may not
take advantage of this resolution.160 Hence, judicial procedure as
a condition for assigning parentage produces a gap between
disadvantaged and wealthy individuals, impeding substantial
equality between the formation of families on the grounds of
socio-economic status. This gap should encourage us to consider
more efficient and simpler methods for formalizing parentage
status, which do not involve court adjudication. The ensuing part
surveys such methods.

155. See id. at 38.
156. Id. at 442.
157. See Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2003, 2063-64 (2014).
158. See, e.g., Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 244-45.
159. See Court Operations During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, JUSTIA,
[https://perma.cc/VYM5-FQSV] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
160. This concern is pronounced in cases of females conceiving via sperm donation
and less in surrogacy. In surrogacy, the anticipated parents are accompanied by an attorney.
Snyder & Byrn, supra note 145, at 633-34.
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2. Non-Judicial Involvement
One possibility for attributing parentage without judicial
intervention is based on pre-birth agreement which is taken into
effect at the child’s birth.161 In jurisdictions that have adopted
this model, such as Illinois,162 British Columbia,163 and
Ontario,164 if the statutory requirements—such as conducting a
written contract and using independent legal representation—are
fulfilled, the anticipated parents are registered as parents with the
relevant authorities immediately or soon after the birth.165 Under
such laws, judicial intervention is not required as a matter of
course but may be invoked in the event of a later dispute.166
Another possibility is a presumption of joint parenthood
based on couplehood. It has long been considered appropriate to
infer paternity from a couple’s relationship—as evidenced by
laws incorporating a marital presumption—laws that have
recently extended beyond the traditional heteronormative model
of marriage.167 Certain scholars, then, offer to move forward and
include couplehood as a basis for the presumption of joint
parenthood.168 This model frees the law from heteronormative
notions that are grounded exclusively in marriage,169 and
161. This possibility has been advocated by various scholars. See Joslin, Protecting
Children(?), supra note 124, at 1221; Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional
Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2016). For further reading on the
advantages of establishing parenthood based on pre-birth agreement, see Yehezkel Margalit,
Intentional Parenthood: A Solution to the Plight of Same-Sex Partners Striving for Legal
Recognition as Parents, 12 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 39, 58-60 (2013).
162. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12 (2017); Surrogacy, ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
[https://perma.cc/RK4E-USJH] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
163. Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 29 (Can.).
164. All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 10(3) (Can.).
165. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12; All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23,
§§ 10–11 (Can.).
166. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(7); Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 31(1)
(Can.); All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, §§ 10(6), 11, 13 (Can.).
167. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
168. See Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 155. To date, this model
has been implemented in three Canadian provinces. See supra note 78.
169. Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 121. That presumption,
therefore, circumvents legal limitations related to law that might have unwanted side-effects
on the parentage regime. Take, for example, a jurisdiction like Israel that is dominated by
religious law, and that does not authorize same-sex marriage (but that registers such
marriages conducted in other jurisdictions by virtue of private international law). Ayelet
Blecher-Prigat & Noy Naaman, The Abolition of Legal Marriage in Israel as a Potential
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promotes stability and predictability at a low cost, as it does not
involve judicial discretion.170
While developing a particular implementation strategy is
beyond the scope of this Article, I conclude this section by
synthesizing three sets of questions that policymakers should
consider in relation to the suggested presumption. The first
relates to the meaning of the relationship on which the
presumption is grounded:
what factors will determine
171
couplehood?
Must the couple be sharing a household?172 If
so, for how long?173 Must the couple maintain a sexual
commitment?174 What moment in time will determine whether
the parties are in a relationship: the moment of birth or of
conception?175 The second concerns the rights of third parties.
How should the presumption be applied when there are multiple
potential parents?176 Who will receive priority among these
potential parents in jurisdictions that do not recognize more than
two parents?177 The third concerns scenarios involving a lack of
Queer-Religious Project, in QUEER AND RELIGIOUS ALLIANCES: FRIENDSHIP IN FAMILY
LAW AND BEYOND (Nausica Palazzo & Jeff Redding eds., forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 2-4).
170. See Aviel, supra note 157, at 2009 n.9.
171. See, e.g., infra note 173.
172. See, e.g., infra note 173.
173. In Ontario, e.g., the All Families Are Equal Act requires a conjugal relationship
without specifying a minimum duration. See All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23,
§§ 1, 8 (Can.) (defining spouse as “the person to whom a person is married or with whom
the person is living in a conjugal relationship outside marriage”). In Saskatchewan, by
contrast, the Children’s Law Act requires a conjugal relationship of at least two years before
the moment of conception. See Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, §§ 55, 60, (defining
spouse as “legally married spouse of a person or a person with whom that person
has cohabited as spouses continuously for a period of not less than 2 years”).
174. One could assert that a commitment is not contingent on monogamy. See Edward
Stein, Adultery, Infidelity, and Consensual Non-Monogamy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 147,
168-69 (2020). This seems to be highly relevant in cases of gay men undergoing surrogacy,
as they disproportionately choose to maintain sexually non-exclusive relationships while still
committed to one another. See, e.g., Colleen H. Hoff & Sean C. Beougher, Sexual
Agreements Among Gay Male Couples, 39 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 774, 774 (2010).
175. For example, in Ontario, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan, the focus of the
presumption in cases of sperm donation is the moment of conception. See All Families Are
Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 8(3) (Can.); Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 27(3)
(Can.); Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, § 60 (Can.).
176. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U.L. REV. 227, 230-31 (2006).
177. In surrogacy, recognizing the parental status of the anticipated parents at birth
requires either ignoring the parental status of the surrogate or recognizing more than two
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consent to raise the child. Can the couple decide in advance that
the presumption will not be applied?178
Under what
circumstances, if any, can one party change his mind?179
III. PRE-BIRTH TEMPORAL DISCREPANCY
The birth of a child legally signifies the birth of
parenthood.180 Self-identification as a parent, however, may
develop much earlier, as an ongoing process, producing an
indeterminate identity as a “parent-to-be” whose legal
implications are unclear.181 The tension between how an
individual perceives the process of becoming a parent and grows
into that identification, and how that process is viewed by the law,
was classified as the second form of temporal discrepancy.182
This part focuses on this doctrinal tension, examining whether
and how the law could moderate its implications.
A. The Contours of Temporal Discrepancy
Can the law acknowledge the process of becoming a parent?
I argue that it is eminently possible to recognize this fluid process
and that of the numerous considerations that might explain its
current failure to do so, several are misguided.
Legal scholars have long investigated how time
systematically infuses the law.183 Among them is Liaquat Ali
Khan, who offers the distinction between two elements, “points
in time” and “durations” of time.184 Khan builds on these
parents (assuming that the law grants parental status to women based on the act of giving
birth). One way to approach this tension is to craft a rule requiring a post-birth waiting period
before that presumption becomes effective. Cf. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 73, at 2340;
Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 139, at 244 n.8.
178. See All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 8(3) (Can.); Family Law Act,
S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 27(3) (Can.); Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, § 60(3) (Can.).
179. One can readily envision scenarios in which the presumption should not apply
due to lack of mutual consent to raise the child together. See All Families Are Equal Act,
S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 8(3) (Can.); Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 27(3) (Can.);
Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, § 60(3) (Can.).
180. Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 120.
181. See id. at 151; see also discussion supra Section II.B.1.
182. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
184. Khan, supra note 33, at 63.
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elements to develop two other principles that are relevant to my
analysis.185 The first, “time trigger[,]” elaborates on the first
element, a point in time, and refers to the moment that activates
or ends rights and obligations.186 The second principle features
the second element, duration of time, and shows that this element
can be either definite or indefinite.187
I argue that the distinction between these principles can
explain the occurrence of temporal discrepancy. While the
construction of the legal identification as a parent is captured by
the principle of time-trigger, the construction of self-identification
may occur over a duration of time. Specifically, the time-trigger
of the legal identification is the moment a child is born, as that is
the moment at which the legal responsibilities and entitlements
inherent in the parental status initiate.188 Self-identification, by
contrast, like other human dynamics, is not always confined to a
specific point in time but develops organically and gradually. The
temporality of the human dynamic can be expressed as a duration
of time that can be either definite or indefinite.189 The
construction of self-identification is definite when that process
has a starting point and an ending point.190 For example, it may
begin at the moment of the decision to conceive and end at the
moment of the birth.191 Together, both points describe a definite
timeframe. But the duration of the development of selfidentification can also be indefinite; this is when selfidentification commences somewhere after or prior to the moment
of conception and emerges gradually, along a spectrum.192 That
185. Id. at 58.
186. Id. at 87.
187. Id. at 65-68 (noting that a provision that ceases to exist at a specified date is an
example of a legal principle characterized by a definite duration of time, and the concept of
“reasonable time” is an example of a legal principle characterized by an indefinite duration
of time).
188. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and
Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
419, 421, 435-36, 463 (2013).
189. See Khan, supra note 33, at 65-69.
190. See id. at 65.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 67. Compare this with the critique of the requirement for pre-conception
intention as a condition for parental determination. That intention, as Ayelet Blecher-Prigat
highlights, “does not emerge as a momentary event, but rather is a process that evolves and
develops over time.” See Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 151; see

3 NAAMAN.MAN.FIN .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

TIMING LEGAL PARENTHOOD

4/13/22 10:04 AM

89

spectrum, however, remains ignored from a legal perspective.193
The disparity between the development of the legal identification,
on the one hand, and the construction of self-identification, on the
other, constitutes the second form of temporal discrepancy.194
Indeed, the doctrinal analysis of temporality provides a
plausible explanation for the occurrence of temporal
discrepancy;195 however, I believe that this explanation wrongly
describes temporal discrepancy as an inevitable phenomenon. To
better understand that temporal tension, I offer to shift the gaze
toward the political considerations that shape its occurrence.
As a new infant depends on others for his survival, there is a
clear public interest in assigning responsibility for the infant to an
adult who can take care of his needs immediately upon his
birth.196 Would this interest not be better served if the anticipated
parents were legally recognized as such before the birth? Why,
then, do so many legal regimes use birth as the triggering event
for creating the legal status of parenthood?197 I outline two
explanations below, each grounded in political-cultural
considerations.
The first explanation reflects an interest in protecting the
self-determination of the party who carries the fetus.198 This
consideration can be divided into two interrelated concerns. The
first is that recognizing the legal status of the parent-to-be might
equate prenatal life with actual life.199 Once the law formalizes
the legal status of the anticipated parent as such, the argument

also Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases:
Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 661
(2012) (stating that “[w]hether that intent existed, and whether it was demonstrated through
particular understandings and conduct, would seem to be more important than its precise
timing (i.e., whether it was manifested before or after conception).”). My analysis extends
beyond that critique and encompasses other relational elements underlying the process of
becoming a parent that slip under the radar of the law. See infra notes 220-24 and
accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
196. Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 188, at 463-64.
197. Id. at 421, 435-36, 463.
198. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 457, 459; see supra notes 150-52
and accompanying text.
199. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 408.
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goes, it equally accords legal status to the fetus as a child-to-be.200
Granting legal existence to the fetus, however, plays into antiabortion rhetoric at odds with women’s right to selfdetermination.201 For that reason, it comes as no surprise that prochoice advocates focus on the moment of birth as the outset of a
woman’s relational status to the fetus.202 The second concern
involves the relationship between the gestational party and the
anticipated parents, which becomes apparent in the context of
surrogacy and pre-birth orders.203 This line of concern focuses on
the possibility that recognizing a legal status of “parent-to-be”
might be construed as granting such parties abortion-related rights
that would limit the self-determination of pregnant women.204
However, recognizing the period at which a parent is
anticipating parenthood is not the same as recognizing parental
status, nor does it endow this status with the same rights to which
a parent is entitled.205 As I will illustrate in the next section, the
implications of becoming a parent are separate from questions
regarding when a fetus is deemed to become a person and do not
inherently grant legal rights to the fetus.206 Understanding that
the process of becoming a parent can be legally recognized
without acknowledging the personhood of the fetus and without
infringing on the gestational party’s self-determination
diminishes these concerns.207
200. Id. at 408, 441-42.
201. This concern has been evident within the debate around the Missing Angel Act in
the United States, which authorizes grieving parents to request from the state a birth
certificate for a stillborn child. With this in mind, Carol Sanger posits that the stakes of
recognizing that emotional suffering of the grieving parents, the (lost) to-be-parents, “may
take on a life of its own” by granting benefits to the grieving parent in the year of the birth.
Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for Law,
100 CAL. L. REV. 269, 306-08 (2012). Doing so, Sanger cautions, equates prenatal life with
life of a born baby, playing into the trap of those who advocate for criminalizing abortions.
Id. This concern has been raised in relation to pre-birth orders that establish the parental
status of the intended parents in surrogacy prior to the birth. See Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy,
supra note 37, at 441.
202. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Disembodied Womb: Pregnancy, Informed Consent,
and Surrogate Motherhood, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 96, 102 (2018).
203. Cory, supra note 148, at 144-45.
204. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic
Entitlement, 91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 522-24 (2017).
205. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
206. See infra Section III.B.
207. Cory, supra note 148, at 144-45.
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A second explanation for why the creation of the legal status
of parenthood is tethered to the moment of the child’s birth is
grounded in cultural beliefs surrounding childbearing.208
According to the Jewish tradition, for instance, taking certain
actions before a birth, including having baby showers, revealing
a baby’s intended name, and buying clothes or preparing a room
for the baby, should be postponed until the birth to avoid “bad
luck.”209 This belief reflects the broader idea rooted in the Jewish
tradition that celebrating something we anticipate before it
happens might cause the “evil eye” (ayin hara).210 This line of
thought runs through the regulation of parental orders in Israel,
specifically in the Attorney General’s approach when opposing
petitions to provide pre-birth orders,211 and in a recent report
issued by a government-appointed task force that assesses the
circumstances under which a parental order can be issued.212
However, ignoring the process of becoming a parent in the
name of such cultural beliefs is problematic in the context of
today’s technologically sophisticated environment.213 As I
explain below, the law can recognize that an individual is
anticipating parenthood without taking any direct action
concerning the eventual child or granting legal rights to the fetus
as a separate entity.
B. Bridging the Gap
How, and for what purpose, can the law recognize the
process of becoming a parent? To pursue this inquiry, I focus on
208. See, e.g., Yael Hashiloni-Dolev, The Effect of Jewish-Israeli Family Ideology on
Policy Regarding Reproductive Technologies, in BIOETHICS AND BIOPOLITICS IN ISRAEL:
SOCIO-LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Hagai Boas, et., eds., 2018).
209. See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, Miscarriage, Superstition and the Jewish Baby
Shower, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014, 11:01 AM), [https://perma.cc/W545-2QBY] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2021). The Jewish belief is in contrast with the Christian notion of
conferring early status as a person. Hashiloni-Dolev, supra note 208, at 124-25.
210. Rabbi Philip Sherman, Why Don’t Many Jewish Couples Have Baby Showers or
Buy Things for Their Baby Ahead of Time? JEWISHBOSTON (Aug. 20, 2013),
[https://perma.cc/H3KN-LJY3] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
211. That opposition was represented in their response to the appeal submitted to the
Supreme Court in FamA 9182/18 John Does v. The General Attorney (June 6, 2020), Nevo
Legal Database (Isr.).
212. INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at 30-31.
213. Sherman, supra note 210.
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two terrains in which temporal discrepancy occurring before birth
emerges; in each, I identify various ways in which questions of
parentage arise prior to the moment of the birth, assess how the
failure to recognize the process of becoming a parent inflicts harm
on that person, and consider how an inclusive vision of becoming
a parent might look. Far from offering a full prescription, I hope
that my analysis can be used as a stepping stone for thinking more
seriously about the law in a way that promotes accountability for
such harms.
Let’s begin with the two elements of the suggested vision.
The first concerns the timeframe of becoming a parent. The
process of becoming a parent is oriented by several events
transpiring during the process of conceiving and carrying a child
to term; the birth is only one constitutive, though crucial, event in
that process.214 Such understanding may become more apparent
in cases of ART, where the trajectory to parenthood could take
years, especially if that process involves experience of
conception-related difficulties and can be challenging and timeconsuming.215 The way individuals perceive themselves as
becoming parents, therefore, may not be forged abruptly at their
child’s birth, but may instead develop gradually and become
complete at the birth.216 That is, the birth completes, rather than
establishes, this process.217 Accordingly, I propose that this
period of time should be considered in disputes relating to
parenthood.218
214. See supra Section III.A.
215. Gash & Raiskin, supra note 102, at 97, 99.
216. See Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 151; see also supra
Section III.A.
217. See supra Section III.A.
218. One question, which will accompany us throughout the ensued discussion and
should be considered further, is when exactly this process initiates. There are several
possibilities—the moment of a mutual consent to conceive, the moment of initial conception
(sperm meets egg), the moment of fertilization (an embryo forms), the moment of
implantation (the embryo successfully implants in the wall of the uterus), or somewhere after
that point during pregnancy. It seems that the significance of determining the moment at
which this process initiates varies in accordance with specific legal aspects. For assisted
reproduction purposes, questions such as the following arise: if one consented to the assisted
reproduction after the pregnancy occurred, might one be able to change one’s mind? And,
if this happens, does the withdrawal depend on the approval of the other party? Also, what
if one consents, but then later seeks to withdraw consent and does so prior to transfer and
conception? Is it then possible that one might still be held to be a parent of the resulting
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The second element concerns the content of that timeframe.
The process of becoming a parent is not confined to events with
biological elements, such as sexual intercourse, conception, or the
delivery of the child.219 The process also encompasses relational
elements, such as the mutual decision to conceive and raise a
child, multiple forms of work associated with the process of
becoming a parent—like adopting behavioral patterns needed to
prepare for the parental role and developing a social network to
facilitate the adjustment to the new role of a parent220—and
special arrangements involved in ART procedure,221 such as
aspects of the decision-making processes, e.g., whom of the two
women would carry and bear the child,222 or whom of the two
men would supply the sperm to impregnate the egg donor,223
researching medical options and legal constraints, finding a clinic
for the reproductive procedure, meeting an egg or sperm donor,
meeting physicians or surrogacy agency staff for in-vitro
fertilization, selecting a surrogacy agency, choosing a prospective
surrogate and establishing meaningful relationship with her,224
and undertaking legal actions involved in that process, such as
negotiating the agreements involved.225 All such elements, in the
eyes of the anticipated parent, contribute to the child’s birth and
shape his selfhood as a parent, which he experiences as an
ongoing process rather than as something fixed or static.226
child? In the United States, for example, the 2017 UPA allows the intended party in
surrogacy to change its mind before an embryo transfer. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 808(a)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017); see also Dara E. Purvis, Expectant
Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 330, 330, 335 (2015).
219. David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 309, 325-30 (2019).
220. Id. at 327-30.
221. Gash & Raiskin, supra note 102, at 104; Darren Rosenblum et al., Pregnant
Man?: A Conversation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 208-17 (2010).
222. For the complexity of this aspect, see Abbie E. Goldberg, The Transition to
Parenthood for Lesbian Couples, 2 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 13, 24-25 (2006).
223. Dana Berkowitz, Gay Men and Surrogacy, in LGBT-PARENT FAMILIES:
INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH & IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 76 (Abbie E. Goldberg &
Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013).
224. Elly Teman & Zsuzsa Berend, Surrogate Non-Motherhood: Israeli and US
Surrogates Speak about Kinship and Parenthood, 25 ANTHROPOLOGY & MED. 296, 300,
308 (2018).
225. Id. at 299.
226. Compare with the literature of legal embodiment. See, e.g., Ruth Fletcher et al.,
Legal Embodiment: Analysing the Body of Healthcare Law 16 MED. L. REV. 321, 335-44
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Accordingly, one may view both the biological and relational
elements as constituting the parental status.227
That
understanding, in turn, produces a need to consider how the law
could be more responsive to the experience of becoming a parent.
I should clarify that I do not suggest that the anticipated
parent should be legally recognized as a parent before the child’s
birth or that anticipated parents should have parental rights before
the birth. Instead, I propose that the law should acknowledge the
process of becoming both through the body and the self and
should reflect both the physical implications of that process and
its relational elements, though without neglecting the gestationalrelated concerns discussed above. In the following sections, I
examine two terrains that exemplify pre-birth temporal
discrepancy and consider how the implementation of my vision
might look.
1. Work-Family Conflicts
In various jurisdictions, the law provides employment
entitlements based on parental status, such as paternity leave and
protections against discrimination based on parental status,
regardless of who carried the fetus or has a genetic relationship to
the child.228 When it comes to the period of pregnancy, however,
the law generally provides special rights only to the pregnant
woman.229 This is out of the recognition that pregnancy, a
condition unique to women, entails peculiar physical and social
implications.230 Pregnant women, for example, are more likely to
face employment discrimination based on the assumption that
(2008) (stressing the subjective, intersubjective, material, and symbolic dimensions of
embodiment, and how these dimensions do, and should, inform the law).
227. Some scholars argue that the embodiments of becoming a parent extend beyond
identity-constituting and involve also relationship-constituting. Alison Reiheld, “The Event
That Was Nothing”: Miscarriage as a Liminal Event, 46 J. SOC. PHIL. 9, 11 (2015).
228. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.120 (2018).
229. When the law does provide the anticipated father with benefits relating to
pregnancy, though, it is mostly when it is necessary for him to care for his pregnant partner.
See, e.g., the Family and Medical Leave Act in the United States which provides beneﬁts
relating to pregnancy to an anticipated father only when necessary “to care for a pregnant
spouse . . . .” See 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(5) (2018).
230. Joanna L. Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy Discrimination Law as It
Approaches Full Term, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 825, 848-49 (2016).
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they will soon be missing work due to their caregiving
responsibilities.231
The process of becoming a parent, nonetheless, involves
human investments that do not flow directly from its gestational
elements, such as attending prenatal appointments and learning
how to care for an infant.232 Additionally, the process may
provoke physiological or psychological effects unrelated to
carrying the fetus, such as antenatal depression among anticipated
fathers due to worries about being a parent.233 These investments
and implications are overlooked by the law, however,
exemplifying what I theorize as one type of temporal
discrepancy.234
The implications of this oversight are palpable in two
categories of employment conflicts, both of which are peculiar to
couples in which neither party is pregnant, e.g., couples (same- or
different-sex), or single individuals who have children through
surrogacy. The first category involves adverse employment
actions based on the parent-to-be status.235 In a scenario in which
an employer’s decision not to hire a (non-pregnant) prospective
employee or not to promote a current (non-pregnant) employee
based on that employee’s status as an anticipated parent, the
employee may find himself without a cause of action under antidiscrimination laws.236 For example, when a single man is
anticipating becoming a parent by surrogacy, the employer might
assume that he is not a dependable employee because of potential
future obligations reducing his investment in work, especially
after the birth.237 Because, in the classic scenario, this assumption
231. Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty, 112 AM.
J. SOCIO. 1297, 1297 (2007); Caroline Gatrell, Managing the Maternal Body: A
Comprehensive Review and Transdisciplinary Analysis, 13 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 97, 98100 (2011).
232. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 327-30.
233. Id. at 337.
234. See supra Section III.A.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 253-54.
236. See infra text accompanying notes 253-54.
237. There is a presumption that employers prefer anticipated fathers as compared to
men who do not expect children out of the assumption that anticipated fathers increase their
breadwinning efforts. See Fontana & Shoenbaum, supra note 219, at 348 & n.241 (citing
Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, Parenthood and the Earnings of Married Men and Women,
7 LAB. ECON. 689, 705-06 (2000)). However, that may not be true in cases of a gay couple
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typically disadvantages pregnant women, anti-discrimination
statutes contemplate recourse for adverse actions taken against
pregnant employees.238 Single men, gay couples, and other nongestational parents, however, may be considered outside the
scope of such statutes’ protections.239
The second category involves adverse employment actions
based on the conduct of the anticipated parent, such as
disciplining an employee for being absent from work to attend a
prenatal appointment or ultrasound test of the surrogate or any
other pre-birth caregiving responsibilities.240 Such actions may
not give rise to an actionable claim of discrimination, since the
law generally does not consider non-gestational anticipated
parents to be within the scope of individuals entitled to invoke
statutory protections.241 By contrast, an anticipated gestational
mother may have a cause of action in the same scenario.242 Giving
legal rights only to the prebirth care-work of a pregnant person is
normatively problematic, especially once we realize that people
undergoing ART have particular prebirth arrangements that may
require their absence from work.243
These two categories of conflicts illustrate that during the
period of pregnancy—or even earlier, while conducting fertility
treatments—certain employees may be subject to adverse
employment actions based on their status or efforts as parents-tobe, but lack legal remedies to redress them.244 Scholars argue that
conceiving through surrogacy given the assumption that the employee will be more likely to
be absent to fulfill his parental responsibilities.
238. Courts in the United States have held that Title VII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (“PDA”) “prohibit[] an employer from discriminating against a woman
‘because of her capacity to become pregnant.’” See, e.g., Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners,
400 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991)).
239. See Fontana & Shoenbaum, supra note 219, at 338.
240. For a discussion of the antagonism directed toward male caregiving embedded in
the workplace, see Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home:
Uncovering the Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
253, 257, 265-69 (2013).
241. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
242. For example, the United States PDA, which amended Title VII to protect against
pregnancy discrimination, covers only women. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
243. See In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 10, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/8934-X52G] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
244. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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this vulnerability lies in the fact that pregnancy is sexualized—
i.e., that issues arising during pregnancy are framed as issues
pertaining exclusively to women—and, therefore, the
implications of pregnancy that are independent of the pregnant
body are invisible to the law.245 Following this line of thought, I
suggest thinking about these conflicts through the lens of
becoming a parent. That is, rather than focusing on pregnancy per
se, we should consider how the period of gestation incorporates
both biological and relational elements.246 By disentangling the
implications of becoming a parent from those that relate to the
physician condition of pregnancy, I do not aim to trivialize the
risks of pregnancy for the gestational party, nor to obscure how
pregnancy has been used to justify the oppression of women.
Rather to clear space for thinking how the law could be responsive
to the nuanced needs of all anticipated parents, including those of
the non-gestational anticipated parents.
Two ways emerge for implementing such a vision in
practice. The first, as David Fontana and Naomi Schoenbaum
offer, is to provide to non-gestational anticipated parents the same
entitlements that pregnant women receive when the entitlements
are designed to address non-biological prebirth care and
commitments.247 These may include, for example, the right to be
absent from work to attend prenatal obstetrician appointments.248
While employers cannot ask for evidence of the appointment,
employers may ask for a declaration of the time and date of the
appointment and of the employee’s relationship with the person
undergoing treatment.249 This avenue would ensure that the nongestational parents could engage in pre-birth work without the
risk of adverse employment consequences.250 It would also
245. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, 311-13.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 217-27.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 217-27; Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note
219, at 324, 336, 338, 354.
248. For example, the UK created a sex-neutral paid prenatal leave program allowing
the non-gestational party to be absent from work to attend a number of prenatal
appointments. See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills & Jo Swinson, Press
Release: New Right for Fathers and Partners to Attend Antenatal Appointments, GOV.UK
(Oct. 2, 2014), [https://perma.cc/8ZCP-DKVQ] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
249. Id.
250. See Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 339-40, 366.
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encourage early development of the emotional bond between
parent and child, which may be weaker when the anticipated
parent does not carry the fetus, by facilitating the involvement of
the anticipated parents in the process of becoming a parent.251
Finally, fostering the non-gestational party’s involvement can
strengthen the relationship between parents so that they can
effectively co-parent the child.252
Another avenue to further consider is providing protection
against employment discrimination based on the employee’s
status of parent-to-be. Just as employment laws prohibit
discrimination against an employee based on parental status after
the child’s birth (regardless of the employee’s gestational or
genetic tie to the child), the law could extend those protections to
the pre-birth period.253 Specifically, the law could recognize
“anticipated parents” as a protected class under current regimes
or enact separate restrictions to prevent employers from
terminating employees based on their status of becoming parents.
These protections could be triggered, for example, by the
employee’s initiation of fertility treatments, at the moment the
employee shares his intention to do so with the employer, or when
the employee informs the employer about the pregnancy of their
future child—namely, when the employee becomes vulnerable to
biases concerning his future commitment to the workplace. This
avenue, however, requires careful consideration of who falls
within the class of anticipated parents,254 and necessitates a
determination of how it could operate in such a manner which
does not unduly burden employers.

251. Id. at 345.
252. This outcome is vital for marriage-like relationships that lack the institutional
support for the commitment that marriage enjoys. See Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without
Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 562-64 (2007).
253. The Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-19, s 5 (provincial statute prohibiting
employment discrimination in Ontario) is an illustrative scheme that could implement these
avenue. This statute provides protections against discrimination on the ground of family
status. It might be worth observing that nothing necessarily prevents a tribunal from
interpreting this protected ground under the Ontario Human Rights Code in a way that
extends protection back in time to cover the context of pregnancy. I am indebted to Kerry
Rittich for this observation.
254. One way could be those who are or who might be determined to be parents at the
moment of the child’s birth.

3 NAAMAN.MAN.FIN .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

TIMING LEGAL PARENTHOOD

4/13/22 10:04 AM

99

2. Reproductive Malpractice
Reproductive malpractice resulting in pregnancy loss
provides another manifestation of temporal discrepancy. As these
disputes arise at the moment tortious conduct suddenly disrupts
the process of becoming a parent, they exemplify the relationship
between the “to-be” self—specifically its liminal character255—
and the law’s (ex-post) acknowledgment of that status or liminal
event.256 This section examines how a broader vision of
becoming a parent can be implemented to address such disputes.
To pursue my inquiry, I consider compensation-based schemes
for intangible harms, under the laws of the United States and
Israel, though my analysis could be applicable to other
jurisdictions as well, given that the inquiry under consideration
transcends jurisdictional boundaries.257
Jurisdictions in the United States vary in terms of the scope
of the right to recovery they recognize for intangible harms
arising out of tortious pregnancy loss.258 Most jurisdictions
provide legal recourse for such harms only if the plaintiff suffers
a physical injury.259 Accordingly, non-gestational parties
typically have no legal claim for malpractice resulting in a
miscarriage or stillbirth.260 Courts in the United States that have
permitted legal recovery for a non-gestational parent have limited
255. Reiheld, supra note 227, at 9-12.
256. Id. at 17.
257. I do not purport to offer a doctrinal analysis. For a comprehensive overview of
the statutes and judicial cases in the United States, see, e.g., Jill Wieber Lens, Tort Law’s
Devaluation of Stillbirth, 19 NEV. L.J. 955, 987-92 (2019).
258. It was only in 2004, for example, in the case of Broadnax v. Gonzalez, that the
New York Court of Appeals permitted the gestational plaintiff, the grieving anticipated
mother, to recover for emotional anguish resulting from miscarriage (or stillbirth) caused by
medical malpractice even though she did not suffer any physical injuries. See, 809 N.E.2d
645, 648-49 (N.Y. 2004). The court clarified that this recourse is not applicable to the father,
and commentators have argued that this view is grounded “on the inseparable and completely
intertwined relationship between the mother and the fetus.” Alicia A. Ellis, Note, Better Late
Than Never: New York Finally Closes the “Gap” in Recovery Permitted for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Prenatal Medical Malpractice Cases, 80 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 725, 750 (2006).
259. For a critique of this legal principle, see generally DOV FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND
WRONGS: HOW MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE REMAKING REPRODUCTION AND THE
LAW (2019).
260. Jill Lens shows that only a few courts have recognized a claim by the father. See
Lens, supra note 257, at 987.
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liability to circumstances in which that parent witnessed the
conduct causing the physical injury or the plaintiff’s own physical
safety was at risk.261 The reluctance to compensate a nongestational party for other intangible harms incident to pregnancy
loss reinforces the notion that becoming a parent is essentially a
gestational process.
This reductionist understanding of parenthood-to-be is
normatively problematic.
Research has shown that both
gestational and non-gestational parents experience emotional
suffering in the event of pregnancy loss due to psychological
factors involved in pregnancy.262 The psychologist Anna
Brandon, for example, demonstrated that developing a prenatal
attachment during pregnancy can transpire regardless of the
anticipated parent’s sex.263 The research of Nathaniel Wagner on
anticipated parents who lost their fetus showed that “men suffer
loss in much the same way as women and that culture is the
primary factor leading to the demonstrated difference in response
. . . .”264 Likewise, an Irish study that examined the emotional
impact of miscarriage on men found that men are inclined to hide
their emotions so that they would be perceived as strong for their
partners.265 Overall, this research demonstrates that there is a
need to approach this experience from a perspective that
denaturalizes the link between the psychological and gestational
experiences of becoming a parent.
One could envision intangible injuries in this context as
those involving the disruption of the self-authorship,266 the loss of
261. Id. at 988.
262. See, e.g., Nathaniel J. Wagner et al., Fathers’ Lived Experiences of Miscarriage,
26 FAM. J.: COUNSELING & THERAPY FOR COUPLES & FAMS. 193, 193, 195-96, 198 (2018);
Anna R. Brandon et al., A History of the Theory of Prenatal Attachment, J. PRENATAL &
PERINATAL PSYCH. & HEALTH 201, 213 (2009).
263. Brandon et al., supra note 262, at 210-11.
264. Nathaniel J. Wagner et al., supra note 262, at 193.
265. McDonald, Men’s Feelings Ignored Over Miscarriages, SUNDAY TIMES (Aug.
15, 2004, 1:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/5RQX-V9K5] (last visited Nov. 25, 2021).
266. Such an argument can be supported by studies highlighting how the prenatal
period becomes a driving force that leads to the development of the paternal identity. See
Catarina Silva et al., Transition to Fatherhood in the Prenatal Period: A Qualitative Study,
26 CIÊNCIA & SAÚDE COLETIVA 465, 466-70 (2021); Hongjian Cao et al., Identity
Transformation During the Transition to Parenthood Among Same-Sex Couples: An
Ecological, Stress-Strategy-Adaptation Perspective, 8 J. FAM. THEORY & REV. 30, 30
(2016). In this regard, Dov Fox offers to think about the intangible harm caused to the
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possibility,267 the expectations for becoming a parent,268 or the
linear process of “relationship-constituting[,]”269 all of which
resonate with the notion of being invested in “physical . . . human
. . . and social capital . . . .”270 This investment includes various
elements, such as accumulating goods needed to care for the
eventual child, forming social networks necessary for the
pregnancy or the eventual child, or other activities involved in
developing the identity of a future parent.271 Focusing on these
elements—all of which are shared by the gestational and the nongestational anticipated parents—highlights the shortcomings of
regimes that limit the scope of non-gestational parties’ recourse
for intangible losses.272
That limitation, furthermore, raises a paradox in surrogacy.
Though the surrogate is likely to be compensated for her
emotional distress, the actual anticipated parents’ distress over
the loss of the eventual child may remain uncompensated.273
Certainly, pregnancy loss entails a penetrating emotional loss.274
This has been shown to be true even for surrogates who disclaim
any attachment to the fetus, and regardless of the level of fetal
development or whether the surrogate suffers a physical injury.275
Yet the anticipated parents are at least as susceptible as the
anticipated parent in similar events of reproductive malpractice, e.g., the loss of frozen
embryos caused by the fertility clinic, as “[t]he disruption of family planning” because the
tortfeasor’s actions invade “the control individuals have over their reproductive lives[,]” and
cause the loss of “people’s legitimate expectations to exercise a reasonable measure of
control over decisions about having children.” See Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 159, 172, 210-11 (2017).
267. Julia Frost et al., The Loss of Possibility: Scientisation of Death and the Special
Case of Early Miscarriage, 29 SOCIO. HEALTH & ILLNESS 1003, 1013 (2007).
268. See Erica Richards, Note, Loss of Potential Parenthood as a Statutory Solution to
the Conflict Between Wrongful Death Remedies and Roe v. Wade, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
809, 812-13 (2006).
269. See Reiheld, supra note 227,at 11.
270. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 327.
271. Id. at 327-30.
272. See id. at 327-28, 330.
273. Lens, supra note 257, at 976 n.154.
274. Zsuzsa Berend, Surrogate Losses: Understandings of Pregnancy Loss and
Assisted Reproduction Among Surrogate Mothers, 24 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 240, 242
(2010).
275. See id. at 242-44, 253 (framing the surrogate’s harm as a failure to deliver the
promised “gift of life” and a loss of both “the . . . ‘journey’ and the dream of fully belonging
to the surrogate community” and “the [anticipated parents’] trust and appreciation”).
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surrogate to mental anguish in the event of pregnancy loss, though
they may experience their grief differently.276
Tort law is one means by which private parties pursue
reparation for their injuries.277 Grounding legal recovery for
intangible harms associated with tortious pregnancy loss
exclusively on the gestational bond is at odds with modern family
structures and technological innovations that disentangle biology
from the responsibility of raising a child.278 Moreover, its
gestational focus produces a systematic distinction between
couples who conceive with the assistance of a surrogate and other
couples.279 These observations underscore the need for tort law
to evolve to reflect modern realities, compensate all anticipated
parents who suffer emotional injuries as a result of tortious
conduct, and redress systematic inequalities.
Critics of this view will undoubtedly argue that once we
begin to consider according non-gestational parties legal rights
and remedies in relation to pregnancy loss, we open the door to
claims by such parties that would restrict women’s reproductive
right to abortion.280 Certainly, that is a tangible concern.
Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons to believe that
abortion rights and my vision could coexist.281 First, while my
suggested view contemplates compensation for tortious conduct
resulting in the loss of pregnancy, “[a]bortion is a voluntary
termination of pregnancy.”282 Second, my suggested view does
not create any rights for the unborn child, but instead, it aims to
provide recovery to the grieving individuals for their emotional
pain stemming from the loss of pregnancy and of the relationship
with their desired (unborn) child.

276. See generally Christa Craven and Elizabeth Peel, Stories of Grief and Hope:
Queer Experiences of Reproductive Loss, in QUEERING MOTHERHOOD: NARRATIVE AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Margaret F. Gibson, ed., 2014).
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
278. See Lens, supra note 257, at 987.
279. See id. at 976 n.154.
280. See Sanger, supra note 201, at 305; Rita M. Dunaway, The Personhood Strategy:
A State’s Prerogative to Take Back Abortion Law, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 327, 327 (2011).
281. Cf. Lens, supra note 257, at 1009-12 (positing that a tort recognition of stillbirth
is consistent with abortion rights).
282. Id. at 1006.
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The Israeli regulatory regime illustrates how challenges to
gestation-based distinctions can channel a more inclusive vision
of becoming a parent. The Israeli Supreme Court in Levy v.
Shaare Zedek Medical Center (“Levi”) paved the way for a
regulatory scheme that allows anticipated non-gestational parents
to recover for intangible harms associated with tortious
pregnancy-related injuries.283 Levi involved a prenatal injury
when a fetus “died” in utero as a result of the hospital’s
negligence.284 The court ruled that both the anticipated mother
and the anticipated father could be compensated for their
emotional harm.285 All three judges held that the anticipated
mother was a direct victim due to her role in the act of giving
birth, during which the damage was caused.286 But the judges
were split as to whether the anticipated father, who was exposed
to the anticipated mother’s injury, should be classified as a direct
victim or a secondary victim.287
283. See CivA 754/05 Levy v. Shaare Zedek Med. Ctr., 218(2) PD 218, 255 (2007)
(Isr.).
284. Id. at 218, 234, 249.
285. Id. at 251, 258. It should be emphasized that this recovery is separate from the
legal recourse available to the gestational parent in relation to the physical experience of her
pregnancy loss. See id. at 246-49 (noting that direct victims who suffer tangible injuries may
recover damages notwithstanding the restrictions Israeli courts apply to indirect victims
seeking reparations for intangible injuries). Under earlier Israeli Supreme Court precedent,
a person who suffers emotional harm as a consequence of severe bodily injury negligently
caused to a close relative can recover only if the emotional harm is severe and provokes
substantial mental consequences. See LCivA 444/87 Alsoucha v. Estate of Dehan, 44(3) PD
397, 433-36 (1990) (Isr.). Specifically, that emotional harm must amount “to a mental
disease (psychosis) or a mental disturbance (neurosis) involving a considerable amount of
disability . . . .” Levi, 218(2) PD at 244. However, that decision left room for flexibility in
applying the criteria. Alsoucha, 44(3) PD at 432. The Court in Levi decided that the
circumstances under consideration justified flexibility and thus ruled that the anticipated
father was entitled to compensation for his emotional harm, notwithstanding the absence of
a serious emotional disability. Levi, 218(2) PD at 252-53, 255.
286. Levi, 218(2) PD at 246, 249, 262, 265. It is worth noting that while the majority
agreed with the trial court’s classification of the anticipated mother as a direct victim, it
remarked that the anticipated mother was not harmed “in the usual sense[,]” as the emotional
distress she suffered resulted from “the death of another—the [fetus] that was in her womb.”
Id. at 246, 249. Indeed, the court opined that the obvious connection between the anticipated
mother and the fetus created a layer of complexity that placed her “on both sides of the
dividing line between a secondary victim and a [direct] victim, with one foot on each side.”
Id. at 249. The court ultimately determined that the anticipated mother could recover
damages regardless of her classification. Id. at 270 (Joubran J., concurring).
287. Id. at 250, 262 (Hayut, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 266 (Joubran,
J., concurring).
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The majority opinion held that the anticipated father was a
secondary victim, reasoning that the injury he suffered derived
solely from his exposure to the tortious conduct that directly
injured the anticipated mother.288 The majority acknowledged the
emotional involvement of the father in the process of conceiving
the fetus, emphasizing, for example, his “torment involved in the
lengthy and exhausting fertility treatments, the keen anticipation
of the child that was about to be born[,] and the bitter pain . . . .”289
In the majority’s view, however, that involvement did not make
the anticipated father a direct victim, but it nevertheless justified
compensating him for his emotional harm, although he did not
suffer the severe mental consequences required by previous legal
precedents.290
By contrast, the minority opinion of Justice Hayut concluded
that the anticipated father should be regarded as a direct victim,
reasoning that he experienced a direct loss as the anticipated
parent of the eventual child.291 Hayut stressed that the process of
conceiving a child is “the result of a partnership and a joint
physical and emotional effort of the spouses as parents . . . .”292
That substantive involvement, in Hayut’s view, justifies treating
an anticipated father as a primary victim.293 That approach
embraces a both/and view of parenthood, which incorporates both
biological and relational elements, while acknowledging the
central and crucial role of the pregnancy experienced by women

288. Levi, 218(2) PD at 250 (majority opinion), 267 (Joubran J., concurring) (“[T]he
emotional damage that he suffered derived from his identification with the suffering that the
mother experienced and from his being a full partner on an emotional level in the birth
process.”).
289. Id. at 266-67 (Joubran, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 255 (majority opinion), 267 (Joubran J., concurring).
291. Id. at 263 (Hayut, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Admittedly, from
a purely physical viewpoint, the mother naturally has a major role in the process as the person
carrying the [fetus] in her womb and as the person from whose womb the [fetus] emerges
into the world. But this does not, in my opinion, detract from the extent of the father’s
emotional and psychological involvement in the process (except in cases where such
involvement does not exist for one reason or another).”).
292. Id.
293. Levi, 218(2) PD at 263 (Hayut J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in procreation.294 That understanding is reflected in the outcome,
which awarded higher compensation to the anticipated mother.295
By shifting the gaze from the gestational elements of
becoming a parent toward its relational elements, Hayut’s rhetoric
embraces an inclusive vision of becoming a parent of the kind I
encourage throughout this Article.296 It conveys a clear message
that pregnancy is a joint experience that involves the mutual
responsibility of both (or sometimes multiple) anticipated parents
and values emotional investment by both men and women in
becoming parents.297 Scholars have long discussed how the legal
discourse of parenthood is constructed by such a narrow
definition of masculinity.298 Recently, more feminist scholarship
has emerged that considers how the post-birth, traditional gender
division of labor is shaped by the period before the birth,299
illustrating the potential of valuing the emotional involvement of
both parents already before birth, as represented by Justice
Hayut’s opinion in the Levi decision.300 This is not to say that
judicial rhetoric alone can undo traditional norms or reshape
family arrangements.301 Nevertheless, incremental changes
consistent with that rhetoric would be important steps toward a
legal framework that acknowledges and supports the full range of
experiences involved in the journey toward parenthood.

294. Id.
295. Justice Hayut awarded NIS 500,000 to the anticipated mother and NIS 350,000 to
the anticipated father. That difference is grounded on the presumption that the emotional
harm of the anticipated mother is shaped also by the physical elements of carrying the fetus.
Id. at 264.
296. See supra Section III.B.
297. See Levi, 218(2) PD at 262-63 (Hayut J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring
Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1048-50 (2012); Dara E. Purvis, The Sexual
Orientation of Fatherhood, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 983, 984-85 (2013). Karin Carmit Yefet,
Feminism and Hyper-Masculinity in Israel: A Case Study in Deconstructing Legal
Fatherhood, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47, 49-50 (2015).
299. See, e.g., Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 311-13, 315.
300. Levi, 218(2) PD at 263 (Hayut J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
301. See also Daphna Hacker, Single and Married Women in the Law of Israel—A
Feminist Perspective, 9 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDS. 29, 52 (2001).
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CONCLUSION
The time has come to think more seriously about the
becoming of legal parental status. The concept of temporal
discrepancy reveals how traditional understandings of becoming
a parent, embedded in different bodies of the law, marginalizes
certain modalities of life and renders them vulnerable.302 This
concept clears space for considering an alternative framework for
breaking with this understanding and mitigating its crippling
outcomes.
I offer to implement this framework both at the time of the
child’s birth by conferring the parental status as close as possible
to the birth,303 and in the period preceding the child’s birth by
proposing a legal understanding that syncs with the experience of
becoming a parent.304 This understanding acknowledges the
relational elements of becoming a parent, such as the social
burdens involved in the process, emotional involvement, and
other precious human investments that often remain invisible.305
This understanding could be implemented by providing legal
protections to the anticipated parents ex-ante, when they are
anticipating parenthood—as exemplified in the discussion of
work-family conflicts306 —and/or ex-post, when the process of
becoming parents is disrupted by a tortious act—as in conflicts
arising from instances of reproductive malpractice.307
My hope is that this analysis can be used as a starting point
for further scholarly and legislative conversations about how the
law could embrace the process of becoming a parent. Instead of
asking only when does a parent become a parent, we should also
ask: how does a parent become a parent? Framing the question
broadly to incorporate the process illuminates the need to
consider its richness and to examine more seriously its
implications.

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.1
See supra Section III.B.2
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While articulating a detailed blueprint for this understanding
as it applies in various legal contexts is beyond the scope of this
Article, my analysis offers several considerations for future
conversations. These include: who falls within the class of
anticipated parents? What timeframe applies to the process of
becoming? Which moments in time are most relevant in each
legal context? This conversation should be framed through the
lens of a gender-neutral understanding of parenthood that resists
a reductionist, biology- and gestation-centric view of procreation,
while remaining attentive to the bodily autonomy of gestational
parents.308
Finally, though the Article’s focus is parental identification,
queer theories of time could fuel us to consider other internal
processes that may be marginalized or simply slip under the radar
of institutional rhythms.309 We should take these theories one
step further and ask whether the law can—or should—embrace
these becomings? Thinking about these questions uncovers a
space in which queer and legal studies have yet to intersect but
should.310

308. I acknowledge that a framework recognizing the richness of becoming a parent
has the potential to interfere with a gestational parent’s self-determination or to minimize the
role of pregnancy. Indeed, this is a concern that policymakers must consider seriously. And,
certainly, it is vital to approach this task with caution, as feminists have been long warning
us about the undesired outcomes for mothers of de-gendering family laws. MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 70-100 (1995). But as the suggestions I offer herein
reflect, such concerns need not stand in the way of a more inclusive approach to legal
parenthood.
309. Consider the experience of the transgender person whose assigned sex is
incompatible with his or her subjective experience of gender. That incompatibility produces
a similar separation and contradiction between the internal/self and the external/societal
spheres. That separation may commence at birth, when there is discrepancy between the
assigned sex on the legal documents, e.g., the birth certificate, and the expressed or felt
gender of the individual, and continue until the formalization process required to bridge that
gap is completed. The moment of temporal harmony will occur only after the transgender
individual complies with the requirements needed to execute the formalization process. Cf.
Ido Katri, Scamming Reforms- Sex Reclassification from the Body to the Self, in OXFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LGBT POLITICS AND POLICY (Don Merkel ed., 2019).
310. Scholars have urged us to extend the scope of queer legal theory to objects of
research beyond sex into other areas such as theories of time. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman,
Queering Queer Legal Studies: An Unreconstructed Ode to Eve Sedgwick (and Others), 6
CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 23, 37-38 (2019). Informed by their call to action, I hope this Article
could lay the foundation for this much-needed intersection in the context of parenthood.
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THE FUTURE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Caleb Epperson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In matters of truth and justice, there is no difference between
large and small problems, for issues concerning the treatment of
people are all the same.1
Following the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020,
social and political movements grew rapidly nationwide to
combat the prevalence of police brutality against AfricanAmerican communities.2 The impact of the ongoing Black Lives
Matter movement has been observed in both cities across the
United States and in related movements internationally.3 This
movement highlights the necessity for police reform and
catalyzes the public’s growing call for greater criminal justice
reform. To achieve the goals of a fundamental reform of
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law 2022. Articles Editor for
the Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author sincerely thanks Professor Alex Nunn for
his guidance and advice in creating this Comment. The author also gives a special thank you
to Michael Roberson for being the initial inspiration behind this article and for the continuing
example he sets as an impassioned criminal defense attorney. The author thanks the editorial
team of the Arkansas Law Review, especially Wyatt Cross, for their diligent work. Finally,
the author would like to thank his mother, father, sister, and niece for their constant support
and encouragement not only in the process of writing this comment, but in all the author’s
adventures before and after.
1. KENJI SUGIMOTO, ALBERT EINSTEIN: A PHOTOGRAPHIC BIOGRAPHY, 166 (Astrid
Amelungse et al. eds., Schocken Books, Inc. 1989) (1987).
2. See Tim Arango et al., How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/4HZY-GJS8]; see also Elaine Godfrey, The
Enormous Scale of This Movement, ATL. (June 7, 2020, 7:58 AM), [https://perma.cc/4ULBAUBD].
3. Sophia Ankel, 30 Days that Shook America: Since the Death of George Floyd, the
Black Lives Matter Movement Has Already Changed the Country, BUS. INSIDER (June 24,
2020), [https://perma.cc/G77X-2WBE]; see also Daniel Odin Shaw & Saman Ayesha
Kidwai, The Global Impact of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) Movement, GEOPOLITICS (Aug.
21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/4ZVN-BJUQ] (explaining the rise and ongoing prevalence of
Black Lives Matter in England, France, and Belgium).
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predatory judicial practices, every aspect of the judicial process—
from arrest, trial, sentencing, and appeal—requires review.
Jury instructions are easily overlooked by the general public
during judicial reform campaigns.
However, these very
instructions threaten the reliable administration of justice if
intentionally or ignorantly misused. After attorneys rest their
cases and deliver their closing arguments, jury instructions are the
final true opportunity for either party to impact the jury’s
perception of the case.4 The instructions that a jury hears outlines
how it is to apply the given facts to the applicable legal standard.5
One such jury instruction that has led to over a century of
controversy is the Allen Charge. The Supreme Court created the
Allen Charge in its 1896 ruling Allen v. United States.6 After over
a century of use, the Allen Charge has created controversy
through its ability to empower presiding judges to force a hung
jury back into deliberations after a discordant return.7 At the heart
of the Allen Charge debate lies a single core issue—a presiding
judge’s ability to coerce jurors into agreeing to a ruling that they
do not believe is proper.8 Further, the issuance of an Allen Charge
risks depriving a criminal defendant of the tactical use of a hung
jury.9 A hung jury consists of two parties of jurors—the majority
and the minority.10 If a jury is unable to provide a unanimous
decision, the presiding judge declares a mistrial, and there are
three potential outcomes: (1) a new jury is selected and a new
trial proceeds; (2) the prosecution and defense reach an agreement

4. How Courts Work: Instructions to the Jury, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/RRF4-X8U2] [hereinafter ABA: Instructions to the Jury].
5. Id.
6. See generally Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
7. Samantha P. Bateman, Comment, Blast It All: Allen Charges and the Dangers of
Playing with Dynamite, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 323, 324 (2010).
8. See id.; Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the “Allen
Charge”, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 386-87 (1963) [hereinafter Deadlocked Juries and
Dynamite].
9. How Courts Work: Mistrials, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/5JHC-7NFJ].
10. See David M. Stanton, United States v. Arpan: How Does the Dynamite Charge
Affect Jury Determinations?, 35 S.D. L. REV. 461, 472 (1990).
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outside of court; or (3) the prosecution simply decides to drop the
charges.11
Given that the 125th anniversary of the Allen ruling passed
in December 2021, it is far past time to conclusively address the
consequences of the Allen Charge.12 Almost every federal and
state judicial system has created a unique approach to the Allen
Charge, with the widest variety of approaches being at the state
level.13 This discrepancy of practices creates an inconsistent
application of legal protections. Depending on where a defendant
faces criminal charges, the protection he or she receives is likely
different from those that a similarly situated defendant receives in
an adjacent state.14 The American Bar Association (“ABA”)
hoped to remedy these concerns upon release of its model jury
instructions in 1968.15 The ABA believed that this new model
instruction addressed the coercive aspects of the Allen Charge.16
However, while some states adopted the ABA model instructions,
not enough did so to trigger an overwhelming change in Allen
Charge practices.
To combat the prevalence of coercive Allen Charge
practices, this Comment introduces what the author has deemed
the “Post-Millennium Allen Charge.”17 This newly created Allentype instruction seeks to revitalize this withered practice to accord
with the modern legal landscape. Creating this new charge
requires a single admission; an Allen-type charge in any form
carries the risk of undue coercion. The Post-Millennium Allen
Charge seeks to limit the potential for undue coercion by
gathering beneficial elements from Allen Charge practices in the
11. How Courts Work: Jury Deliberations, AM. BAR Ass’n (Sept. 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/873Q-QHJF].
12. Current as of April 2022. The Supreme Court declared its ruling on December 7,
1896. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
13. This Comment will focus specifically on the discrepancy of Allen Charge practices
among state judicial systems. A number of states recognize the use of Allen Charges for both
civil and criminal cases; however, this Comment will focus solely on case law and statutory
language that affects criminal cases.
14. See infra Appendices I-V.
15. AM. BAR ASS’N: ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CRIM. TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (1968).
16. Id.
17. “Post-Millennium Allen Charge” is a term of art created by the author for purposes
of identifying a new model instruction.
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fifty states. For this new model instruction to gain traction, it
must contain features that appeal to the vast majority of state
judiciaries and provide coherent instructions that leave little
discrepancy in its implementation. With this necessity for reform
in mind, this Comment seeks to accomplish two fundamental
goals. First, it categorizes and examines the Allen Charge
practices of all fifty states.18 Second, these state practices are
dissected and used to construct the newly proposed PostMillennium Allen Charge.19
Part II begins the substantive discussions of this Comment
by outlining the development of the Allen Charge. First, it
examines the history of Allen and its key predecessor case,
Commonwealth v. Tuey. Next, it highlights the most heavily
recognized—and scrutinized—features of the Allen Charge. Part
III dissects the controlling Allen Charge practices in all fifty
states. The first subsection focuses on Massachusetts and
Connecticut, states that have never formally adopted the Allen
Charge but have implemented Allen-type practices. Next, the
Comment examines the ABA’s model Allen Charge instruction
and the implementation of the instruction into state practice.
Third, the discussion turns to those states that have banned the
Allen Charge completely or in part. The final examination is of
states that have placed no limitations—or only partial
limitations—on the use of Allen Charges. Part IV concludes the
Comment with the proposed Post-Millennium Allen Charge.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLEN CHARGE
The purpose of this background section is to offer two
supporting layers of information for the analysis that follows.
First, the creation of the Allen charge is examined through an
analysis of the procedural and factual history of both Tuey20 and
Allen.21 Second, the Allen Charge’s coercive areas, as identified
18. Current through 2021. This Comment recognizes the debates regarding the Allen
Charge in the jurisdictions of Washington D.C. and other U.S. territories but has chosen to
not include them in the present discussion.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 3 (1851).
21. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896).
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by both scholars and practitioners, are examined to outline the
systemic problems within Allen-type charges. This background
knowledge serves as the skeleton frame of the analysis to follow.
A. History of the Allen Charge
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unknowingly
laid the groundwork for the Allen Charge in 1851.22 In Tuey, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the wording
and application of a set of proto-Allen instructions did not have
an undue coercive effect on the jurors.23 Specifically, the court
ruled that the presiding judge properly instructed the jurors in the
minority to reassess their perspectives after the jury returned
deadlocked.24 The court supported that minority jurors who find
that their perspectives of the case are in opposition to the majority
should use that as a hint to review the evidence.25 In his appeal,
Tuey argued that the given instructions represented an action
“equivalent to a direction.”26 Despite his best efforts, the court
upheld Tuey’s guilty verdict and laid the groundwork for the
introduction of the Allen Charge four decades later.27
By 1896, Alexander Allen had successfully appealed two
convictions for the murder of Phillip Henson.28 With the murder
taking place in Cherokee Territory, Allen’s trials took place
before the infamous “Hanging Judge” Isaac C. Parker of the
Western District of Arkansas.29 Allen’s appeals of his first two
22. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 1.
23. Id. at 3-4. “Proto” prefix is used here to represent the origin of the set of
instructions that would later become known as “Allen Charges.” Proto-, DICTIONARY.COM,
[https://perma.cc/Y2DV-TGBW] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
24. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 3-4.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 3-4.
28. Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 561-62 (1893) (describing reversal and
remand of Allen’s first conviction); see also Allen v. United States, 157 U.S. 675, 681 (1895)
(describing reversal and remand of Allen’s second conviction).
29. David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the United States Supreme Court
Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and Taught Some Lessons for
Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 313-15 (2000). Judge Isaac C.
Parker received the moniker the “Hanging Judge” based on his affinity for the use of capital
punishment. Judge Isaac C. Parker, NAT’L PARK SERV., [https://perma.cc/8LT6-TZ5K]
(last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
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convictions brought into dispute the facts regarding who initiated
the confrontation, if Allen had a duty to retreat, and whether Allen
admitted guilt when he fled the scene.30 However, Allen’s appeal
of his third murder conviction is the scene where the cornerstone
of over a century of controversy has laid.31 In this appeal, Allen
brought into dispute whether Judge Parker’s jury instruction was
unduly coercive over the minority.32 Unfortunately for Allen, the
United States Supreme Court found little merit in his claim.33
In his opinion, Justice Henry B. Brown spent little time
evaluating the merits of the instruction given by Judge Parker.34
The language of the instruction approved by the Supreme Court
in Allen came almost verbatim from Tuey.35 The relevant portions
of the instruction included:
But, in conferring together, you ought to pay proper respect
to each other’s opinions, and listen, with a disposition to be
convinced, to each other’s arguments. And, on the one hand,
if much the larger number of your panel are for a conviction,
a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his own
mind is a reasonable one, which makes no impression upon
the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally
intelligent with himself, and who have heard the same
evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire to
arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of the same oath.
And, on the other hand, if a majority are for acquittal, the
minority ought seriously to ask themselves, whether they
may not reasonably, and ought not to doubt the correctness
of a judgment, which is not concurred in by most of those
with whom they are associated; and distrust the weight or
sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry conviction
to the minds of their fellows.36

Summarizing the instruction, Justice Brown acknowledged
that the charge placed pressure on the minority out of an interest

30. Allen, 150 U.S. at 560-61; Allen, 157 U.S. at 678-80; Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492, 498-99 (1896).
31. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 501-02.
34. Id. at 501.
35. Id.
36. Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 2-3 (1851).
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to reach a unanimous verdict.37 However, in this
acknowledgment, Justice Brown found that there was no
reversible fault with the instruction.38 The deliberation process is
described by Justice Brown as an opportunity to achieve
“unanimity by a comparison of views . . . [among] equally honest,
equally intelligent” jurors.39 The opinion in Allen seems to praise
the instruction for applying pressure on those in the minority to
not “close [their] ears” from the arguments of their fellow
jurors.40 Effectively, Justice Brown argued that the deliberation
room’s purpose was to host an exchange of ideas and emotions in
an effort to obtain solidarity among the jurors.41 Despite outlining
the importance of these principles, the Justice failed to mark the
extent to which a judge may reasonably instruct jurors. Although
Justice Brown’s opinion only considered the validity of Judge
Parker’s instruction for two paragraphs, Allen has become the
principal case for this classification of jury instructions.42
B. Coercive Effects of the Allen Charge
Throughout the 1900s, a number of state judiciaries have
turned their backs on the Allen Charge, with many notably
adopting the ABA’s model instruction.43 The cited reasons why
these courts have chosen to abandon the precedent set in Allen
stems from a wariness of the Allen Charge’s inherent
coerciveness.44 When speaking of the “coercive effects” of the
Allen Charge, the focus is specifically on the ability of a presiding
judge to pressure a juror in the minority to “substitute the
majority’s opinion for his own.”45 The charge’s reputation for
37. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-02.
38. Id. at 502.
39. Id. at 501.
40. Id. at 501-02.
41. Id. at 501.
42. Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-02; see also Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite, supra note
8, at 386.
43. J. Grant Corboy, Trial Procedure – Bombshell Instruction for Deadlocked Juries:
A.B.A Standard Replaces Allen Charge in District of Columbia, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV.
672, 676-80 (1972); Karen P. O’Sullivan, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 ME.
L. REV. 167, 168 (1985); see also infra Appendix II.
44. Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite, supra note 8, at 386.
45. Id. at 386-87.
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overcoming the most resilient of jurors has earned it the common
epithet as the “dynamite charge.”46 To overcome this negative
characterization, Allen Charge supporters heavily rely on the
argument that the instructions are necessary for the sake of
judicial economy.47 In essence, presiding judges must consider
the cost of conducting a new trial when determining whether
giving an Allen Charge is proper.48 In an effort to overcome the
argument of the charge’s supporters, Allen Charge dissenters have
focused on various elements within the Allen Charge that they
view as the primary roots of the coercive threat. The two broad
categories that this Comment is focused on are: (1) the undue
pressure placed on the minority; and (2) the coercive actions of
presiding judges during presentation of the charge.
1. Pressure on the Minority
The modern jury deliberation room is likely not as
captivating as it is made out to be in the hit 1957 film Twelve
Angry Men. Throughout the film, through the use of logic and
passionate speeches, the stoic hero aids his fellow jurors in
recognizing that they, the majority, were wrong in their
assumption of the defendant’s guilt.49 While these scenes may
inspire legal experts and laypeople alike, they do not represent the
reality of the dynamic between jurors.
One of the most significant threats against jury independence
is an Allen Charge that places direct pressure on the minority.50
Upon receiving an Allen instruction, jurors in the minority are

46. Paul Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Criminal Cases: Is the Dynamite Charge
About to be Permanently Defused?, 43 MO. L. REV. 613, 615 (1978); Bateman, supra note
7, at 325.
47. Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen
Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123, 125 (1967).
48. Judicial Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
49. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
50. Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323 (S.C. 2002) (explaining South Carolina’s ban
on any Allen-type instructions that mention either the minority or majority); see also
Deadlocked Juries—The “Allen Charge” is Defused—United States v. Thomas, 6 U. RICH.
L. REV. 370, 375 (1972) (describing the threat an Allen Charge poses to an independent jury
ruling) [hereinafter Deadlocked Juries: Thomas].
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more likely to change their stance than those in the majority.51
Further, the use of an Allen Charge has shown to “short-circuit
the usual leniency bias” of a jury.52 In essence, upon issuance of
an Allen Charge, jurors become more likely to shift their
perception of the case to favor a guilty verdict.53 The use of the
Allen Charge serves only to boost the majority’s morale and
allows for this party to apply undue pressure on the minority.54
The importance of protecting the minority from undue
coercion is seen once again in the discussion of hung juries. The
right to a mistrial without a unanimous verdict is crucial in the
pursuit of justice.55 While both the prosecutorial and defense
teams may indicate that a decisive ruling is preferable, to imply
that a hung jury has no place in the legal system is dangerous. As
previously discussed, those leaning towards an acquittal break
under the pressure of a majority that believes the defendant is
guilty.56 By not allowing for deadlocked juries to occur, a judge
is—in essence—depriving a defendant of a tactical tool to secure
lesser charges, have the charges against them dropped, or an
opportunity to obtain a more sympathetic jury pool.57
2. Presentation of the Allen Charge
Criticisms of the Allen Charge focus heavily on specific
aspects of the presentation of the charge that lend power to the
presiding judge to sway the deliberation process. A number of
these criticisms serve as the basis of judgments made by state
courts and legislatures nationwide. The most frequent of these

51. Vicki L. Smith & Saul M. Kassin, Effects of the Dynamite Charge on the
Deliberations of Deadlocked Mock Juries, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 632 (1993).
52. Id. at 640.
53. Id.
54. Corboy, supra note 43, at 679 (explaining that the use of the Allen Charge has the
greatest effects on jurors in the minority); see also Smith & Kassin, supra note 51, at 639.
55. See Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection
of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 569, 581-83 (2007).
56. Corboy, supra note 43, at 679; see also Smith & Kassin, supra note 51, at 639-40.
57. When a Tie is Really a Win: Hung Juries and Mistrials, SCROFANO L. (Mar. 31,
2017), [https://perma.cc/K4GK-6MWQ] (describing the possible outcomes following a hung
jury).
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criticisms are: (1) the use of “final test” language;58 (2) the
presiding judge’s knowledge of the numerical split of the jury;59
(3) the specific language used during the delivery of the
instruction;60 (4) when the presiding judge chooses to deliver the
charge;61 and (5) if the presiding judge repeats the charge after it
is first issued.62
The “final test” criticism references multiple issues
regarding the duties of the jury.63 A presiding judge who uses
“final test” language often misrepresents the duties of the jury in
order to illicit a unanimous decision.64 The presiding judge
informs jurors that they must reach a final verdict and that their
duties as jurors only end upon reaching said verdict.65 This is at
the very least a misrepresentation of the law and at most an
intentional attempt to coerce the jury into reaching a verdict
endorsed by the judge. A presiding judge takes further coercive
actions if he or she inquires about the numerical split of the jury
and uses the given information to determine if an Allen Charge is
necessary.66 However, the likelihood of coercion is lower if the
jury approaches the presiding judge regarding the split vote

58. State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, 359 Mont. 257, 264-69, 248 P.3d 817, 822-25
(defining and barring use of “final test” language).
59. Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 826-28 (Del. 1994) (ruling that a presiding judge
should not inquire into the numerical split of a hung jury prior to delivering an Allen Charge).
60. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that an instruction that strays
from ABA model language and given after a jury has started deliberation will face higher
scrutiny upon appeal); see also Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000) (ruling that the coerciveness of a given charge can be determined based on the specific
language used during delivery).
61. State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 285-86 (Kan. 1994) (finding that it is less
prejudicial to deliver an Allen Charge prior to deliberations).
62. Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14, 21-22 (Wyo. 1969) (instructing that an Allen Charge
should not be given after jury deliberations begin and that a repeated charge should be read
alongside all other relevant jury instructions); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-5.4 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
INSTRUCTION]; cf. Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d 412, 415-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may not repeat an Allen Charge more
than once).
63. Norquay, 2011 MT 34 at ¶¶ 38-42.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 827 (Del. 1994); see also People v. Saltray, 969
P.2d 729, 733 (Colo. App. 1998) (ruling that presiding judges in Colorado may not directly
inquire about the numerical split of a hung jury).
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without prompt.67 Many jurisdictions have also limited the
language that a presiding judge uses when issuing an Allen
Charge.68 Any charge that uses different language than an
approved example—or simply uses language that is widely
accepted as unduly coercive—faces higher scrutiny and is at a
higher risk of being overturned.69
The final criticisms levied seek to restrict when a presiding
judge can issue an Allen Charge. Many jurisdictions state a
preference for the presentation of an Allen Charge in the predeliberation period.70 These jurisdictions require (or strongly
recommend) presiding judges to issue the charge alongside all
other jury instructions.71 In doing so, it is thought that the
coercive language of the Allen Charge is lessened due to it not
being singled out.72 This further lessens the impact of the charge
on individual jurors since clear groupings of the majority and
minority are not yet set. However, if a jurisdiction chooses to
allow for the reissuance of the charge, it often limits the number
of times a presiding judge may do so.73 A totality of the
circumstances test is often implemented to determine whether the
choice to repeat the given charge is unduly coercive in a given
case.74

67. Desmond, 654 A.2d at 827.
68. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that an instruction that strays
from ABA model language and given after a jury has initiated deliberations will face higher
scrutiny upon appeal).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994).
71. Id.; see also Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14, 22 (Wyo. 1969).
72. See Whitaker, 872 P.2d at 286; Elmer, 463 P.2d at 22.
73. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, § 15-5.4; see also Almeida v. State,
157 So. 3d 412, 415-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida
state courts may not repeat an Allen Charge more than once).
74. See State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 900 (R.I. 1981) (ruling that a presiding judge
must consider case-specific circumstances when considering whether to issue an Allen-type
instruction); see also Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting
Miller v. State, 645 So. 2d 363, 366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)) (stating that the “whole context”
of a given case must be used to determine the coerciveness of a given charge).
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III. ALLEN CHARGE PRACTICES IN THE FIFTY
STATES
Justice consists not in being neutral between right and
wrong, but in finding out the right and upholding it, wherever
found, against the wrong.75
Whether or not one agrees or disagrees with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Allen, ignoring that the ruling has resulted in a
mosaic of case law and statutes across the state judicial systems
promotes the unequal treatment of criminal defendants
nationwide.
This outcome undermines the necessity for
uniformity for legal concepts and practices of this caliber.
Unfortunately, the simple solution of an outright ban of Allentype charges does not provide the necessary solution to the
coercive question. The Allen Charge has proven to be a hydra; a
killing blow may seemingly be struck, but new Allen-type charges
rise in its place. Instead—if the Allen Charge is to be effectively
implemented—the proposed Post-Millennium Allen Charge must
limit the specific weaknesses of the base charge. The following
analysis does not seek to outline the Allen Charge practices of
every state to the fullest extent but rather classifies states based
on (1) their historical treatment of the Allen Charge and (2)
specific features in a state’s practice that address the concerns
discussed in Section II.B. of this Comment. The broad subcategories explored are: (A) the outliers; (B) states that have
adopted the ABA model instruction; (C) states that have
implemented Allen Charge bans; and (D) those states that still
allow the use of the Allen Charge.
A. The Outliers
An appropriate place to begin our examination of the Allen
Charge is by examining those states that have never taken part in
the Allen Charge debate. These outliers, Massachusetts and
Connecticut, have implemented Allen-type charges, but have

75. QUOTATIONS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 30 (2004).
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done so outside the parameters of the Allen decision.76 In doing
so, they have avoided the last century of national debate and
instead nurtured the growth of their own Allen-type charges
within the boundaries of their states. Understanding the outcomes
of these debates will set the stage for what to expect as the
practices of various Allen Charge jurisdictions are later discussed.
The following discussion centers on the (1) Tuey Charge of
Massachusetts and (2) the Chip Smith Charge of Connecticut.
1. Massachusetts
The first state in the spotlight is Massachusetts. Instead of
adopting the Allen Charge, the state adopted the guidelines of
Allen’s predecessor, Tuey.77 The Tuey Charge, now known as the
Tuey-Rodriquez Charge, is still an accepted practice in
Massachusetts but has seen limited use.78 However, in recent
decades the Judiciary of Massachusetts has imposed a series of
limitations on the charge that seeks to limit the probability of
undue coercive acts. Notably, a Tuey Charge in Massachusetts
may no longer use language that places undue pressure on the
minority of the jury.79 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts recognized this weakness in Commonwealth v.
Rodriquez and chose to end the practice affirmatively.80 In its
decision, the court corrected the model jury instruction by
removing any mention of the minority versus majority distinction
and changed the wording to emphasize that all parties within the
jury are to reconsider whether their views are reconcilable with
those on the opposing side.81

76. Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 2-3 (1851) (establishing the practice
of the “Tuey Charge” as the appropriate jury instruction to give to deadlocked juries in
Massachusetts); see also State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376, 386 (1881) (creating the Chip Smith
charge).
77. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 2-3. See generally EDWARD M. SWARTZ, TRIAL
HANDBOOK FOR MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS § 35:9 (3d ed. 2020).
78. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 2-3; see also Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d
192, 200-03 (Mass. 1973) (controlling case that served as catalyst of revision of Tuey Charge
practices).
79. See Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d at 201, 203.
80. Id. at 201-03.
81. Id. at 203.
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The court in Rodriquez also chose to limit the ability of
judges to give a Tuey Charge that states, “the case must at some
time be decided.”82 This stricken-out language unduly stated that
the jury had to reach a unanimous verdict.83 Simply put, whether
it be a conviction or acquittal, it is improper to state that a decision
is required. In its dismissal of this language, the court decries any
slight material change to an instruction that has a coercive
effect.84 Any instructions that reference the monetary or time cost
of the ongoing proceedings—or future proceedings—are also
unduly coercive.85
The Supreme Judicial Court has addressed limitations on
how the charge is presented as well. In Commonwealth v. Rollins,
the court banned the use of the charge in an indiscriminate or
premature manner.86 However, a presiding judge has the
discretion to give a Tuey Charge based on the length of
deliberations and the overall complexity of the given case.87
What is not in the presiding judge’s discretion, however, is the
language of the charge.88 When a judge announces a Tuey
Charge, the charge is read in its entirety, and the judge cannot
stray from the approved language.89 A presiding judge who strays
from the approved language jeopardizes the efforts of the higher
courts to limit the coercive effects of the charge, and thus, the
presiding judge’s actions are found to be unduly coercive.90
The Tuey Charge has been thoroughly vetted by the
Massachusetts courts. In doing so, the Tuey Charge has become
a model of what a limited Allen-type charge should strive to
achieve. The specific areas that the courts have addressed are the
same areas that the Post-Millennium Allen Charge must limit if it
hopes to overcome the inherently coercive nature of the Allen
Charge.
82. Id. at 201 (quoting Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) at 1) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
83. Id. at 200-01.
84. Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d at 202.
85. Commonwealth v. Brown, 323 N.E.2d 902, 906, 907 (Mass. 1975).
86. 241 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Mass. 1968).
87. Commonwealth v. Haley, 604 N.E.2d 682, 688 (Mass. 1992).
88. Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 839 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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2. Connecticut
The second outlier to discuss is Connecticut. Like the Tuey
Charge of Massachusetts, the Chip Smith Charge of Connecticut
predates the Allen Charge.91 The Chip Smith Charge derives its
name from the 1881 case State v. Smith.92 In what proves to be a
long list of arguments upon appeal, the creation of the Chip Smith
Charge comes in a single paragraph.93 In its conclusion of issue
eleven brought forth by Smith, the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut alluded to the Tuey decision in concluding that it is
proper for a presiding judge to give an instruction that urges jurors
in the minority to reconsider their position.94 In a divergence
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut has instead chosen to uphold a number of
the coercive aspects of the Chip Smith Charge.95
Unlike its relative in Massachusetts, the Chip Smith
Charge’s adopted language allows presiding judges to place
pressure on “dissenting jurors” to consider if their votes are
reasonable.96 The Supreme Court of Connecticut argues that the
use of “balancing language” counteracts the coercive effects of
singling out dissenting jurors.97 This “balancing language”
instructs jurors to “express [their] own conclusion[s]” and that it
is improper for them to “merely . . . acquiesc[e] in the
conclusion[s] of [their] fellow jurors.”98 The court confidently
states that, even if the language directed at the minority is
improper, the balancing language nullifies this effect.99 This line
of argument is prevalent in many jurisdictions that have done little
to limit the Allen Charge’s coercive nature.100
In State v. Feliciano, the court allows the reading of the Chip
Smith Charge multiple times.101 The state courts of Connecticut
91. See State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376, 381, 386 (1881).
92. Id. at 381.
93. Id. at 386.
94. Id.
95. State v. O’Neil, 207 A.2d 730, 746 (Conn. 2002).
96. Id. at 745-46.
97. Id. at 746.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., State v. McArthur, 899 A.2d 691, 706-07 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
101. 778 A.2d 812, 821 (Conn. 2001).
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argue that if a presiding judge appropriately issues a charge the
first time, there is no fault with the same instruction being
repeated multiple times.102 Comments by presiding judges that
place pressure on jurors to reach a conclusive decision have also
been approved.103 While Connecticut courts discourage the
mention of the costs associated with a mistrial, they have affirmed
the use of such instructions upon appeal.104 To support these
rulings, they state that the potential coercive effects of the
additional language are nullified if the presiding judge accurately
states the commonly accepted language of the Chip Smith
Charge.105
The Chip Smith Charge practice in Connecticut is exactly
what the Post-Millennium Allen Charge seeks to overcome.
Essentially, presiding judges are given free rein to use the charge
at their discretion. This practice inappropriately increases the
threat of an unduly coercive act of a presiding judge. For the PostMillennium Allen Charge to be successful, it must not mirror the
mistakes of the Chip Smith Charge.
B. American Bar Association Recommended Instruction
Decades after the first approval of the Allen Charge, the
ABA created a model Allen-type instruction that addressed the
rampant coercive issues relating to the charge.106 The creation of
the ABA model instruction served as a hopeful counter against
the wild landscape of Allen Charge practices in state courts. This
model Allen Charge was carried into the twenty-first century
within Section 15-5.4 of the Trial by Jury Standards.107 Section
15-5.4’s model instruction states that:
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give
an instruction which informs the jury:

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
McArthur, 899 A.2d at 705-07.
Id. at 706, 708.
Id. at 707.
AM. BAR ASS’N: ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CRIM. TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (1968).
107. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, § 15-5.4.
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(1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto;
(2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be
done without violence to individual judgment;
(3) that each juror must decide the case for himself or herself
but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with
the other jurors;
(4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and change an
opinion if the juror is convinced it is erroneous; and
(5) that no juror should surrender his or her honest belief as
to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
opinion of the other jurors, or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to
agree, the court may require the jury to continue their
deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as
provided in section (a). The court should not require or
threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable
length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon
a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability
of agreement.108

As seen in the model language above, the ABA’s greatest
concern regarding Allen Charges seems to be the abuse of the
minority.109 Specifically, sections 5.4(a)(3)-(5) outline the duty
of the jurors to balance the need for independent conclusions with
the necessary considerations of the views of their fellow jurors.110
This approach to handling the minority issue reflects the efforts
of Massachusetts to limit the coercive effort of the Tuey
Charge.111 If one desires to take pressure off those in the
minority, the simple solution seems to be to limit the mention of
any party within given instructions. The model ABA instruction
also addresses the issues of giving an Allen Charge multiple times
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 15-5.4(a)(3)-(5).
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d 192, 201 (Mass. 1973).

4 EPPERSON.MAN.FIN..DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

126

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

4/13/22 10:00 AM

Vol. 75:1

to the same jury.112 Section 5.4(b) allows for a presiding judge to
repeat the charge multiple times if he or she deems it necessary.113
However, Section 5.4(b) limits the use of repeat charges that
threaten a jury into reaching a unanimous verdict or force
deliberations to extend for an unreasonable amount of time.114
The ABA model Allen Charge provides a necessary and
strong foundation for the Post-Millennium Allen Charge.
However, as is the case with many recommended practices, the
ABA model instruction’s effectiveness is limited by the number
of states that adopt it. Studying the states that have adopted the
ABA model instruction provides information on the strengths and
weaknesses of this category of charges. In the following
discussion, the focus will shift to states that have (1) adopted the
ABA model instruction; (2) co-opted language from the ABA
model; or (3) performed a “soft adoption” of the ABA model
instruction.
1. Adopted ABA Model Instruction
Very few states have adopted the ABA model instruction in
its entirety. The only states to have fully adopted the use of the
ABA instruction thus far are (1) Illinois; (2) Maine; (3)
Minnesota; (4) Vermont; (5) Tennessee; (6) New Jersey; and (7)
Michigan.115 While the ABA model instruction requires finetuning, the Supreme Court of Illinois describes the model
instruction as being the current best option to “resolve the many
questions created by the uncertainty . . . [of] instructing a jury that
is in disagreement.”116 In its adoption of the ABA model
instruction, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine decried the use
of any Allen Charge or any modified charge that achieved the
same purpose.117 This adoption of the ABA instruction is less of
an acknowledgment of the strength of the ABA recommendations
and is more likely a preventive action to avoid future abuse of
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, § 15-5.4(b).
Id.
Id.
See infra Appendix II.A.
People v. Prim, 298 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Ill. 1972).
State v. White, 285 A.2d 832, 838 (Me. 1972).
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Allen Charges.118 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine seems
more inclined to an outright ban of the use of Allen-type charges
and adopted the ABA standards as a stepping stone towards this
goal.119 This distinction of a preference for the outright
elimination of Allen-type charges brings a thought-provoking
debacle to the surface. Despite their seemingly best efforts, states
that have banned the use of Allen Charges have simply replaced
the charge with a pseudo-Allen Charge that carries with it the
same potential for coercion.120 As discovered by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, the best option to overcoming the
challenges posed by Allen is to choose the least threatening
option.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota gave a resounding rebuttal
of the use of the Allen Charge in State v. Martin.121 In its ruling,
the court outlined the specific coercive features of the Allen
Charge that are overcome by the ABA model instruction.122 Like
the courts in Massachusetts, the feature of the Allen Charge that
the Supreme Court of Minnesota found to be the most egregious
was the undue pressure that it placed on the minority.123 The
egregiousness of this aspect of the instruction intensified upon
consideration that the base Allen Charge seemingly takes the side
of the majority.124 Further, the court found error in the practice
of instructing juries that “a case must at some time be decided.”125
To end its blitz of the Allen Charge, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota rebuked the common argument of judicial economy.126
The court found that “[h]ung juries are not a serious problem in
. . . criminal cases” and that allowing coercive instructions to
overcome such a trivial problem is “too dear a price to pay for
relieving court congestion.”127 In this final refutation, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota cemented the death of the Allen
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
See id.
See infra Appendix III.B.
See 211 N.W.2d 765, 765, 769-71 (Minn. 1973).
See generally id.
Id. at 771.
See id.
Id. at 769.
Martin, 211 N.W.2d at 770-71.
Id. at 771.
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Charge in the state and provided a key counterargument to Allen
Charge dissenters.
In State v. Perry, the Supreme Court of Vermont made the
final determination to remove the base Allen Charge from regular
use and instead chose to use the ABA model instruction as its new
standard moving forward.128 In its argument, the court cited the
commonly referenced issue regarding the unequal pressure placed
on those jurors in the minority.129 The court’s condemnation of
the charge mirrored the arguments of the presiding courts in
Maine and Minnesota. However, the Supreme Court of Vermont
provided insight into another potential issue: that the burden of
proof can shift during jury deliberations after the issuance of an
Allen Charge.130 Criminal trials mandate that the prosecution has
the burden of proof during proceedings.131 The Perry court
implied that the jurors take on the responsibility of the
prosecution upon the commission of a non-facially neutral Allen
Charge.132 Tennessee followed suit in 1975 in Kersey v. State.133
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Tennessee recognized that
the Allen Charge unduly pressured the minority to abandon its
view and give in to those of the majority.134
In its decision in State v. Czachor, the New Jersey Supreme
Court banned the use of the conventional Allen Charge and
endorsed the use of the ABA model instruction.135 Similarly,
Michigan banned the use of conventional Allen Charges in
1974.136 Both states’ supreme courts referenced rulings in other
states and in federal appellate courts that banned the use, or
repeated use, of the Allen Charge as they made their rulings.137
While their reasonings for abandoning the base Allen Charge
reflect the arguments offered in other jurisdictions, the examples

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See 306 A.2d 110, 112 (Vt. 1973).
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
525 S.W.2d 139, 144 (Tenn. 1975).
Id.
413 A.2d 593, 600 (N.J. 1980).
People v. Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d 441, 450 (Mich. 1974).
See Czachor, 413 A.2d at 599-600; see also Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d at 447, 449.
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they provide are used for a greater purpose.138 These debates
offer insight into the implementation of the Post-Millennium
Allen Charge on the national scale. Simply put, a revisionary
wave is required. As an increasing number of jurisdictions adopt
the use of the new model instruction, jurisdictions that have not
done so face mounting pressure to consider adoption as well.
Winning victories state by state in the drive to implement the
Post-Millennium Allen Charge builds the force required to break
through the most draconian of Allen Charge jurisdictions.
2. Co-opted ABA Language
The second classification to discuss is those states that have
never adopted the use of the ABA model instruction but have
instead co-opted its language. These states have approved new
instructions that rely on guidelines included in the ABA model
instruction. Co-opted instructions based on the ABA model
instruction are used in (1) Colorado and (2) North Carolina.139
The Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court released a
directive on September 22, 1971, that outlines the use of a new
series of model charges.140 This directive forbids the use of the
Allen Charge and instead inserts new guidelines that mirror the
ABA model instruction.141 However, the Colorado courts have
refined these guidelines in a series of cases since the 1970s.142
Specifically, presiding judges should not abuse their discretion by
giving an Allen-type instruction if there are clear signs that the
jurors are past the point of being able to agree.143 When deciding
whether it is appropriate to give an additional jury instruction,
presiding judges should consider the length of the deliberations
prior to the return of a split verdict.144 Further, a presiding judge
should make an inquiry to determine whether the jurors believe
that there still exists a “likelihood of [achieving] a unanimous
138. See Czachor, 413 A.2d at 599-600; see also Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d at 447-50.
139. See infra Appendix II.B.
140. People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000, 1012 (Colo. 1984).
141. Id.; cf. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62.
142. See People v. Gonzales, 565 P.2d 945, 947 (Colo. App. 1977); see also People v.
Saltray, 969 P.2d 729, 732-33 (Colo. App. 1998).
143. Schwartz, 678 P.2d at 1012.
144. Id. at 1011; see also Gonzales, 565 P.2d at 947.
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verdict.”145 However, this inquiry is limited to the jurors’
opinions of potential agreement and cannot seek the numerical
split of the minority and majority.146 North Carolina has also
codified a modified Allen Charge that relies heavily on the
language of the ABA model instruction.147 The Criminal Code
Commission of North Carolina describes the language of its new
charge as the “‘weak’ charge set out in [ABA] Standards.”148 An
interesting feature included in North Carolina is that presiding
judges are instructed to state to the jury that they do not favor a
specific ruling in a given case.149 Having language that reaffirms
the presiding judge’s effective neutrality in the given case makes
it clear to judges and jurors alike that a given instruction is not an
endorsement of any one verdict.
The additional features present in the model instructions of
Colorado and North Carolina expose weaknesses present in the
ABA model instruction. While the ABA model instruction
provides clear guidelines of what a presiding judge may express
to the jury in an instruction, it leaves questions of how to do so
effectively from a procedural standpoint. Further, the type of
language included in North Carolina reaffirms the judiciary’s
drive for complete neutrality. For the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge to be effective, it must include clear guidelines that
address these common conflicts.
3. Soft Adoption of ABA Standards
The final sub-category of the states that have recognized the
ABA model instruction is those that performed a “soft adoption”
of the standards.150 Soft adoptions of the ABA standards offer
scant recommendations for the body of the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge but instead provide examples of how to achieve
implementation on a national scale. The “revisionary wave”
addressed in earlier discussion is not a process that happens
145. Saltray, 969 P.2d at 733.
146. Id.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1235 (2021).
148. § 15A-1235 cmt. (Criminal Code Commission 1977).
149. State v. Alston, 243 S.E.2d 354, 364 (N.C. 1978).
150. “Soft adoption” is a term of art created by the author for the purposes of this
Comment.
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quickly. To ensure the full implementation of the PostMillennium Allen Charge, soft adoptions offer a compelling
strategy. States are more likely to accept the new model
instruction if they can see the success it brings in neighboring
jurisdictions.151 While the need for change is urgent, it is more
important to ensure the effective implementation of the new
instruction rather than provide a hurried relief effort. The states
that have conducted soft adoptions are (1) Oregon; (2) Alaska; (3)
New Hampshire; (4) North Dakota; (5) Maryland; (6) Nebraska;
and (7) Rhode Island.152 These states support using the ABA
model instruction, but do not enforce its use and allow for other
Allen-type charges to be used on a case-by-case basis.
Oregon offers a simple example of the “soft adoption”
approach. In its opinion in State v. Marsh, the Supreme Court of
Oregon “disapproved the future use” of any supplemental Allentype charge, but recommended the use of the ABA model
instruction when necessary, moving forward.153 This is a theme
that occurs time and time again. The ABA model instruction
receives approval not only for its substance but also because it is
the least harmful alternative. As expressed by the court in Marsh,
the ABA instruction is recommended but is “not to be regarded
as ‘graven in stone.’”154
The ruling of the Alaskan Supreme Court in Fields v. State
recommends that judges refer to the ABA model instruction for
future use.155 It does not mandate the use of the ABA model
instruction but instead offers guidance by stating that those judges
who follow the model instruction are effectively minimizing the
coercive nature of the Allen Charge.156 The Supreme Courts of
New Hampshire and North Dakota have followed suit.157 In its
ruling in State v. Blake, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
151. See Gérard Roland, Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and SlowMoving Institutions, 38 STUD. IN COMPAR. INT’L DEV. 109, 126 (Winter 2004) (discussing
the importance of gradualism within the context of institutional reform).
152. See infra Appendix II.C.
153. 490 P.2d 491, 503 (Or. 1971).
154. Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
155. 487 P.2d 831, 840-43 (Alaska 1971).
156. Id. at 842.
157. See State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1973); see also State v. Champagne,
198 N.W.2d 218, 238-39 (N.D. 1972).
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recommended that presiding judges make use of “more
circumscribed instructions recommended in the ABA
Standards.”158 However, the opinion does not provide additional
commentary, as seen in the Alaskan ruling.159
In its
recommendation of the ABA model instruction, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota focuses specifically on the model
instruction’s emphasis on limiting minority coercion and limiting
the time frame for issuing the instruction.160
In its ruling in Kelly v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated that the use of the ABA model instruction will always be
proper, but other instructions may also be used.161 Further,
presiding judges may personalize a given charge if they issue one
prior to the deliberation period.162 A similar practice has been
adopted in Nebraska. The Nebraskan Supreme Court in State v.
Garza acknowledged that presiding judges may use the ABA
model instruction, but the use of the instruction is heavily
scrutinized with a preference towards no charge whatsoever.163
Rhode Island has also taken a unique approach to the soft
adoption theory. After recommending the use of the ABA model
instruction, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island admitted that it
would not heavily enforce the use of the instruction.164 Instead,
it recognized that “[i]n Rhode Island [it is not] require[d] that a
trial justice read a patterned instruction.”165 In the place of a strict
enforcement protocol, the court established a totality of the
circumstances test.166 For any future Allen-type charge, Rhode
Island courts would determine the validity of a given charge based

158. 305 A.2d at 306.
159. Compare id., with Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 840-43 (Alaska 1971).
160. Champagne, 198 N.W.2d at 238-39.
161. 310 A.2d 538, 541 (Md. 1973).
162. Id. at 542.
163. 176 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Neb. 1970); see also Potard v. State, 299 N.W. 362, 36465 (Neb. 1941) (ruling that the only purpose of using an Allen-type instruction was to
“encourage or coerce the jury”).
164. State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300, 322-23 (R.I. 1973) (recommending the use of
ABA model instructions in future trials); see also State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 899-901
(R.I. 1981).
165. Souza, 425 A.2d at 900.
166. Id.
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on the circumstances of the case and the specific language of the
given instruction.167
C. Strong Disapproval of Allen Charges
One of the largest categorizations of states is those that have,
in theory, implemented a near-complete ban of Allen Charges.
The states that have done so are (1) Arizona; (2) California; (3)
Hawaii; (4) Idaho; (5) Indiana; (6) Kentucky; (7) Louisiana; (8)
New Mexico; (9) Ohio; (10) South Dakota; (11) Tennessee; and
(12) Washington.168 Despite what first assumptions imply, the
majority of these states have only banned the use of the charge as
outlined in Allen. The following discussion will focus on how
states have implemented either (1) a total ban of the Allen Charge;
or (2) modified instructions.
1. Total Ban
An intriguing sub-category to analyze first are those states
that have implemented a total ban of any type of Allen Charge.
The states included in this sub-category are (1) Louisiana; (2)
South Dakota; (3) Arizona; (4) Hawaii; and (5) Idaho.169 Of these
states, Louisiana offers the clearest ruling regarding the Allen
Charge. Louisiana bans the use of both the base Allen Charge and
any Allen-type variations.170 This ban applies to any acts by
presiding judges that have a coercive effect, and any violation of
this ban is met with heavy scrutiny.171 This total ban is also in
place in South Dakota.172
Arizona initially implemented a ban on the Allen Charge in
State v. Thomas.173 In its decision, the court struck down the
“Voeckell [Charge].”174 The Supreme Court of Arizona found
167. Id.
168. See infra Appendix III.
169. See infra Appendix III.A.
170. State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d 639, 641 (La. 1975).
171. Id. at 641-43.
172. State v. Fool Bull, 2009 SD 36, 766 N.W.2d 159, 170 (indicating ban of Allen
Charge in criminal cases).
173. 342 P.2d 197, 200 (Ariz. 1959).
174. Id.
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that this charge mirrored the language of the base Allen Charge
and unduly: (1) placed pressure on jurors in the minority; and (2)
implicitly implied that a hung jury is a waste of state resources.175
The Arizona court later reaffirmed this ban of Allen-type charges
in State v. Smith.176 The court found that any form of an Allen
Charge contained “potentially objectionable material” and that
any future use of the charge would be grounds for appeal in future
matters.177 Agreeing with the Arizona Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii barred future use of Allen-type
instructions.178 In its decision to ban the use of the charge, the
court found that the use of Allen Charges is detrimental to the
pursuit of equal justice since the “evils [of the Allen Charge] far
outweigh the benefits . . . .”179
Idaho provides a clear example of how a total ban on Allen
Charges has been implemented. Following its ruling in State v.
Flint, the Idaho Supreme Court barred any future form of the
“dynamite instruction.”180 It took this ruling one step further
when it provided a new practice for presiding judges to follow.181
Instead of forcing jurors back into deliberation through the use of
an Allen Charge, presiding judges are to take polls of split
juries.182 If the polling indicates that jurors still believed that they
are capable of reaching an agreement, then they will enter back
into deliberation.183 The choice to provide this alternative
practice is interesting in light of how other states have chosen to
direct presiding judges during the deliberation period. Diverging
from the customary course of action, the Idaho Supreme Court
instructs presiding judges on what they may do instead of limiting
what they may not do. A beneficial limiting factor to
acknowledge is that presiding judges may not reference the

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
493 P.2d 904, 907 (Ariz. 1972).
Id.
State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20, 25 (Haw. 1985).
Id. (quoting State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (Ariz. 1959)).
761 P.2d 1158, 1162-65 (Idaho 1988).
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Id.

4 EPPERSON.MAN.FIN..DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

4/13/22 10:00 AM

THE FUTURE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE

135

necessity of the “efficient administration of criminal justice.”184
This practice coincides with the Minnesota judiciary’s decision to
adopt the ABA model instruction.185 The decisions of these
courts directly attack what is likely the strongest argument in
favor of the Allen Charge—judicial economy.
2. Modified Instructions
The following states have banned the use of the base Allen
Charge but still allow the use of modified instructions: (1)
California; (2) New Mexico; (3) Indiana; (4) Mississippi; (5)
Ohio; (6) Montana; (7) Wisconsin; (8) Kentucky; and (9)
Washington.186 States that have chosen to introduce modified
instructions have either created new Allen-type charges
themselves or have modified the original charge.
California originally banned the use of any Allen Charge in
1977.187 In the Supreme Court of California’s decision, it cited
the coercive practice of placing undue pressure on the minority.188
However, this ruling was overturned in 2012.189 Following the
decision in People v. Valdez, courts in California now give Allentype instructions if the instructions equally encourage the
majority and minority to reconsider their views.190 The Court of
Appeals of Indiana and the Supreme Court of Ohio have reached
similar conclusions.191 Allen Charges face careful scrutiny in
Indiana.192 The language of a given Allen Charge must strive to
remain neutral, and a second reading of the charge must be
accompanied by all other instructions that are given before

184. State v. Martinez, 832 P.2d 331, 335 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); D. CRAIG LEWIS,
IDAHO TRIAL HANDBOOK § 30:23 (2d ed. 2020).
185. Martinez, 832 P.2d at 335; cf. State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 771-73 (Minn.
1973).
186. See infra Appendix III.B.
187. People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1003-06 (Cal. 1977).
188. Id. at 1005.
189. People v. Valdez, 281 P.3d 924, 984-85 (Cal. 2012).
190. Id.
191. See Fultz v. State, 473 N.E.2d 624, 629-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Lewis v.
State, 424 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind. 1981)); State v. Howard, 537 N.E.2d 188, 194-95 (Ohio
1989) (describing the Ohio courts use of a neutrally structured Allen Charge).
192. Clark v. State, 597 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
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deliberations begin.193 This theme of neutrality continues in
Mississippi’s model charge. There, the shortened charge that
survived the state court’s ban on Allen Charges instructs all jurors
to equally weigh the evidence before them and the arguments of
their peers.194
The Supreme Courts of Montana and Wisconsin refined their
model Allen Charge instructions for similar reasons. Both state
courts took issue specifically with the lack of neutrality regarding
how presiding judges address the jurors.195 However, a unique
feature that the Montana Supreme Court chose to focus on is what
is referred to as “final test” language.196 This “final test” language
mandates that jurors “make a determination of guilt or innocence
. . . .”197 The court found that this language misrepresents the law
and places undue pressure on the jurors.198 Kentucky’s model
Allen Charge follows a similar practice. Presiding judges cannot
give an instruction that explains the “desirability of reaching a
verdict.”199 Further, presiding judges cannot poll the jury prior to
the return of a verdict.200 Matching the requirements outlined by
Kentucky, presiding judges in Washington cannot “instruct the
jury in such a way as to suggest the need for agreement, the
consequences of no agreement, or the length of time a jury will
be required to deliberate.”201
Finally, New Mexico offers a unique alternative. After
banning the use of the “shotgun [charge],” it instituted a three
factor test that determines whether a given instruction is
coercive.202 In the first step, the court determines whether the
presiding judge read “any additional instruction” to the jury.203
Next, the court determines whether the given instruction both
193. Fultz, 473 N.E.2d at 629-30.
194. MISS. R. CRIM. P. 23.4; see also Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss.
1976) (barring use of the base Allen Charge).
195. See State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, ¶¶ 29-33, 38-40, 42-43, 359 Mont. 257, 26469, 248 P.3d 817, 822-25; see also Quarles v. State, 233 N.W.2d 401, 402 (Wis. 1975).
196. Norquay, 2011 MT 34 at ¶¶ 29-33, 38-43.
197. Id. at ¶¶ 38-43.
198. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 38, 42-43.
199. KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.57(1).
200. KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.57(2).
201. WASH. SUP. COURT CRIM. R. 6.15(f)(2).
202. State v. Salas, 2017-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 24-25, 400 P.3d 251, 261.
203. Id.
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“failed to caution a jury not to surrender [its] honest convictions”
and whether the presiding judge “established time limits on
further deliberations . . . .”204 This is an interesting approach to
the alternative instruction theory. Instead of creating a strict
instruction, the courts have instead created a test to determine the
validity of any future instructions. While this practice is not used
in the Post-Millennium Allen Charge, it reflects the ever-present
threat of presiding judges going outside of accepted model
language. For the new model instruction to succeed, it must
address this threat directly.
The practices previously discussed address many of the
concerns outlined at the outset of this Comment. Once again, the
concern regarding undue pressure on the minority is at the
forefront. No matter how strictly a jurisdiction limits the use of
Allen-type charges, it will always agree that the minority party
issue must be addressed. This is a clear indicator that the
substantive language of the Post-Millennium Allen Charge must
also address this concern. Further steps taken by the states
previously discussed are also vital as the proposed instruction is
shaped. While many of these aspects may not find a home in the
body of the presented charge, they may still be implemented as
sub-elements that direct presiding judges as they issue the
instruction.
D. Allows Use of the Allen Charge
For every state that has implemented some form of ban on
the Allen Charge, another has upheld its use. However, these two
opposing groups often share similar sentiments and worries
regarding the Allen Charge’s potential coerciveness. As these
groups tackle the coercion issue, a variety of tactics have arisen.
To begin, the states that allow the use of the Allen Charge are (1)
Alabama; (2) Arkansas; (3) Delaware; (4) Florida; (5) Georgia;
(6) Kansas; (7) Missouri; (8) Nevada; (9) New York; (10)
Oklahoma; (11) South Carolina; (12) Texas; (13) Utah; (14)
Virginia; (15) West Virginia; and (16) Wyoming.205 The ensuing
204. Id.
205. See infra Appendix IV.
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discussion will focus on (1) states that have preserved the original
charge; and (2) states that allow the use of the Allen Charge but
have introduced some form of limiting factor.
1. Preserve Original Charge
The simplest sub-category to discuss is the states that have
not implemented any significant changes to their Allen Charge
practices. These states are (1) Arkansas; (2) Georgia; and (3)
Oklahoma.206 The Arkansas Supreme Court definitively upheld
the use of Allen Charges in its 1982 ruling Walker v. State.207 Its
dismissal of the appellant’s arguments against the use of the Allen
Charge indicates a clear dismissal of the critical coercive
arguments recognized by other states.208 Most notably, the court
allows a judge to describe the potential expenses related to the
current proceedings and any future trials on the same matter.209
Further, presiding judges who use differing language from the
recommended instruction face less scrutiny when compared to
judges in other jurisdictions.210 These judges are given free rein
to indicate that no future jurors are better suited to reach a
decision than the current jurors.211 The Arkansas Supreme Court
acknowledged that these practices allow a presiding judge to
misrepresent the regular proceedings of the judicial process.212
The court finalized its rebuttal of the appellant’s argument, stating
that “the statement itself does not encourage the jury to find the
accused guilty; therefore, [the] appellant cannot show any
resulting prejudice . . . .”213
The Georgia Supreme Court followed suit in its approval of
the Allen Charge. Falling in line with prior precedent, the court
decided that—despite the controversy—the Allen Charge’s base
language was not “extreme or improper” and thus preserved the
206. See infra Appendix IV.
207. 276 Ark. 434, 435-37, 637 S.W.2d 528, 529 (1982).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.; cf. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that any instruction
that strays from ABA model language will face higher scrutiny upon appeal).
211. Walker, 276 Ark. at 435-37, 637 S.W.2d at 529.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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charge for future use.214 The Oklahoma judiciary has approved
the use of Allen Charges in a similar fashion.215 In Miles v. State,
the Court of Criminal Appeals found that an Allen Charge is
proper if the jurors have been told “that they are not being forced
to agree . . . .”216 This language seems to indicate a preference for
subduing language relating to the minority or majority of the jury,
but in practice, this limitation has not been implemented.217 The
recommended supplemental Allen Charge instruction still
includes language that asks the minority to consider the
arguments and views of the majority.218 The use of the original
Allen Charge is still alive and well in Oklahoman and Georgian
courts.
These three jurisdictions provide a unique perspective in the
Allen Charge debate. Despite recognizing the potential coercive
harm of Allen Charges, Arkansas, Georgia, and Oklahoma have
decided that the potential benefits outweigh any danger to future
defendants.219
When addressing the advocacy of these
jurisdictions regarding the Allen Charge, the arguments seem to
rely solely on the ideal of judicial economy.220 Even if harm
occurs, if the courts are able to keep efficiently processing cases,
then that justifies the harm suffered. These actions accrue a
greater cost beyond harm suffered by individual defendants; it
erodes the reliability and faith in the judicial process. As
recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the actual process of
administering an Allen Charge requires a presiding judge to
misrepresent the judicial process.221 The costs associated with
this line of thinking are far too great.

214. Anderson v. State, 276 S.E.2d 603, 606-07 (Ga. 1981).
215. Miles v. State, 1979 OK CR 116, 602 P.2d 227, 228-29.
216. Id.
217. STEPHEN JONES ET AL., VERNON’S OKLAHOMA FORMS § 23.58 (2d ed. 2020).
218. Id. As of the August 2020 update.
219. Walker v. State, 276 Ark. 434, 435-37, 637 S.W.2d 528, 529 (1982); Anderson,
276 S.E.2d at 606-07; Miles, 602 P.2d at 228-29.
220. See Walker, 276 Ark. at 435-37, 637 S.W.2d at 529; Anderson, 276 S.E.2d at 60607; Miles, 602 P.2d at 228-29.
221. Walker, 276 Ark. at 435-37, 637 S.W.2d at 529.
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2. Implemented Limiting Factors
The second sub-category of approved Allen Charges
attempts to address the coercive nature of the charge. States have
taken various measures to limit the coercive effects of the Allen
Charge, including (a) limiting references to the minority; (b)
implementing a totality of the circumstances test; and (c) limiting
how an Allen Charge is presented.222 Many state jurisdictions
have implemented many of these measures.
a. Restrictions on Minority Pressure
As seen in the previous discussion of states that have adopted
the ABA model instruction and states that have implemented a
ban on Allen Charges, the most commonly referenced concern is
that the Allen Charge places undue pressure on the minority. With
this in mind, it is little surprise that even those states who wish to
retain the use of the Allen charge have shared this sentiment. The
states that have not banned the Allen Charge but have taken steps
to remedy the minority issue are: (1) Pennsylvania; (2) South
Carolina; (3) Virginia; (4) Iowa; (5) New York; (6) Nevada; and
(7) Florida.223 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania provides a
base understanding of the concerns in this category. Approaching
the issue from the perspective of criminal defendants, the court
found that calling for the minority to reconsider its view tips the
scale of justice by “impl[ying] that only those who entertain a
reasonable doubt as to guilt should reconsider.”224
The practices approved by the South Carolina judiciary
provide an interesting example of how a model instruction
addresses the minority issue. In South Carolina, not only is it
improper to emphasize the minority in a supplemental instruction,
but the guidelines provided by the South Carolina Supreme Court
mandate that a presiding judge address a jury with complete
neutrality.225 Language approved by the Virginian Supreme
Court bolsters this push for neutrality. In Poindexter v.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See infra Appendix IV.
See infra Appendix IV.
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 263 A.2d 923, 926 (Pa. 1970).
Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323-24 (S.C. 2002).
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Commonwealth, the court approved an Allen Charge that asked
jurors to consider the views of their peers but instructed that they
do not surrender any “conscientious opinion.”226 The model Allen
Charge in Iowa provides an extension of the language discussed
above. Neutrality remains the focus of the charge, but each juror
approaches the arguments of their fellow jurors with “a
disposition to be convinced . . . .”227 This principle achieves one
of the goals of the Post-Millennium Allen Charge. The immediate
goal of the new model instruction is to ensure the protection of
criminal defendants. By approaching the creation of the new
model instruction language with the goal of complete neutrality,
the minority coercion issue is directly attacked, thus eliminating
the most recognized threat of the base Allen Charge.
The state of New York also focused on the minority issue in
its modified Allen Charge.228 Specifically, the modifications have
been made to avoid attempts by a presiding judge to “shame the
jury into reaching [a] verdict . . . .”229 By banning the mention of
the minority in an Allen Charge, the New York judiciary is
recognizing that the minority faces attacks on multiple fronts.
Not only are jurors in the minority facing pressure from their
fellow jurors, but with the issuance of an improper Allen Charge,
they are being told by the presiding judge that they are a burden
on the judicial process.230 The Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling in
Azbill v. State supports the assertions made in New York.231
Recognizing that the use of an Allen Charge gives a presiding
judge the ability to interfere with the deliberation process, the
Nevada Supreme Court recommends that judges rarely use the
Allen Charge.232 However, the rare usage of the instruction must
not place any undue pressure on the minority, and the instruction
is faulty if it does not “remind . . . jurors . . . to surrender
conscientiously . . . .”233 Once again, like the practices seen in
226. 191 S.E.2d 200, 203 (Va. 1972).
227. State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Iowa 1980).
228. People v. Aponte, 759 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 495 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Nev. 1972).
232. Id.
233. Ransey v. State, 594 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Nev. 1979) (citing Redeford v. State, 572
P.2d 219, 220 (Nev. 1977)).
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South Carolina, the proper route to ensure jury independence is to
take each juror at face value and to express that each individual is
responsible for considering the views expressed by their peers.
Florida offers a unique instruction that serves as a final
example of the current measures taken to limit undue pressure on
the minority. Like the previously discussed states, the Florida
model instruction limits any language that refers to the minority
or majority and further limits the ability of a presiding judge to
re-issue a given charge.234 What it does offer is a roundtable type
of discussion.235 After the issuance of the charge, the jurors return
to the deliberation room and sequentially argue their views of the
case.236 During this time, the jurors are expected to acknowledge
the weaknesses in their arguments.237 After this “roundtable” has
concluded, if it seems that the jurors are still unwilling to concede,
they return to the judge with a final hung verdict.238 This
approach is an oddity in comparison to the practices of other states
but is not without its own merits. While this roundtable style of
discussion has not found a new home in the Post-Millennium
Allen Charge, the Florida judiciary should be commended for its
efforts to address the challenges of Allen-type charges.
b. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
Three states have concluded that the best manner to address
the Allen Charge is to review the merits of the given charge on a
case-by-case basis.239 In what is commonly referred to as a
“totality-of-the-circumstances test,” the states that follow this
practice judge the use of an Allen Charge within the parameters
of the case that is currently before the court.240 Instead of issuing
a blanket ban on the practice, these states have found it easier to
234. FLA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 4.1 (1981); see also Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d
412, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may
not repeat an Allen Charge more than once).
235. FLA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 4.1.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See infra Appendix IV.
240. “Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test” is a term of art used to collectively
reference certain state practices. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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address issues when they appear. The states that fall within this
sub-category are: (1) Alabama; (2) West Virginia; and (3)
Utah.241
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has simply
stated that the Allen Charge is permissible “if the language of the
charge is not coercive or threatening.”242 To determine whether
the language is improperly coercive, the court judges the given
charge based on the “whole context” of the given case.243 The
specific factors that the court considered in Maxwell v. State are
quite limited.244 It considered whether the presiding judge gave
an indication of how he believed the jury should decide the case
and if the specific language used was “coercive or threatening.”245
The West Virginian judiciary follows a similar practice, stating
that undue coercion is difficult to “determine[] by any general or
definite rule.”246 Instead, the courts have implemented a practice
of determining undue coercion on a case-by-case basis.247 In a
similar vein, the Court of Appeals of Utah has indicated that a
valid Allen Charge is still unduly coercive if the presiding judge
acts coercively.248 This practice of determining coerciveness
implements an environment of indecisiveness that will not aid the
new model instruction. Instead of relying on various judges’
interpretations of what constitutes coercive behavior, the model
instruction must provide clear guidelines that keep judges within
the allowed parameters. By setting a strict barrier for use,
defendants on appeal can effectively argue any undue coercive
acts of a presiding judge based on how far the judge strayed from
the guidelines of the Post-Millennium Allen Charge.

241. See infra Appendix IV.
242. Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting
Gwarjanski v. State, 700 So. 2d 357, 360 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)).
243. Id. (quoting Miller v. State, 645 So. 2d 363, 366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)).
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. STEPHEN P. MEYER, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 37:19
(2021).
247. Id.; State v. Spence, 313 S.E.2d 461, 463 (W. Va. 1984).
248. See State v. Harry, 2008 UT App 224, ¶¶ 27, 33-34, 189 P.3d 98, 106-08.
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c. Presentation of the Allen Charge
The final sub-category of approved Allen Charge
jurisdictions are those states that limit how a presiding judge may
present an instruction.249 These guidelines limit the when and
how a presiding judge is to issue a charge, and further serve as
indicators to prove that the judge has acted in a coercive manner.
The states that have taken limiting measures are: (1) Delaware;
(2) Kansas; (3) Wyoming; (4) Texas; and (5) Missouri.250
In its steps to limit the coercive effects of the Allen Charge,
the Delaware judiciary recognizes that when a presiding judge
chooses to present an instruction is a determining factor when
deciding whether the judge acted coercively.251 Further, the
length of jury deliberations prior to and after the issuance of an
Allen Charge can reflect the coercive nature of an instruction.252
The Delaware Supreme Court elaborates further by stating that
the likelihood of coercion increases if the presiding judge knows
the numerical division of the jury.253 While it is a reversible error
for the judge to inquire about how the jury is split—if the jury
informs the judge without prompt—then giving an Allen Charge
is not automatically improper.254 This acknowledgment of the
potential issues arising out of the presiding judge’s knowledge of
the numerical split of the jury is a valuable feature. Implementing
such a feature into the Post-Millennium Allen Charge places a
strict barrier between the presiding judge and the jurors during
deliberation, thus ensuring that any intentional—or
unintentional—coercive acts do not occur.
The standards in Kansas and Wyoming further elaborate on
how the timing of an instruction aids in determining whether a
presiding judge acted coercively. In Kansas, presiding judges
deliver Allen Charges before the jurors begin deliberating.255
Further, it is improper for the presiding judge to emphasize the
249. See infra Appendix IV.
250. See infra Appendix IV.
251. Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 826-27 (Del. 1994).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 827.
254. Id. at 827-28.
255. State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994); State v. Roadenbaugh, 673
P.2d 1166, 1174 (Kan. 1983).

4 EPPERSON.MAN.FIN..DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

4/13/22 10:00 AM

THE FUTURE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE

145

instruction as being of higher importance than any other
concurrent instructions.256 To accomplish this, the Allen Charge
is read alongside other jury instructions.257 The Wyoming
Supreme Court followed suit in its decision in Elmer v. State.258
After providing a harsh rebuke of the use of the charge, the court
recommended that the issuance of the charge occur during the
delivery of the other jury instructions.259 Straying from this
recommendation increases the likelihood that the presiding judge
has acted unduly coercively.260 Here, this practice limits the
potential for undue coerciveness in the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge. First, it limits the potential coercion of jurors in the
minority since the instructions are read prior to these parties being
formed. Further, by reading these instructions alongside the other
jury instructions present in a given case, some weight is taken off
the charge by making it seem no more important than any other
instruction. These are vital features in the newly proposed model
instruction.
The issue of timing also serves a beneficial purpose. A
balancing test allows for a court to understand whether it is
appropriate to give an Allen Charge or if the charge has coerced a
decision out of the jury.261 In Texas, presiding judges have the
discretion of determining whether the jury has deliberated for an
appropriate amount of time.262 The severity of the charges and
the overall complexity of the facts are used to determine whether
it is proper to issue a charge.263 For example, in Andrade v. State,
the court found that the presiding judge properly extended jury
deliberations given the complexity of the capital murder
charges.264 After receiving the instruction, the jury deliberated
for eight additional hours before reaching a unanimous verdict.265
Here, since the facts of the case were complex and the alleged
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Whitaker, 872 P.2d at 286.
Id.
463 P.2d 14, 22 (Wyo. 1969).
Id. at 21-22.
See id. at 23 (McIntyre, J., concurring).
See Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
Id.
See id.
700 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
Id. at 588-89.
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crime was severe, the presented Allen Charge was not coercive.266
If the jurors had returned a verdict within a shorter time frame, it
is more likely that the given instruction coerced them to reach the
verdict.267 The use of the “hammer [charge]” in Missouri carries
similarities to the Texas balancing test process.268 Presiding
judges in Missouri are given broad discretion in determining if
their actions and the delivery of an Allen-type charge is
coercive.269 The balancing test weighs heavily in favor of
presiding judges.270
The balancing test described by the Texas and Missouri
courts aids the development of the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge. This test can be used to aid a presiding judge as he or she
determines whether to issue a subsequent reading of the new
instruction. Likewise, if the presiding judge’s decision to present
the instruction is appealed, the commentary aids the appellate
judge in determining if the presiding judge’s actions are unduly
coercive. Giving a presiding judge this discretion is certainly a
risk but it is a necessary feature to build a well-rounded
instruction.
IV. THE POST-MILLENNIUM ALLEN CHARGE
If we want our criminal justice system, and American society
at large, to operate on a higher ethical code, then we have to
model that code ourselves.271
The Post-Millennium Allen Charge does not seek to
empower a presiding judge but rather places barriers on judicial
discretion to protect the interest of defendants. This new model
instruction must address the concerns of the various state
judiciaries while simultaneously filling in the gaps of their current
practices. In its model language, the Post-Millennium Allen
Charge seeks to specifically address the issue of undue minority
266. Id.
267. Id.; Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
268. City of St. Charles v. Hal-Tuc, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
269. Id.; see also State v. Dewitt, 924 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
270. Hal-Tuc, Inc., 841 S.W.2d at 781-82; see also Dewitt, 924 S.W.2d at 570.
271. Barack Obama, How to Make this Moment the Turning Point for Real Change,
MEDIUM (June 1, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9Q2D-CQCD].
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coercion and the multiple issues related to the presentation of an
Allen-type charge. To accomplish this goal, the following
discussion contains both (A) the elements of the Post-Millennium
Allen Charge; and (B) notes of use to aid the implementation of
the model instruction.
A. Elements272
In issuing the given Post-Millennium Allen Charge, the
presiding judge must adhere to the guidance of the following
elements:
(A) Prior to the jury’s retirement for deliberation, the court
may present this instruction, informing jurors that:
(1) a unanimous verdict requires that all jurors have
independently reached the same conclusion;
(2) during deliberations, individual jurors should be
impartial to the facts of the case and should give weight to
the views and arguments of their fellow jurors;
(3) while it is the duty of every juror to reach an independent
conclusion of innocence or guilt, jurors should partake in a
thorough debate to ensure all aspects of the given case have
been explored; and
(4) no juror is to surrender an honest belief of guilt or
innocence based on threats or pressure of other jurors or
court officials, or out of interest of returning a unanimous
verdict.273
(B) The presiding judge may repeat the present charge a
single time after the jury informs the judge that they are
unable to reach a verdict.274

272. The following instructions were written by the author of this Comment for the
express purpose of proposing a new model Allen-type instruction.
273. The language of the presented charge is a modified version of the language in the
ABA model instruction. See ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, at § 15-5.4(a)(1)(5).
274. While multiple jurisdictions allow the re-issuance of a given charge multiple
times, the Post-Millennium Allen Charge follows the example and reasoning referenced by
the Florida state courts. See Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d 412, 415-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may not repeat an Allen Charge
more than once).
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(1) The presiding judge must repeat all necessary
instructions to fully explain the controlling statutory
language and duties of the jury; and275
(2) the presiding judge is to consider the length of
deliberations and the complexity of the given case in
deciding whether to repeat the given instruction.276
(3) The presiding judge may not inquire into the numerical
split of the jury when determining whether to re-issue the
language in Section (A)(1)-(4);277
(4) however, it is not improper for the presiding judge to
repeat the present charge if the judge gained knowledge of
the numerical split from an independent act of the jury.278
(C) It is improper for presiding judges to use any language
that strays from the requirements outlined in Section (A)(1)(4) of this charge.279
(D) Presiding judges are prohibited from referencing any
cost associated with the current matter before the court, or

275. This element adopts the reasoning presented by the Kansas state courts that
presenting a charge alongside other relevant instructions aids in combating the undue
coercive effects of the instruction. See State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994)
(finding that it is preferable to repeat an Allen Charge alongside all other instructions present
in the given case).
276. This element is reminiscent of the manner in which Allen Charges are determined
to be improperly coercive in Texas. See Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) (ruling that the context of the given case must be considered when determining
whether it was proper to issue an Allen Charge); see also Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d 585,
589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (declaring that the complexity of the given case and the severity
of the charges against the defendant are relevant factors when determining whether issuing
an Allen Charge was proper).
277. As seen in multiple jurisdictions, the inquiry into the numerical split of a hung
jury poses multiple threats of coercion. See Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 827 (Del.
1994) (ruling that the likelihood of coercion increases if a presiding judge seeks out the
numerical split of a jury before issuing an Allen Charge); see also People v. Saltray, 969 P.2d
729, 732-33 (Colo. App. 1998) (ruling that presiding judges in Colorado may not directly
inquire about the numerical split of a hung jury).
278. This element seeks to avoid unnecessarily limiting presiding judges from
presenting the model instruction when they do not improperly learn of the numerical split of
the jury. Desmond, 654 A.2d at 826-28 (ruling that a presiding judge is not limited from
issuing an Allen Charge if the jury informs him of its numerical split without prompt).
279. This element implements the standard set by the Maryland state courts in their
adoption of the original ABA model instruction. Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md.
1973) (stating that any instruction that strays from ABA model language will face “careful”
scrutiny upon appeal).
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any other associated costs that may result from an
inconclusive verdict.280
(1) It is further unacceptable to state that it is improper for
an inconclusive verdict to be given.281

B. Notes of Use282
Dissecting the elements of this new model instruction
provides guidance on how this charge combats the coercive
nature of the base Allen Charge. Elements (A)(1)-(4) contain the
base language of the actual charge. This language is what the
presiding judge reads to the jurors prior to their retirement for
deliberations. The language contained within is a version of the
ABA model instruction that is refined by the lessons learned from
the studied state practices.283 Element (A)(1) provides a clear
definition of the duty of individual jurors. While jurors should
seek a unanimous verdict, their independence is of greater value
to the judicial process. Elements (A)(2)-(4) define what an
independent verdict means in the context of the current
proceedings and provides practical guidance on how the jurors
should conduct themselves in the deliberation room. A vital
feature of these sub-elements is the reference to individual jurors.
Banning the mention of either the majority or minority overcomes
the largest hurdle of this debate—the undue coercion of the
minority.284

280. As discussed by multiple jurisdictions, the discussion of any costs associated with
a proceeding only serve to unduly pressure a jury into reaching a verdict. See State v. Martin,
211 N.W.2d 765, 771 (Minn. 1973) (ruling that the coercive nature of informing jurors of
the costs of the ongoing proceedings does little to aid the interest of judicial economy).
281. This specific element seeks to combat the improper use of “final test” language.
See State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, ¶¶ 31, 37, 38-41, 43, 359 Mont. 257, 264-69, 248 P.3d
817, 822-25 (defining and barring use of “final test” language).
282. The following information provides guidelines on the use of the proposed PostMillennium Allen Charge.
283. ABA MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 62, at § 15-5.4(a)(1)-(5).
284. Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323 (S.C. 2002) (explaining South Carolina’s ban
on any Allen-type instructions that mention either the minority or majority); see Smith &
Kassin, supra note 51, at 639-41 (finding that the minority faces greater pressure after the
issuance of an Allen Charge compared to the majority); see also Deadlocked Juries: Thomas,
supra note 50, at 375 (describing the threat an Allen Charge poses to an independent jury
ruling).
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Elements (B)-(D) define and limit the duties of the presiding
judge in his or her issuance of the charge. First, Element (B)
limits the number of times and the manner in which a presiding
judge can repeat the instruction to the jury. A presiding judge
risks coercing the jury into reaching an improper ruling if he or
she repeatedly insists that the jurors reenter deliberations.285 To
avoid this, the model instruction limits the ability of the presiding
judge to re-issue the charge to a single time. Further, Element
(B)(1) limits the potential for coercion by mandating that all
provided instructions be repeated alongside the model instruction.
This practice avoids singling out the model instruction in the eyes
of the jury.286 Element (B)(2) empowers the presiding judge to
determine whether issuing the charge a second time is necessary
by conducting a totality of the circumstances test. In conducting
this test, the presiding judge is to weigh the apparent complexity
of the given case with the conduct of the jury. For example, the
issuance of a second charge is likely proper if the jury deliberated
for a relatively short amount of time in a case with complex facts
or statutory requirements.287 This specific sub-element is the area
where coercive acts by the presiding judge offer the greatest
threat, thus the limitation of repeating the model instruction a
single time. Elements (B)(3)-(4) prevent presiding judges from
inquiring about the numerical split of a hung jury when deciding
whether to re-issue a second iteration of the language in Elements
(A)(1)-(4). However, to avoid unduly punishing a presiding
judge who took no improper actions, Element (B)(4) does not
prevent the judge from issuing a second charge if he or she gained

285. This practice has repeatedly been found to be unnecessary when weighed against
the possible coercive effects of a given charge. See Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d 412, 41516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling that presiding judges in Florida state courts may not
repeat an Allen Charge more than once).
286. See State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994) (finding that it is preferable
to repeat an Allen Charge alongside all other instructions present in the given case).
287. As discussed prior, this process is a modified version of the process established
in Texas state courts when determining if a given charge was coercive. See Montoya v.
State, 810 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (ruling that the context of the given case
must be considered when determining whether it was proper to issue an Allen Charge); see
also Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (declaring that the
complexity of the given case and the severity of the charges against the defendant are relevant
factors when determining whether issuing an Allen Charge was proper).
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knowledge of the numerical split from an independent act of the
jury.288
Elements (C)-(D) conclude the model instruction by further
limiting the presiding judge’s ability to coerce the jury into
reaching a desired conclusion. Specifically, these elements limit
a judge from straying from the stated language in Elements
(A)(1)-(4) and from referencing any associated costs with the
judicial process.289 First, Element (C) prevents a presiding judge
from unknowingly creating a secondary instruction that
improperly coerces a jury. Implementation of this element
provides jurisdictions greater control over the language used in
the listed instruction and provides a test for an appellate court to
judge the actions of the lower court.290 Element (D) recognizes
that the costs associated with trying a case can be unduly coercive
over a juror. Presiding judges cannot use the costs of the ongoing
proceedings and any future proceedings as a way to guilt the jury
into reaching a unanimous ruling. The costs of a trial are not the
concerns of the jury and should not distract it in its determination
of guilt.
V. CONCLUSION
After 125 years, it is time to put the Allen Charge debate to
rest. In a social climate focused on reform and guarantees of
equal justice, the legal community must examine the weaknesses
and areas of potential harm in the judicial process assiduously.
The Allen Charge is a relic of a bygone legal era that placed
judicial efficiency as the highest ideal. In considering the Allen
Charge’s role, it is clear it can serve a beneficial purpose if the
inherent coercive nature of the charge can be effectively
overcome. The Post-Millennium Allen Charge is a collective
piece that ties together the best practices of the fifty states and the
288. See Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 826-28 (Del. 1994) (ruling that a presiding
judge is not limited from issuing an Allen Charge if the jury informs him or her of its
numerical split without prompt).
289. See State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 771 (Minn. 1973) (ruling that the coercive
nature of informing jurors of the costs of the ongoing proceedings does little to aid the
interest of judicial economy).
290. See Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538, 542 (Md. 1973) (stating that any instruction that
strays from ABA model language will face higher scrutiny upon appeal).
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ABA model instruction. Adopting such a charge takes a step
forward towards providing safeguards as criminal defendants
traverse the ever-changing legal realm.
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APPENDIX I: THE OUTLIERS291
State

Cited Materials

A. Tuey-Rodriquez Charge

Massachusetts

Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851);
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez,
300 N.E.2d 192 (Mass. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 323
N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Rollins,
241 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Haley, 604
N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 1992);
Commonwealth v. O’Brien,
839 N.E.2d 845 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2005).

B. Chip Smith Charge

Connecticut

State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376
(Conn. 1881); State v. O’Neil,
207 A.2d 730 (Conn. 2002);
State v. Feliciano, 778 A.2d
812 (Conn. 2001); State v.
Martinez, 378 A.2d 517
(Conn. 1977); State v.
McArthur, 899 A.2d 691
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006).

291. The following materials listed in Appendices I-IV are not the sole controlling
authorities in the listed jurisdictions—they are simply the materials that were referenced or
cited in the discussion above. While some sources listed in the appendices are not cited in
the body of this Comment, they are listed due to the aid they provided in preparing this
Comment.
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APPENDIX II: ABA MODEL INSTRUCTIONS
State

Cited Materials

A. Adopted ABA Model Instruction

Illinois

Maine

Michigan

Minnesota

New Jersey

Tennessee

People v. Prim, 298 N.E.2d
601 (Ill. 1972); People v.
Branch, 462 N.E.2d 868 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984); People v.
Brown, 362 N.E.2d 820 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977).
State v. White, 285 A.2d 832
(Me. 1972); State v. Cote, 507
A.2d 584 (Me. 1986); State v.
Kaler, 1997 ME 62, 691 A.2d
1226.
People v. Sullivan, 220
N.W.2d 441 (Mich. 1974);
People v. Lawson, 223
N.W.2d 716 (Mich. Ct. App.
1974); People v. Thompson,
265 N.W.2d 632 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d
765 (Minn. 1973); State v.
Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.
2012); State v. Danforth, 573
N.W.2d 369 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
State v. Czachor, 413 A.2d
593 (N.J. 1980); State v.
Boiardo, 268 A.2d 55 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970);
State v. Ross, 93 A.3d 739
(N.J. 2014).
Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d
139 (Tenn. 1975).
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State v. Perry, 306 A.2d 110
(Vt. 1973); State v. Rolls,
2020 VT 18, 229 A.3d 695.

B. Co-opted ABA Language

Colorado

North Carolina

People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d
1000 (Colo. 1984); People v.
Gonzales, 565 P.2d 945 (Colo.
App. 1977); People v. Saltray,
969 P.2d 729 (Colo. App.
1998).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235
(1977); State v. Alston, 243
S.E.2d 354 (N.C. 1978); State
v. Blackwell, 747 S.E.2d 137
(N.C. Ct. App. 2013).

C. Soft Adoption of ABA Standards

Alaska

Maryland

Nebraska
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon

Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831
(Alaska 1971); Stapleton v.
State, 696 P.2d 180 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1985).
Kelly v. State, 310 A.2d 538
(Md. 1973); Goodmuth v.
State, 490 A.2d 682 (Md.
1985); Hall v. State, 75 A.3d
1055 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2013).
State v. Garza, 176 N.W.2d
664 (Neb. 1970); Potard v.
State, 299 N.W. 362, 365
(Neb. 1941).
State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300
(N.H. 1973)
State v. Champagne, 198
N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1972).
State v. Marsh, 490 P.2d 491
(Or. 1971); State v. Garrett,
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426 P.3d 164 (Or. Ct. App.
2018); State v. Hutchison, 920
P.2d 1105 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d
300 (R.I. 1973); State v.
Souza, 425 A.2d 893 (R.I.
1981); State v. Luanglath, 863
A.2d 631 (R.I. 2005).

APPENDIX III: STRONG DISAPPROVAL
State

Cited Materials
A. Total Ban

Arizona

Hawaii
Idaho

Louisiana

South Dakota

State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 197
(Ariz. 1959); State v. Smith,
493 P.2d 904 (Ariz. 1972);
State v. Kuhs, 224 P.3d 192
(Ariz. 2010).
State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20
(Haw. 1985).
State v. Flint, 761 P.2d 1158
(Idaho
1988);
State
v.
Martinez, 832 P.2d 331 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d
639 (La. 1975); State v.
Bradley, 995 So. 2d 1230 (La.
Ct. App. 2008); State v. Caston,
561 So. 2d 941 (La. Ct. App.
1990).
State v. Fool Bull, 2009 SD 36,
766 N.W.2d 159; State v.
Ferguson, 175 N.W.2d 57 (S.D.
1970); State v. Hall, 272
N.W.2d 308 (S.D. 1978).
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B. Modified Instructions

California

Indiana

Kentucky

Montana

Mississippi

New Mexico

Ohio

People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997
(Cal. 1977); People v. Valdez,
281 P.3d 924 (Cal. 2012);
People v. Butler, 209 P.3d 596
(Cal. 2009).
Fultz v. State, 473 N.E.2d 624
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Lewis v.
State, 424 N.E.2d 107 (Ind.
1981); Clark v. State, 597
N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.57;
Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
943 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1997);
Gray v. Commonwealth, 480
S.W.3d 253 (Ky. 2016).
State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34,
359 Mont. 257, 248 P.3d 817;
State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 1054
(Mont. 1960); State v.
Santiago, 2018 MT 13, 390
Mont. 154, 415 P.3d 972.
Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d
591 (Miss. 1976); Bell v. State,
2015-KA-00643-SCT (Miss.
2016); Gearlson v. State, 482
So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1986).
State v. Salas, 2017-NMCA057, 400 P.3d 251; State v.
Laney, 81 P.3d 591 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2003); State v. Romero,
526 P.2d 816 (N.M. Ct. App.
1974) (Sutin, J., dissenting).
State v. Howard, 537 N.E.2d
188 (Ohio 1989); State v.
Maupin, 330 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio
1975); State v. May, 2015Ohio-4275, 49 N.E.3d 736.
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WASH. SUP. COURT CRIM. R.
6.15(2); State v. Parker, 485
P.2d 60 (Wash. 1971).
Quarles v. State, 233 N.W.2d
401 (Wis. 1975); Kelley v.
State, 187 N.W.2d 810 (Wis.
1971).

APPENDIX IV: ALLOWS USE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE
State

Cited Materials

A. Preserve Original Charge

Arkansas

Georgia

Oklahoma

Walker v. State, 276 Ark. 434,
637 S.W.2d 528 (1982);
Griffin v. State, 2 Ark. App.
145, 617 S.W.2d 21 (1981);
Moore v. State, 2015 Ark. App.
480, 469 S.W.3d 801.
Anderson v. State, 376 S.E.2d
603 (Ga. 1981); Anglin v.
State, 806 S.E.2d 573 (Ga.
2017); Barnes v. State, 266
S.E.2d 212 (Ga. 1980).
Miles v. State, 602 P.2d 227
(Okla. 1979).

B. Restrictions on Minority Pressure

Florida

FLORIDA STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTION § 4.1 (1981);
Almeida v. State, 157 So. 3d
412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015);
Peak v. State, 363 So. 2d 1166
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997
(Fla. 2001).

4 EPPERSON.MAN.FIN..DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

4/13/22 10:00 AM

THE FUTURE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE

Iowa

Nevada

Pennsylvania

New York

South Carolina

Virginia
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State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d
803 (Iowa 1980); State v.
Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa
1978); State v. Hackett, 200
N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972).
Azbill v. State, 495 P.2d 1064
(Nev. 1972); Ransey v. State,
594 P.2d 1157 (Nev. 1979);
Basurto v. State, 472 P.2d 339
(Nev. 1970).
Commonwealth v. Spencer,
263 A.2d 923 (Pa. 1970);
Commonwealth v. Gartner,
381 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1977);
Commonwealth v. Lambert,
299 A.2d 240 (Pa. 1973).
People v. Aponte, 759
N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003); People v. Abston, 645
N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).
Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318
(S.C. 2002); State v. Lynn, 284
S.E.2d 786 (S.C. 1981); State
v. Singleton, 460 S.E.2d 573
(S.C. 1995).
Poindexter v. Commonwealth,
191 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1972);
Prieto v. Commonwealth, 682
S.E.2d 910 (Va. 2009).

C. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test

Alabama

Utah

Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d
347 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000);
Daily v. State, 828 So. 2d 344
(Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
State v. Harry, 2008 UT App
224, 189 P.3d 98; State v.
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct.
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West Virginia

Vol. 75:1

App. 1988); State v. Cruz, 206
UT App 234, 387 P.3d 618.
State v. Spence, 376 S.E.2d
618 (W. Va. 1988); State v.
Waldron, 624 S.E.2d 887 (W.
Va. 2005).

D. Presentation of the Allen Charge

Delaware

Kansas

Missouri

Texas

Wyoming

Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d
821 (Del. 1994); Brown v.
State, 369 A.2d 682 (Del.
1976); Collins v. State, 56 A.3d
1012 (Del. 2012).
State v. Whitaker, 872 P.2d
278 (Kan. 1994); State v.
Roadenbaugh, 673 P.2d 1166
(Kan. 1983); State v. Gomez,
143 P.3d 92 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006).
City of St. Charles v. Hal-Tuc,
Inc., 841 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Dewitt,
924 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); State v. Carl, 389
S.W.3d 276 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013).
Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d
160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989);
Andrade v. State, 700 S.W.2d
585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985);
Barnett v. State, 189 S.W.3d
272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14
(Wyo. 1969); Carter v. State,
2016 WY 36, 369 P.3d 220
(Wyo. 2016); Hoskins v. State,
552 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1976).

4 EPPERSON.MAN.FIN..DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

4/13/22 10:00 AM

THE FUTURE OF THE ALLEN CHARGE

161

APPENDIX V292

292. If included, the decisions of the Washington D.C. circuit create a model
instruction that is classified under the “Co-opted ABA Language” sub-grouping. United
States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also United States v.
Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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IMPORTING INDIAN INTOLERANCE:
HOW TITLE VII CAN PREVENT
CASTE DISCRIMINATION IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE
Brett Whitley*
If Hindus migrate to other regions on [E]arth, [Indian]
Caste would become a world problem.
— Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (1916)1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is the year 2020. You are one of the more than
160 million people across India that are labeled as Dalits,
formerly known as the “Untouchables.” Most Hindus view Dalits
as belonging to the lowest rung in the ancient system of social
stratification that impacts individuals across the globe called the
caste system.2 Your people have endured human rights abuses
for centuries, but luckily, neither you nor a loved one have ever
been the victim of one of the thousands of horrendous crimes such
as assault, rape, or murder committed against your people each
year.3 Even so, you have never felt safe, especially when
*
The author would first like to thank his advisor to this Comment, mentor, and friend—
Dean Cynthia Nance. Without Dean Nance thoughtfully incorporating present-day issues
into her Employment Law class, the author likely would not have encountered this important
topic. Next, the author would like to show gratitude to Dr. Suraj Yengde for taking the time
to enlighten the author about the complexities of caste discrimination using his own personal
experiences as well as the experiences of so many others. Finally, the author would like to
thank his parents, Teresa and Rick Whitley, as well as his sister, Alexis Whitley, for all their
unconditional love and support.
1. M. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., CASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SURVEY OF CASTE
AMONG SOUTH ASIAN AMERICANS 4 (Equality Labs 2018), [https://perma.cc/JW3G-V9JG].
2. What is India’s Caste System?, BBC NEWS (June 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9B7FBKAN].
3. Hillary Mayell, India’s “Untouchables” Face Violence, Discrimination, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (June 2, 2003), [https://perma.cc/9D9Y-FBU7] (“Statistics compiled by
India’s National Crime Records Bureau indicate that in the year 2000, the last year for which
figures were available, 25,455 crimes were committed against Dalits. Every hour two Dalits
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newspaper headlines read: “Dalit [] beaten to death for plucking
flowers;” “Dalit tortured by cops for three days;” or “Dalit woman
gang-raped, paraded naked.”4 Despite your fears, you have
persevered throughout school due to India’s affirmative action
plan, or “compensatory discrimination” program.5 You wish not
only to escape the country that is hostile to your caste, but to also
obtain a job outside of the realm of undesirable occupations to
which Dalits are ordinarily limited.6 To your delight, you obtain
a respectable job working for a tech giant in the United States.
However, you quickly learn that the caste discrimination you
faced at home transcends borders.
At your new job, you begin to associate with your upper
caste coworkers who also immigrated from India. After a short
conversation about where you went to school in India and your
last name, your Dalit status is apparent, and your coworkers and
supervisors input limitations for you based on your caste. From
that point onward, you “receive[] less pay, fewer opportunities,
and other inferior terms and conditions of employment . . . .”7
This is no imaginary tale. It is the story of an anonymous
Dalit employee who sought to bring a Title VII claim based on
caste discrimination against his employer, CISCO.8 Importantly,
he is not alone. It may be difficult to ever know how many Dalits
are currently in the United States because they fear that their caste

are assaulted; every day three Dalit women are raped, two Dalits are murdered, and two Dalit
homes are torched.”).
4. Id.
5. M. Varn Chandola, Affirmative Action in India and the United States: The
Untouchable and Black Experience, 3 IND. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 101, 109 (1992). Such
affirmative action programs reserve admission in institutions of higher education for Dalits
and other disadvantaged classes of people.
6. Shambhavi Raj Singh, #DalitLivesMatter: Why Are Atrocities Against Dalits On
The Rise?, FEMINISM IN INDIA (June 11, 2020), [https://perma.cc/Q6FB-HD67] (“Even
today, more than 90% of the employees in the sanitation and cleaning sector are Dalits.”);
see also Jeremy Sarkin & Mark Koenig, Ending Caste Discrimination in India: Human
Rights and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Individuals and Groups from Discrimination
at the Domestic and International Levels, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 541, 550 (2010)
(“Most Dalit people are still landless agricultural laborers today, just as they have been for
centuries.”).
7. Complaint at 3, Cal. Dep’t Fair Emp. & Hous. v. CISCO Sys., Inc., No. 5:20-cv04374-NC (N.D. Cal. 2020) (dismissed), [https://perma.cc/5PC4-TEQW].
8. Id. at 1-2.
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can be revealed, or in other words, “outed.”9 However, there are
concrete numbers that in 2003 only 1.5% of Indian immigrants in
the United States were Dalit or lower caste, leaving them vastly
outnumbered in comparison to the total 2.5 million people of
Indian descent who lived in the United States at the time.10 It may
also be useful to compare the 2003 figures in the United States to
statistics in South Asia regarding Dalit demographics to get an
idea about disproportionate Dalit representation. A 2016 survey
found that in some South Asian countries “Dalits represent an
average of 15-18% of the population and Brahmins, the highest
ranking caste, [represent] approximately 3-4%.”11
Heinous crimes like sexual assault or murder are the most
extreme products of caste discrimination and should warrant the
most attention, but the effects of caste discrimination are not
limited to these crimes. There are many other, less apparent ways
in which a biased upper caste supervisor may remind Dalit and
lower caste employees that they are inferior, therefore upholding
the caste hierarchy that exists so prevalently in their home country
of India. Whether the biased supervisor torments a Dalit or lower
caste employee with caste-related jokes or takes his or her
discriminatory goals a step further by making it his or her mission
to limit the success of Dalits or lower caste employees, the
supervisor’s actions are the product of the caste system.
As Indian immigration to the United States continues to
grow exponentially,12 the tech industry has become “increasingly
dependent on Indian workers.”13 Further, as more lower caste and
Dalit individuals benefit from India’s affirmative action programs
and welfare schemes, Dalits and lower caste individuals now have
the increased opportunity to become skilled employees and
immigrate to the United States. As the United States becomes
increasingly more dependent on South Asian, and especially
9. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-17 (50% of all Dalit respondents who
live in the United States stated that they live in fear of their Caste being “outed”).
10. Tinku Ray, No Escape from Caste on These Shores, ‘Untouchables’ from India
Say, PULITZER CTR. (Feb. 26, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2WN7-S72J].
11. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 17.
12. NEIL G. RUIZ, INDIAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. 6 (Pew Research Center 2018),
[https://perma.cc/KY9Z-3525].
13. AB Wire, India’s Engineers and its Caste System Thrive in Silicon Valley: Report,
AM. BAZAAR (Oct. 28, 2020, 7:08 PM), [https://perma.cc/EY8F-FYE5].
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Indian, workers, more and more Dalit and lower caste individuals
have found themselves coming to the United States for gainful
employment. This growing dependency on workers who come
from differing caste backgrounds paired with the caste system’s
entrenched place in Hindu culture suggests that caste
discrimination in the United States workplace is likely to get
worse, especially in Indian-dominant industries such as the tech
sector.14 Though most Americans may not know the role caste
plays in Hindu culture, caste discrimination is very much an
“American problem.”15 Whether it is the American employer
seeking to eliminate discrimination in the workplace or the Dalit
employees seeking a better life, there is legislation that can
protect Dalit and lower caste employees—Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
This Comment begins in Part I with an overview of the caste
system and its origins. In Part II, this Comment demonstrates
how caste discrimination in employment contexts constrains
social mobility. Parts III and IV include the crux of my
proposal—the theory of Intersectionality shows that caste
discrimination is prohibited under Title VII by recognizing that
caste discrimination is simultaneous discrimination based upon
one’s existence in multiple protected classes. After establishing
caste’s coverage under Title VII, this Comment narrows its focus
to how a victim of caste discrimination may bring a claim under
Title VII in Part V. Lastly, in Part VI, this Comment provides
proposals specific to legislative bodies, employers, and most
importantly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Such proposals contend that legislative bodies,
employers, and the EEOC should create caste-centric policies and
interpretations that specifically prohibit caste discrimination
instead of attempting to shape caste so that it fits into just one of
Title VII’s protected classes. Overall, these proposals would

14. See Nitasha Tiku, India’s Engineers Have Thrived in Silicon Valley. So Has its
Caste System., WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/8HMR-U798] (“[A] nonprofit
advocacy group for Dalit rights, received complaints about caste from nearly 260 U.S. tech
workers in three weeks . . . .”).
15. Telephone Interview with Dr. Suraj Yengde, Assoc., Dep’t of Afr. & Afr. Am.
Stud., Harvard Univ. (Oct. 19, 2020).
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show courts that there is support for prohibiting caste
discrimination in the American workplace.
It is also important to note that this Comment is not the only
work that addresses the possibility of caste discrimination being
covered by Title VII. Guha Krishnamurthi and Charanya
Krishnaswami authored a preliminary draft titled Caste and Title
VII to discuss the possible prohibition of caste discrimination in
the American workplace. This work thoughtfully applies the
authors’ expertise on the caste system to what we know about
Title VII’s protected classes in order to determine whether caste
discrimination is discrimination based on one or more of the
protected classes.16 Similar to this Comment, Caste and Title VII
contends that caste discrimination is a legally cognizable claim
under Title VII because “in light of the Supreme Court’s teaching
in Bostock v. Clayton County, caste discrimination is cognizable
as race discrimination, religious discrimination, and national
origin discrimination.”17 This Comment also discusses how and
why caste discrimination is discrimination based upon the
protected classes. Additionally, this Comment seeks to add to the
current scholarship by discussing the use of the theory of
Intersectionality when arguing Title VII’s coverage of caste.
This Comment adds to the current scholarship by describing
how caste discrimination can be at least based in part upon one’s
membership in all of Title VII’s protected classes. However, this
Comment does not list options, or in this case, protected classes,
that a court may choose to recognize caste discrimination as
falling under. Instead, this Comment contends that, under the
theory of Intersectionality, not only can courts recognize caste
discrimination as being discrimination based either on one’s race,
religion, color, sex, or national origin, courts should recognize
caste discrimination as simultaneous discrimination based
potentially on one’s existence in all of the protected classes.18
Importantly, Caste and Title VII does not deny the possibility that
16. See generally Guha Krishnamurthi & Charanya Krishnaswami, Title VII and Caste
Discrimination, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 456 (2021).
17. Id. at 481.
18. The word “potentially” is only included due to the fact that there is only a potential
chance that the protected class of sex is going to be implicated since there is only a potential
chance that one is a woman—the most likely gender to be harmed by caste discrimination.
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the theory of Intersectionality should be used in arguing that caste
discrimination is covered by Title VII. Ultimately, while this
Comment and Caste and Title VII are similar in many aspects,
such as the overarching argument that caste discrimination is
prohibited by Title VII, the two works reach this conclusion in
different ways.
I. CASTE: AN OVERVIEW
In this Part, the Comment first gives a general overview of
the caste system. Next, this Part provides a brief background of
the development of today’s caste system. Finally, this Part
connects the caste system to one’s ability to be upwardly mobile
in society via employment.
A. What is caste?
Caste is a system of religious purity.19 One inherits this
religious purity at birth from which there is no mobility. The caste
system strictly prohibits “varnasankara,” or the mixture of varnas,
restricting “inter-dining and inter-marriage.”20 The varnas are an
“ancient fourfold arrangement of socioeconomic categories.”21
The varnas, listed in order of religious purity are the Brahmins
(“priests, scriptural knowledge-keepers, and legislators”), the
Kshatriyas (“kings and warriors”), the Vaishyas (merchants), and
the Shudras (peasants).22
The caste system effectively separates people spiritually,
politically, economically, and even physically, denying Dalits
access to land ownership, schooling, places of worship, hospitals,

19. M.V. Nadkarni, Is Caste System Intrinsic to Hinduism? Demolishing a Myth, 38
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4783, 4783 (Nov. 8, 2003).
20. Id.
21. T.N. Madan, Varnas, BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/A9SZ-S82X] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2021).
22. ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
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water sources,23 markets, and other public places.24 One’s level
of purity decides his/her varna. Hindu origin myths state that the
four varnas “were created from different parts of God Brahma’s
body and were to be ranked hierarchically according to ritual
status, purity, and occupation.”25 Hinduism considers the Dalits,
meaning “broken but resilient,” and the Adivasis, or the
indigenous peoples of South Asia, outside the four-caste group
structure making up the varnas described above, which means that
both groups are considered to be of the utmost impurity.26
B. When did caste-based hierarchy begin?
Caste-based hierarchy is thousands of years old, making it
one of the oldest systems of social discrimination in the world.27
Despite the caste system’s historical roots, there is much debate
within Hindu society as to whether the caste system is integral to
Hinduism.28 The differences in belief are a result of differing
interpretations of ancient Hindu scripture.
Those who believe caste is integral to Hinduism believe that
the caste system is religiously codified in ancient Hindu

23. See, e.g., Susie Sell, Access to Clean Water: How Dalit Communities in India are
Fighting for Change, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2013), [https://perma.cc/657W-LBTP] (“Dalits
usually have little other option in urban areas than to cram into the already crowded slums,
where their access to clean, safe water and sanitation is often severely limited. Many still
get their water from dirty shallow wells, or illegally from leaks in the city’s piped water
supply.”).
24. Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 543 (quoting Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reps. Submitted By States Parties Under Article 9
of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Inda, 3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/IND/CO/19 (2007)).
25. ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
26. Id.; see also India: Adivasis, MINORITY RTS. GRP. INT’L, [https://perma.cc/HAS3LYWV] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021) (“Adivasis are not a homogenous group; there are over
200 distinct peoples speaking more than 100 languages and varying greatly in ethnicity and
culture. However, there are similarities in their way of life and generally perceived
oppressed position within Indian society. According to the official Census held in 2011,
Adivasis constitute 8.6 percent of the nation’s total population, some 104.3 million people.”).
27. What is India’s Caste System?, supra note 2.
28. Nadkarni, supra note 19, at 4784; see Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 548-49
(“Mahatma Gandhi argued, ‘[C]aste has nothing to do with religion. It is a custom whose
origin I do not know and do not need to know for the satisfaction of my spiritual hunger.’”)
(quoting SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS REFORM: THE HINDUS OF BRITISH INDIA 199-200 (Amiya
P. Sen ed., 2003)).
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scripture.29 However, those who oppose this belief argue that the
importance of caste is a relatively new idea developed during
British colonial rule—at a time when access to information was
scarce and censored through the colonizer’s perspective.30
There are many reasons why one may continue to believe
that the caste system is integral to Hinduism, despite other,
explicitly contradictory interpretations of the Hindu canon.31 For
one, those who support the interpretation that favors the caste
system’s legitimacy have the most to lose. Understandably, those
who are in power do not want to relinquish their power nor the
power their children inherit. Supporters of the interpretation that
favors the caste system’s legitimacy may argue that the caste
system provides a stable, organized system of labor that avoids
the overexploitation of resources by only allowing certain castes
to reap the benefits of certain resources.32
Before British colonialism reached India, those who would
now be defined as Hindu existed without a unified collective
religious identity.33 During the age of British colonial expansion,
the colonizers quickly developed an awareness that the diversity
of cultures and religions would require cognizable categories that
would be comparable to the normative Christian perspective.34
This perspective supports a system of “an absolute claim for only
one truth, of a powerful church dominating society, and
consequently of fierce religious and social confrontation with
members of other creeds.”35 Operating in accord with this
normative Christian perspective, the British held a preconceived
29. ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
30. Sanjoy Chakravorty, Viewpoint: How the British Reshaped India’s Caste System,
BBC NEWS (June 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/HJ3D-U4AW].
31. See Nadkarni, supra note 19, at 4785-88.
32. Id. at 4790 (“It was easier for skills and knowledge to be imparted within family
from father to children as there were no trade schools . . . [a]s families became specialised in
arts and crafts, they flourished . . . .”); Id. (“The caste system performed an important
function of reducing competition for and avoiding overexploitation of natural resources.
Only fisherman caste could go for fishing . . . [o]nly hunters’ caste could go for hunting
wildlife in the forests . . . .”).
33. Ben Heath, The Impact of European Colonialism on the Indian Caste System, EINT’L RELS. (Nov. 26, 2012), [https://perma.cc/9J4L-WNU2].
34. RICHARD KING, ORIENTALISM AND RELIGION: POSTCOLONIAL THEORY, INDIA
AND ‘THE MYTHIC EAST’ 99 (1999).
35. Id. at 103 (quoting HINDUISM RECONSIDERED 14-15 (Günther-Dietz Sontheimer
& Hermann Kulke eds., 1991)).
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notion that Hinduism was the one religion that unified India
despite the diversity of cultures and religions that the British knew
existed in India.36 This Christian perspective also led the British
to look to Indian literary works, as well as the proclaimed experts
of such works, as sources for understanding Indian culture.37
In such an age, only one group held such expertise—the
Brahmins. Accompanying this expertise, the Brahmins already
had great social, economic, and political power, placing them in
a position where they could serve as the sole source of
information regarding Hinduism. Specifically, the Brahmins
influenced the British interpretation of these texts by emphasizing
brahmanical beliefs “as central and foundational to the ‘essence’
of Hinduism.”38
And most importantly, the Brahmins’
interpretations supported the Christian/Western tradition of “an
absolute claim for only one truth, [in] a powerful church
dominating society.”39 The British, by following the Brahmins’
interpretations, understood that Hinduism “represent[ed] the
triumph of universalized, brahmanical forms of religion over the
‘tribal’ and the ‘local’ [religions] . . . .”40 Through the Brahmins’
interpretations, the “British found a loosely defined cultural élite
that proved amenable to an ideology that placed [the Brahmins]
at the apex of a single world-religious tradition.”41 With this
information, the British could now classify Hindus under a single,
social construct, effectively making colonial control and
manipulation easier.
To officially begin solidifying this emerging form of
Hinduism which, at its core is nothing more than a textual theory
called “Brahmanism,” the British elevated Brahman-Sanskrit
texts like the Manusmriti to canonical status in the 19th Century
by deeming these texts the authentic sources of knowledge
regarding Hindus.42 The Manusmriti is now regarded as the most
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id. at 103.
39. KING, supra note 34 (quoting HINDUISM RECONSIDERED 14-15 (Günther-Dietz
Sontheimer & Hermann Kulke eds., 1991)).
40. Id. at 104.
41. Id. at 103.
42. See Padmanabh Samarendra, Census in Colonial India and the Birth of Caste, 46
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 51, 54 (2011) (“The colonial officials like William Jones and Henry
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authoritative book on Hindu law and “acknowledges and justifies
the caste system as the basis of order and regularity of society.”43
The caste system was further institutionalized in India during
“the mid to late 19th Century through the census.”44 The census
was a direct survey of the population of India. The administrators
of the census went to the people of India with questionnaires to
inquire about their number, attributes, and where they fit within
the fourfold varna divisions described in the Brahmin texts.45
However, the administrators were met with great difficulty in
accomplishing this task, finding instead that a strict fourfold varna
division was “non-existent” throughout India.46 Despite this lack
of uniformity, similar census projects continued in an effort to
organize colonial India.47 As similar processes unfolded over
time, Indians began to associate their national and cultural
identity with this view of Hinduism. When India became
independent in 1947, this view of Hinduism, that originated from
the colonizers and Brahmins, was already solidified. Although
the British and Brahmins shaped modern-day Hinduism, modernday Hindu scholars sometimes categorize the same texts “very
differently,” placing emphasis on the multitude of other
Sanskritic texts that serve as the basis of Indian culture.48
C. How does caste limit social mobility via occupations and
employment?
Although caste and India are colloquially associated with
each other, the concept of untouchability is not at all confined to
the 160 million Dalits located in India.49 Approximately ninety
million additional Dalits suffer caste discrimination abuses in
other Asian countries as well as other parts of the world, such as
Colebrook, writing from towards the close of the 18th century, considered Sanskrit texts as
the authentic sources of knowledge about the Hindus.”).
43. What is India’s Caste System?, supra note 2.
44. Chakravorty, supra note 30.
45. Id.
46. Samarendra, supra note 42, at 57.
47. Id.
48. See Chakravorty, supra note 30.
49. Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 543; see also Mayell, supra note 3 (describing
India’s Dalit population and the effects of untouchability).
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Europe and North America.50 While international actors have
addressed the issues of caste discrimination and untouchability
since the 1990s,51 the “international community has failed to
[monitor] the progress of the Indian government and others in
addressing these abuses.”52 Article 17 of the Indian Constitution
has abolished the practice of untouchability and “Article 15
prohibits discrimination and mentions caste discrimination as one
type of discrimination that is no longer permissible.”53 However,
“despite formal protections in law, discriminatory treatment
remains endemic and discriminatory societal norms continue to
be reinforced by government and private structures, often through
violent means.”54 Smita Narula, an esteemed caste scholar and
professor of law, even goes so far as to compare caste to “oxygen”
in Indian society because both are “invisible and indispensable.”55
Poverty is deceptive, leading an observer to believe that it
affects all who suffer from it equally. While lack of upward
mobility is not limited to Dalits and lower caste people, the truth
of the matter is that “if you are a Dalit in India, you are far more
likely to be poor” and “the poverty endured is abject, violent, and

50. See, e.g., Anushiya Shrestha et al., The Hydro-Social Dynamics of Exclusion and
Water Insecurity of Dalits in Peri-Urban Kathmandu Valley, Nepal: Fluid yet Unchanging,
28 CONTEMP. S. ASIA 320, 326 (2020) (“Without land, with limited education and few capital
assets, livelihood options are limited for Dalits [in Nepal].”); KALINGA TUDOR SILVA ET AL.,
INDIAN INST. OF DALIT STUD., CASTE DISCRIMINATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SRI
LANKA: AN OVERVIEW 17-19 (Sukhadeo Thorat & Surinder S. Jodka eds., 2009) (study
demonstrating that among many difficulties faced by some lower castes in Sri Lanka, lower
castes in different areas face limited access to “religious and ritual spheres,” difficulty in
securing land from high caste landowners, poor access to water and sanitation facilities, and
are degraded to “unclean work”); see also Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, at 543.
51. See Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 6, 563-64 (“[Since India’s independence in 1947]
a number of international treaties and findings by treaty bodies require that India properly
address caste discrimination. The ICERD [occurring in 1965] is most applicable . . . . Other
applicable treaties include the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) [occurring in 1966], the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) [occurring in 1966], the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
[occurring in 1989], and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) [occurring in 1979].”).
52. Id. at 544.
53. Id. at 556; see also Citizens for Just. & Peace, Caste Discrimination and Related
Laws in India, CJP (Jan. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/C2WT-E8WH].
54. Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The “Untouchable” Condition
Critical Race Perspective, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 255, 257 (2008).
55. Id. at 259.
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virtually inescapable.”56 Though some Dalits have the privilege
of escaping such poverty, they have had no luck in escaping caste
discrimination in the American workplace. Dalits’ inability to
escape caste discrimination in the workplace is reflected not only
through the occasional snide remark, but also in limitations in
upward, social mobility.57 It is easy to see why such limitations
would exist in the workplace because one’s job is a prerequisite
for development in India as well as most, if not all, other countries
across the globe.58
These limitations, in turn, further
institutionalize the caste system “because of its capacity not only
to monitor the movements of groups, but also to regulate the
occupational map of the society.”59
This lack of upward mobility can be illustrated by looking at
a study evaluating the relationship between caste and occupation
in Pune, India. Pune is “traditionally known for the dominance
of the upper castes and their spread to various upper occupational
locations.”60 The study reflects that this tradition has for the most
part, continued to hold true in the twenty-first century. In 2007,
54% of upper caste earners were in the higher occupations while
32% of Dalits engage in “[v]ery poor” occupations, an 8%
increase from the year 2000.61 The study broadly classifies
occupations into upper or higher, upper middle, middle, lower
middle, poor or low, and very poor or very low. These
occupational categories “implicitly refer to ideas of status
attached to various occupations, opportunities for generating
wealth and requirement of knowledge skills/technical skills or
mere physical labour.”62 Thus a “very poor” occupation would
likely involve “mere physical labour,” while an “upper”

56. Id. at 268.
57. See ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
58. Kaivan Munshi, The Impact of Caste on Economic Mobility in India, MINT (Aug.
16, 2017, 8:37 AM), [https://perma.cc/ZMG6-2WUZ] (“Economic mobility is a prerequisite
for development.”).
59. Rajeshwari Deshpande & Suhas Palshikar, Occupational Mobility: How Much
Does Caste Matter?, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 61, 66 (2008).
60. Id. at 64.
61. Id.; see also Narula, supra note 54, at 285 (“Eighty-five percent of Dalits live in
rural areas while over 75 percent of Dalits perform land-connected work; 25 percent as
marginal or small farmers and over 50 percent as landless laborers . . . .”).
62. Deshpande & Palshikar, supra note 59, at 63.
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occupation would likely involve knowledge skills/technical
skills.63
While this study also shows Dalits as the most upwardly
mobile over the last four generations, it is important to note where
the Dalits started. To illustrate further, the upper caste has not
been as upwardly mobile as the Dalits have been over the last four
generations, but the upper castes already hold the highest
occupations. Essentially, the upper castes have, for the most part,
already reached the occupational peak, while the Dalits started
from the lowest point. In other words, “[t]here is a difference in
moving upwards from a middle occupational location and from a
very low occupational location.”64 Most importantly, the findings
of this study conclude “for purposes of upward movement, caste
matters.”65 Indeed, this conclusion is the reason why it is
included in this Comment. In order to realize how a biased
supervisor discriminating against an employee of a lower caste
violates Title VII, one must first realize how “[c]enturies of sociophysical segregation and illiteracy compromise [lower caste
individuals’] position[s] in today’s economy and society.”66
With this background in mind, it is easy to imagine how
entrenched Indian norms like caste discrimination can transcend
borders and persist in the American workplace despite legislative
efforts in India and on the international stage to combat caste
discrimination. Claims of caste discrimination are most prevalent
in South Asian-dominant sectors, such as the tech sector.67 In
fact, a 2018 survey of South Asians in the United States found
that 67% of Dalits reported being discriminated against at their
workplace due to their caste.68 However, few South Asian
employees actually raise their concerns of caste discrimination to
their American employers because they believe “their concerns
63. Id.
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id. at 66.
66. Rajnish Kumar et al., Social and Economic Inequalities: Contemporary
Significance of Caste in India, ECON. & POL. WKLY., 55, 56, (2009).
67. AB Wire, supra note 13 (investigating high rates of claims for caste discrimination
in tech companies, with a nonprofit advocacy group in 2020 receiving a number of such
claims from Facebook (33), Cisco (24), Google (20), Microsoft (18), IBM (17), and Amazon
(14) employees).
68. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
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will not be given weight” due to Americans’ lack of
understanding of caste dynamics or will lead to “negative
consequences to their career.”69 In some cases, lower caste
individuals do not even make it past the interview process when
searching for jobs in America when another Indian is the
interviewer.70 Though lower caste individuals in the United
States are likely to be skilled workers71 who have achieved greater
upward mobility in comparison to the majority of lower caste
individuals in India, lower caste individuals, regardless of what
job they have, face caste discrimination that limits their
advancement. For instance, a Dalit surgeon expressed that though
he was a member of the Legislative Assembly and a microsurgeon
specializing in hand and spinal reconstruction, he still “remain[s]
very much a dalit . . . open to routine humiliation from the upper
castes.”72
II. HOW DID TITLE VII COME TO BE?
In the 1960’s, African Americans faced significant
inequality in American society. In 1964, Congress finally took
measures to combat such inequality through the enaction of the
monumental Civil Rights Act.73 However, Congress also realized
that in order to truly achieve the goals of the Civil Rights Act—
to integrate African Americans into mainstream society—
Congress would have to fight discrimination not only in public
accommodations, schools, and voting, but also in the realm of
employment.
The notion that one’s employment opens (or closes) many
doors for his future is as true today as it was in 1964—when the
Civil Rights Act was enacted. In 1962, the rate of unemployment
was 124% higher for nonwhite Americans in comparison to the
69. Id.
70. Tiku, supra note 14 (“In more than 100 job interviews for contract work over the
past 20 years, Kaila said he only got one job offer when another Indian interviewed him in
person.”).
71. See Sonia Paul, When Caste Discrimination Comes To The United States, NPR
(Apr. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/3WJL-RADD] (“Today, India alone routinely attracts the
majority of skilled worker visas the US allots to foreign nationals . . . .”).
72. Narula, supra note 54, at 266.
73. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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white rate; and the trend worsened as unskilled and semi-skilled
jobs that African Americans traditionally held were rapidly
disappearing due to the growth of automation.74 It was clear that
Congress needed to address this lack of opportunity and the
practices that imposed these limitations on African Americans in
order to successfully integrate African Americans into
mainstream society.
Congress’s answer to the problems that African Americans
faced in the employment realm was the equal employment
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).75
Congress enacted these provisions to prohibit discrimination
against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.76 Specifically, it is unlawful for employers:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or
employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.77

“[E]mployer” under Title VII means “a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such a person.”78 Just as Title VII was initially enacted
to combat discrimination in the workplace against African
Americans in 1964, Title VII can also be used to protect Dalit and
lower caste employees from potential discriminators in

74. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Title VII Race or National Origin Discrimination in
Employment—Supreme Court Cases, 182 A.L.R. Fed. 61 § 2(a) (2002).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
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employment agencies, labor organizations, training programs,
and in many more aspects of employment.79
Broadly, Title VII’s purpose is to create a nondiscriminatory workplace. This purpose is advanced when
employers take preemptive measures to avoid discrimination like
adopting anti-discrimination policies, implementing effective
grievance mechanisms, and following the EEOC’s guidance on
Title VII. Importantly, courts hold that in order to carry out the
“purposes of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness
and humiliation of . . . discrimination,” Title VII must be
accorded a liberal construction.80 The fact that courts must accord
Title VII a liberal construction is significant to this Comment’s
proposal because though caste is not specifically listed as—or is
not easily pigeonholed into—a protected class, these
circumstances alone should not restrict courts from interpreting
Title VII to cover caste.
III. HOW CAN CASTE BE CLASSIFIED UNDER
TITLE VII?
Now that the background and goals of Title VII are apparent,
this Comment demonstrates why courts should recognize that
Title VII prohibits caste discrimination. This Comment argues
that the method described below gives potential victims of caste
discrimination the best opportunity to obtain relief and prevent
future caste discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, this
Comment proposes that the theory of Intersectionality offers the
best solution to prohibiting caste discrimination under Title VII.
By recognizing that caste cannot fit within only one protected
class and instead, simultaneously overlaps into multiple protected
classes, courts should accept that caste is covered by Title VII.
In 1989, “Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the idea that civil
rights laws are ill equipped to address the types of inequality and
discrimination faced by people who suffer multiple, or

79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)-(d).
80. See Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 578 F.3d 787, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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‘intersecting,’ axes of discrimination.”81 While courts have
always recognized that Title VII protects individuals from
discrimination based on their existence in one of the protected
classes mentioned in Title VII, courts have begun, albeit slowly
and incompletely,82 to recognize that Title VII also “protects
individuals against discrimination based on the combination or
‘intersection’ of two or more protected classifications.”83
There are multiple reasons why courts have begun to accept
the theory of Intersectionality as a means to bring employment
discrimination claims. For one, courts look to the plain text of
Title VII to find Congress’s intent to accept this theory.84 Most
importantly, the courts see the “or”85 used when listing the
protected classes in Title VII as legislative intent to defend those
who face discrimination due to their existence in multiple
protected classes. Courts also see Congress’s intent to accept
Intersectionality by observing its refusal to adopt an amendment
to Title VII, which would have added the word “solely” to modify
the word “sex.”86 If Congress would have added the word
“solely,” Congress would have demonstrated its intent to limit
Title VII plaintiffs to using their membership in only one

81. Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 991 (2011).
82. See Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 713, 729 (2015) (describing how since the late 1970s, some decisions have
“contained encouraging language allowing black women to bring combined race/sex
discrimination claims, but employ[] an awkward ‘sex-plus’ analysis” that “allow[s] African
American women to ‘aggregate’ evidence of racial and sexual harassment, but implie[s] that
race and sex discrimination were ‘additive’ rather than inextricably intertwined . . . in
particular . . . abuses directed toward female employees of color”).
83. Brown v. OMO Grp., Inc., No. 9:14-CV-02841, 2017 WL 1148743 at *5 (D.S.C.
2017); see Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cnty., 876 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (D. Md. 2012);
see also Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t. of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769-771 (E.D. Wis.
2010).
84. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987).
85. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[]”).
86. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416 (“The use of the word ‘or’ evidences Congress’ intent to
prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics.”)
(quoting Jeffries v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980));
see Alice Abrokwa, “When They Enter, We All Enter”: Opening the Door to Intersectional
Discrimination Claims Based on Race and Disability, 24 MICH. J. L. & POL. 15, 52 (2018);
see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989), superseded on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in
Comcast Co. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
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protected class as the basis for their suit.87 Lastly, courts realize
that refusing to accept this theory would leave those who do not
fit within a single protected class—such as is the case for African
American women—without a viable Title VII remedy.88
“Intersectionality theorists [suggest] two distinct processes
through which people facing multiple disadvantages are
subordinated in the courts . . . .”89 These are “demographic
intersectionality” and “claim intersectionality.”90 Demographic
intersectionality focuses on how judges’, juries’, and lawyers’
discriminatory preconceptions of someone who belongs to
multiple protected classes impact court outcomes.91 However,
because demographic intersectionality focuses on the effects of
discrimination in the courtroom, it is not the focus of this
Comment.92 Instead, claim intersectionality is the focus because
it puts the attention on “discriminatory [processes] that operate in
the labor market.”93
Claim intersectionality occurs “when plaintiffs allege
discrimination on the basis of two or more ascriptive
characteristics” like national origin and sex.94 This theory
“examines how multiple identities overlap to produce distinct
forms of oppression.”95 Claim intersectionality focuses on the
belief that “the law does not adequately redress intersectional
discrimination that occurs in the labor market.”96 Claim
intersectionality is more relevant because this Comment seeks to
recognize that the law indeed can adequately redress
intersectional discrimination that occurs in the labor market. The

87. See Abrokwa, supra note 86, at 52; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
88. See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032.
89. Best et al., supra note 81, at 993.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 994.
92. See Id.
93. Id.
94. Best et al., supra note 81, at 994.
95. Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic All., No. C10-0862, 2011 WL 13100729
at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 1, 2011); see e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 641 (7th
Cir. 2000) (finding claims of both racial and sexual harassment were present and supported
by allegations that plaintiff’s supervisor made statements such as “[o]nce you go black, you
never go back” while rubbing against her buttocks).
96. Best et al., supra note 81, at, 993.
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EEOC, “the agency charged with interpreting Title VII,”97 clearly
supports Intersectionality. The EEOC Compliance Manual
states:
Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one
protected trait (e.g., race), but also because of the
intersection of two or more protected bases (e.g., race and
sex). For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination against
African American women even if the employer does not
discriminate against White women or African American
men. Likewise, Title VII protects Asian American women
from discrimination based on stereotypes and assumptions
about them “even in the absence of discrimination against
Asian American men or White women.” The law also
prohibits individuals from being subjected to discrimination
because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered
by another EEO statute—e.g., race and disability, or race and
age.98

Although Intersectionality may be a relatively innovative
and complex idea regarding Title VII claims, “it nonetheless has
been admitted in many cases.”99
Despite this support for the viability of Title VII claims that
use Intersectionality, plaintiffs that use this theory still face
multiple hurdles in the judicial system due to skepticism of the
theory. First, some courts refuse to even recognize intersectional
claims as legally cognizable.100 In these cases, the judges
considered race and sex discrimination claims separately, despite
Black female plaintiffs arguing that they experienced unique
discrimination due to their existence in multiple, protected
classifications.101 Second, the complexity of the theory of

97. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 172 (3rd. Cir. 1991), abrogated on
other grounds St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
98. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC Compliance Manual, Section
15: Race and Color Discrimination, at 8-9, [https://perma.cc/YTS4-H8MT].
99. Apilado, 2011 WL 13100729 at *3; see also Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406, 1416 (concluding that a plaintiff may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with
evidence of sexual hostility in a Title VII action); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action
Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (“We agree that discrimination against black
females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.”);
see B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t 276 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. See Best et al., supra note 81, at 996.
101. See Id.
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Intersectionality also may limit the theory’s utility.102 Plaintiffs
who bring claims based upon Intersectionality face “complex
bias” in court and disproportionate difficulty in winning their
cases.103 Lastly, even in cases where judges allow the use of
Intersectionality as a method to demonstrate discrimination, some
judges limit their considerations to the intersection of two
characteristics at the most “out of concern that [] too many
intersections would turn Title VII into a ‘many-headed Hydra’
and make it impossible to make any employment decisions
‘without incurring a volley of discrimination charges’ . . . .”104
The fact of the matter is that discrimination is often multifaceted due to the multiple characteristics that employees possess.
With this being said, caste, a construct that combines numerous
aspects of life, would be the perfect centerpiece of a Title VII
claim based upon Intersectionality. Therefore, courts must begin
to apply Intersectionality with the understanding that Title VII
was constructed to cover all who face employment
discrimination, including those who face simultaneous
discrimination on multiple fronts.
Dr. Suraj Yengde, a leading scholar on caste discrimination
who was born into a family of “Untouchables,” describes caste as
a storm cloud overhead.105 When a Dalit or lower caste member
sees the cloud of caste overhead, he or she does not expect just
one drop of racism or one drop of colorism. Instead, as any Dalit
or lower caste individual knows, there is going to be a violent
downpour of all types of discrimination.106 While one protected
class under Title VII may be applicable to a certain set of facts in
a discrimination case, caste cannot be jammed into one category
or another. To understand caste discrimination, one must realize
102. Mayeri, supra note 82, at 730.
103. Id.; see also Best et al., supra note 81, at 992, 997 (“[P]laintiffs who make
intersectional claims, alleging that they were discriminated against based on more than one
ascriptive characteristic, are only half as likely to win their cases as are other plaintiffs.”
Plaintiffs lost the defense motion for summary judgment 96 percent of the time in an
empirical study that examined 26 employment discrimination cases in the federal district
courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, a rate higher than plaintiff loss
rates in other studies of summary judgment outcomes.).
104. Best et al., supra note 81, at 997.
105. Telephone Interview with Dr. Suraj Yengde, Assoc., Dep’t of Afr. & Afr. Am.
Stud., Harvard Univ. (Oct. 19, 2020).
106. Id.
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that Dalits and lower caste individuals face discrimination that is
multi-dimensional. Despite the multitude of the aforementioned
hurdles that challenge plaintiffs who aim to utilize
Intersectionality, Intersectionality is the best method to apply to
caste discrimination because it appreciates the complexity of
caste.
IV. WHICH PROTECTED CLASSES PROHIBIT CASTE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII?
This Part describes how caste discrimination potentially
intersects into all of the protected classes enumerated in Title
VII.107 It will be clear that some of the classes described have the
capability of prohibiting caste discrimination all by themselves.
Meaning, a court can find that caste discrimination is prohibited
under Title VII because caste discrimination is discrimination
based on just race or national origin. However, this Comment
discusses not how each protected class can single-handedly
prohibit caste discrimination, but how the courts should recognize
that caste discrimination is a multi-dimensional problem that
simultaneously overlaps among a number of protected classes.
A. Race
Race is a “social construction” rather than a biological
category.108 Looking to India, the Indian government, Dalits, and
progressive academics seem to be in agreement that caste is not
race.109 Dalit scholars actually classify the caste system as “worse
than racism” partly because it is “[i]nflicted by birth, sanctified

107. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
108. SOCIOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING AND CHANGING THE SOCIAL WORLD 331-33
(2010) (stating that among the reasons to question the biological concept of race are the facts
that “people from different races are more than 99.9% the same in their DNA” and that “an
individual or a group of individuals is assigned to a race on arbitrary or even illogical
grounds.”).
109. Ambrose Pinto, UN Conference Against Racism: Is Caste Race?, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., 2817-18 (2001) (“The position of GONGO’s (a term that is used for government of
India’s bureaucrats and officials) [is] that caste is social and race is biological . . . .”); Id.
(“Dalits in India, the Ambedkarites, and the progressive academics have never equated race
with caste.”).
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by religion, [and] glorified by tradition.”110 Ultimately, while
these views may be important in shaping future EEOC guidance
regarding Title VII’s coverage of caste discrimination, we must
look to what the EEOC, the courts, and other legislation currently
say about race to determine whether courts may accept caste
discrimination as discrimination based upon race.
Currently, “Title VII does not contain a definition of
‘race.’”111 Further, “Title VII cases largely have been silent as to
what ‘race’ means under the statute.”112 With Title VII’s silence
in mind, one might also look to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to find
definitions of racial discrimination because “[t]he basic contours
of what constitutes racial discrimination under § 1981 also apply
in Title VII cases, and vice versa.”113 Section 1981(a) gives “[a]ll
persons,” regardless of race, the same right to “make and enforce
contracts,” and pertinent to this piece, employment contracts.114
Most importantly, the Court in St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,
a case where an associate professor claimed racial discrimination
based upon his Arabian ancestry, held that “[u]nder § 1981 the
term ‘race’ includes groups identified by their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics.”115 Thus, the St. Francis College Court showed
that a plaintiff could bring a § 1981 claim, and therefore a Title
VII claim, based on racial discrimination if the plaintiff was
discriminated against based on his or her ethnicity or ancestry.
It is clear that one’s caste can very well be interpreted as
one’s ethnicity because ethnicity refers to one’s “unique set of
cultural characteristics” such as one’s religion, naming, and
110. Id. at 2819.
111. Questions and Answers about Race and Color Discrimination in Employment,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 9, 2006), [https://perma.cc/9NNP-MST8]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
112. WHAT IS “RACE” DISCRIMINATION, 5 EMP. COORDINATOR EMP. PRACTICES §
3:5.
113. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 475 n.107.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
115. See supra note 112 (emphasis added); see generally St. Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (emphasis added) (“Based on the history of § 1981, we
have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because
of their ancestry of ethnic characteristics . . . . The Court of Appeals was thus quite right in
holding that § 1981, ‘at a minimum,’ reaches discrimination against an individual ‘because
he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping
of homo sapiens.’”).
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public life.116 It may even be the case that caste fits perfectly
within the class of race due to the characteristics listed as making
up one’s ethnicity, and therefore one’s race. As this Comment
discussed in Part I, it is true that one’s caste is a conglomeration
of such cultural characteristics such as naming,117 religion,118 and
public life.119 However, though a plaintiff can possibly base his
or her entire claim on the premise that caste discrimination is race
discrimination, this Comment shows how a plaintiff can use the
theory of Intersectionality to more completely demonstrate how
caste encompasses discrimination based at least in part upon all
of Title VII’s protected classes.
Though the vast number of cases are silent as to what “race”
means under Title VII, the Second and Third Circuits have issued
similar holdings that align with St. Francis College. In Bennun v.
Rutgers State University, the court held that Title VII protects
individuals who are ethnically Hispanic—“of or derived from
Spain or the Spanish.”120 Further, the Bennun Court ruled that
discrimination based on someone’s “ancestry or lack thereof
constitutes racial discrimination” under Title VII.121 Similarly, in
Barrella, the Second Circuit also held that “race” under Title VII
encompasses ethnicity just as § 1981 does.122
Lastly, and most importantly for courts following the Second
and Third Circuits, the EEOC also supports this idea that
discrimination based upon one’s ancestry is racial discrimination.
The EEOC explains that “[r]ace discrimination includes
discrimination on the basis of ancestry or physical or cultural

116. Hervé Varenne, The Study of Ethnicity, Minority Groups and Identity,
BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/TN29-6MBD] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
117. Jeya Rani, So the Term ‘Dalit’ Can’t Be Used But ‘Brahmin’ and 6,000 Other
Caste Names Can, WIRE (Sept. 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9JJC-J454] (describing how it
is common that one’s caste can be identified through their surname).
118. Why This India Priest Carried an ‘Untouchable’ into a Temple, BBC NEWS (Apr.
20, 2018), [https://perma.cc/DDB4-2GZH].
119. Sell, supra note 23 (“Dalits usually have little other option in urban areas than to
cram into the already crowded slums, where their access to clean, safe water and sanitation
is often severely limited. Many still get their water from dirty shallow wells, or illegally
from leaks in the city’s piped water supply.”).
120. See supra note 112; see also Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 180
(3d Cir. 1991).
121. See supra note 112.
122. Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016).
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characteristics associated with a certain race, such as skin color,
hair texture or styles, or certain facial features.”123 The aspects of
ancestry in the EEOC’s definition, as well as the rulings in the
Second and Third Circuits, strengthen this Comment’s contention
that caste, a system centered upon ancestry and encompassing
characteristics common to one’s ethnicity, intersects with the
protected class of race.
B. Color
Discrimination based on color is not defined in Title VII.
However, the EEOC describes “Color [D]iscrimination” as
involving treating someone unfavorably because of “his/her skin
pigmentation (lightness or darkness of the skin), complexion,
shade, or tone.”124 Therefore, in order for caste discrimination to
be discrimination based on color in the eyes of the EEOC, caste
discrimination must involve treating someone unfavorably due to
their complexion. Importantly, in the caste discrimination
context, “[c]olor discrimination can occur . . . between persons of
the same race or ethnicity.”125 When inquiring whether caste
discrimination is based on color and/or race, one analyzes similar
facts because race is based on physical features and skin color is
a physical feature.
While Indian scholars and commentators discount the idea
that skin color is inherent to Hinduism,126 there seems to be an
understanding among Indians that skin color, caste, and religion
are clearly “closely related” and that “whatever is black is not
welcome in the Indian society.”127 One innovative and frequently
cited study has even gone as far as to support this relation through
science, finding that the “social structure defined by the caste
123. See supra note 111.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Neha Mishra, Indian and Colorism: The Finer Nuances, 14 WASH. U. GLOB.
STUDS. L. REV. 725, 726 n.6 (2015) (“[U]nderstanding Varna in the context of color is
misleading.”); see also Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 477 (“[C]aste
discrimination is not best understood as discrimination on the basis of ‘color.’”).
127. David Love, Blackness Around the Globe: Dark-Skinned Dalits Fight an
Oppressive Caste System in India—‘Whatever is Black is Not Welcomed’, ATLANTA BLACK
STAR (May 2, 2016), [https://perma.cc/XSR2-KVTY].
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system has a ‘profound influence on skin pigmentation.’”128 As
one Indian observer notes “[a]ll the images of the popular gods
and goddesses that we see around us, photographs in our home
shrines or prayer halls . . . all show them to be light-skinned.”129
These light-skinned portrayals are sometimes even in direct
contrast to how the gods and goddesses are illustrated in Hindu
scripture.130
Most significantly, in terms of finding that caste
discrimination can be based on one’s complexion, lower caste
applicants report that their skin color is an immediate way to
reveal their lower caste status, which in turn, severely limits their
ability to be hired.131 Ultimately, though the link between caste
and skin color may not be religiously codified, the connection has
subsequently been cemented into Hindu culture—a culture that
has now immigrated into the American workplace. With this
evidence of caste-based colorism existing both in India and in the
United States, the courts should acknowledge that caste
discrimination is prohibited by Title VII because caste
discrimination can, at least in part, be based upon one’s
complexion. Further, the fact that skin color is a feature of caste
discrimination, strengthens the argument that caste is best
understood as an intersectional issue because caste discrimination
overlaps into the protected class of color.

128. Luke Koshi, Does Caste Influence Colour in India? Genetics Study Finds a
Profound Link, NEWS MINUTE (Nov. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/D7UY-VLFK].
129. Dark is Divine: What Colour are Indian Gods and Goddesses?, BBC NEWS (Jan.
21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/84YN-BHMJ].
130. See Id. (“[E]ven Krishna, who is described as a dark-skinned god in the scriptures,
is often shown as fair. And so is the elephant-headed Ganesha, even though there are no
white elephants in India.”).
131. Tiku, supra note 14 (“In more than 100 job interviews for contract work over the
past 20 years, Kaila said he only got one job offer when another Indian interviewed him in
person . . . . ‘They don’t bring up caste, but they can easily identify us,’ Kaila says, rattling
off all of the ways he can be outed as potentially being Dalit, including the fact that he has
darker skin.”).
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C. Religion
The EEOC Compliance Manual clearly recognizes that
Hinduism is a religion under Title VII.132 Further, “Title VII
defines ‘religion’ to include ‘all aspects of religious observance
and practice as well as belief.’”133 As discussed in Part I, despite
many scholars arguing that the caste system is relatively new to
the practice of Hinduism, there is no doubt that since the British
arrived, caste has become inextricably intertwined with
Hinduism.134 Currently, it is true that caste cannot exist without
Hinduism and vice versa. Importantly, there are no cases where
the plaintiff has used the theory of Intersectionality to
demonstrate that he/she is being discriminated against based upon
his or her existence in both the protected class of religion as well
as another protected class. Therefore, this Section is only an
expression of the concept of Intersectionality and how a victim of
caste discrimination can still use this theory in bringing a Title
VII claim.
We can see this interconnectedness by looking at the history
of Hinduism’s growth in the Indian sub-continent. In fact, the
dominant brahmanical religion that we now know as modern
Hinduism, absorbed many primeval tribal groups—such as the
Dalits—over centuries of development, along with their gods,
goddesses, religious rituals and customs.135 Brahmin priests
absorbed tribal traditions and institutionalized them with myths
and forms of cult practices to their own advantage. This process
of “Hindu imperialism” went hand in hand with subjugating tribal
groups politically and economically so as to justify the Dalits’
exclusion.136
As previously discussed in Part I, the caste system is a
system of religious purity that is handed down from generation to

132. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2021, SECTION 12:
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (2021), [https://perma.cc/9LTW-S4QF].
133. Id.
134. See supra Section I.B.
135. A.M. Abraham Ayrookuzhiel, The Dalits, Religions and Interfaith Dialogue, 7 J.
HINDU-CHRISTIAN STUDS. 2 (1994) (“the tribal god or Orissa became identified with
Vishnu”).
136. Id.
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generation.137 Important to this point, “discrimination on the
basis of religion can be on the basis of religious heritage.”138 In
Gulitz v. DiBartolo, the court recognized that because the
plaintiff’s coworkers discriminated against him based on his
Jewish heritage—an assertion supported due to his father’s
practicing of Judaism—Title VII protected the plaintiff because
he fell into the protected class of religion.139 Essentially, the fact
that plaintiff was “being discriminated against on account of the
religion of his forbears” qualified him for Title VII protection.140
Such reasoning would translate well to a potential caste
discrimination case brought by a Dalit or lower caste plaintiff
because “to discriminate against someone based on caste is [] to
discriminate against them on the basis that they had an ancestor
who occupied a certain position in Hindu society.”141 Following
the Gulitz reasoning, this type of discrimination would certainly
be religious discrimination prohibited by Title VII and fits the
mold of the Intersectionality theory despite Gulitz itself not being
a case based upon Intersectionality.
Though Hinduism has led Dalits to embrace other religions
in search of human dignity, such as Islam, Sikhism, Christianity,
and Buddhism,142 one’s Dalit status does not leave them. Indeed,
for those that suffer the most from the caste system, the Dalits,
conversion “is an action that does not bear any change in [Dalits’]
material lives.”143 For example, despite Christianity professing
itself as an egalitarian religion, Dalit Christians are not even
allowed to sit in pews meant for higher-caste Christians.144
Indeed, Dalit Christians are “‘twice discriminated against’—in
society and within the church.”145 Further, Dalit Muslims are not
allowed to marry high-caste Muslims and “Buddhist monasteries
137. See Nadkarni, supra note 19, at 4783.
138. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 477.
139. No. 08-CV-2388, 2010 WL 11712777, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010).
140. Id.
141. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 478.
142. See Ayrookuzhiel, supra note 135, at 3.
143. Rahul Sonpimple, Dait Conversions: An Act of Rebellion Against Caste
Supremacy, ALJAZEERA (June 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4HCU-CXUG].
144. Vatsala Vedantum, Still Untouchable: The Politics of Religious Conversion,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY (June 19, 2002), [https://perma.cc/4F4J-YHJH].
145. Id.

5 WHITLEY.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

190

4/13/22 10:01 AM

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 75:1

have not been able to prevent their converts from their earlier
casteist practices.”146 At the end of the day, even if Dalits convert,
they are still subject to discrimination based upon Hindu tradition.
Therefore, such discrimination would still be religious
discrimination and would therefore fall under Title VII.
D. Sex
While it is difficult, if not plainly inaccurate, to “simply
reduc[e]”147 caste discrimination to sex discrimination, it would
be even more inaccurate to reject the fact that “[c]aste
discrimination has a unique and specific impact on Dalit women
who endure multiple forms of discrimination.”148 By recognizing
that Dalit and lower caste women suffer from a unique type of
caste discrimination that is based not only upon their caste status,
but also upon their sex, one can easily see why the theory of
Intersectionality best encompasses caste discrimination.
Importantly, to understand how caste discrimination based at least
in part on sex even exists in United States employment, one must
look to caste discrimination based on sex in India. By looking to
the effects of caste discrimination against women in India, one
can better understand why an upper-caste supervisor in the United
States may attempt to uphold such entrenched practices by
discriminating against Dalit and lower caste women even in the
United States employment context.
Dalit women in particular face a “‘triple burden’ of gender
bias, caste discrimination and economic deprivation.”149 In India,
caste discrimination against Dalit women rises to the level of
outright violence. Dalit women “continue to be stalked, abused,
molested, raped and murdered with impunity.”150 In India, ten
146. Id.
147. Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 471.
148. Narula, supra note 54, at 277. Although this Section will focus on caste
discrimination perpetuated against lower caste women on the basis of sex due to the
overwhelming evidence that shows that lower caste, and especially Dalit, women suffer from
the worst treatment, it is important to realize that simultaneous caste and sex-based
discrimination in United States employment could exist against both men and women as well
as against those who are members of the upper castes.
149. Soutik Biswas, Hathras Case: Dalit Women are Among the Most Oppressed in
the World, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S6EB-WBYK].
150. Id.
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Dalit women were raped every day in 2019.151 Though records
do not reflect that such sexual violence is perpetuated against
Dalit women in the United States, sexual violence against Dalit
women is not completely foreign to the United States.152
For employment, Dalit women in India “are allotted some of
the most menial and arduous tasks and experience greater
discrimination in payment of wages than Dalit men.”153
Therefore, one can imagine how it is even more offensive to an
upper caste supervisor as well as the caste hierarchy to see that
Dalit women, considered the lowest of the low in India, are
achieving economic and social mobility through employment in
the United States. While Dalit women in the United States have
much more opportunity than Dalit women in India, who are often
landless laborers or forced into prostitution,154 Dalit women do
not shed their caste once they are in the United States.
Such an inability to escape caste in the United States as a
Dalit or lower caste woman can be seen by looking at the story of
Maya Kamble. Kamble was one of the first women to enter the
technical industry in Los Angeles, California.155 Kamble
identifies as a Buddhist Ambedkarite but nonetheless is
considered as a Dalit to her upper caste supervisors due to the fact
that Buddhist Ambedkarites descend from Dalit converts.156
Kamble’s supervisor, knowing that she came from Dalit origins,
continuously subjected her to bias in the workplace.157 This
supervisor “continually ice[d] her out of conversations” and even
told her not to touch a tool because she was “ill-fated”—a jeer
used towards Dalits, and especially Dalit women, due to the belief
that a Dalit’s impurity generates misfortune.158
151. Id.
152. See e.g., Ray, supra note 10 (discussing the story of Preeti Meshram, a Dalit
woman who was raped by an upper caste classmate while going to New England college for
her doctorate).
153. Narula, supra note 54, at 277-78.
154. Id. at 278-83.
155. Thenmozhi Soundararajan, Caste in the USA, Episode 4: Battling Caste Bias as
a Woman in Tech, and Thriving Under Non-Indian Bosses, FIRSTPOST (Nov. 11, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/Q2LL-VU26].
156. Gail Omvedt, BUDDHISM IN INDIA: CHALLENGING BRAHMANISM AND CASTE
264 (2003).
157. Soundararajan, supra note 155.
158. Id.
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Importantly, Kamble is not the only Dalit woman in the
United States tech industry who faces “the casteist networks of
Silicon Valley Tech.”159 In October 2020, thirty Dalit female
engineers in Silicon Valley came forward with a statement
speaking out on caste bias in their workplaces, which included
tech giants like Apple, Microsoft, and Google.160 These female
engineers described that “working with Indian managers is a
living hell,” stating that “[t]heir gender and caste politics leave a
lot to be desired.”161 Specifically, these engineers said that
“[d]ominant caste men make jokes about Dalit reservation, as
well as inappropriate jokes about Dalit and Muslim women.”162
These women even told of instances where this hostility in the
workplace escalated to sexual harassment.163
Overall, from these personal accounts in the United States,
it is clear that although Dalit and lower caste men are also
subjected to similar treatment, Dalit and lower caste women face
unique discrimination. By observing the limitations and violence
Dalit women face in India and how this discrimination has
translated to the American workplace, one can see that Dalit and
lower caste women are at the intersection of both caste and sexbased discrimination. With this understanding, the theory of
Intersectionality is the best way to address caste discrimination,
especially for female employees.
E. National Origin
Similar to the analysis in Section D, it would be inaccurate
to reduce caste discrimination as discrimination based solely on
one’s South Asian identity.164
However, although caste
discrimination may not be distilled solely to national origin
discrimination, this Comment proposes that caste discrimination
can, at least in part, overlap into the protected class of national
159. A Statement on Caste Bias in Silicon Valley from 30 Dalit Women Engineers,
WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/KW5Q-Q3XK].
160. Tiku, supra note 14.
161. A Statement on Caste Bias in Silicon Valley from 30 Dalit Women Engineers,
supra note 159 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 472.
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origin based on the EEOC’s, and the common law’s, definition of
national origin discrimination. While one’s membership in some
of the protected classes may be easy to identify, such as one’s
race, color, or sex, one’s national origin may be more difficult to
identify. Courts across the country recognize that unlawful
discrimination must be based on the employee’s objective
appearance to others, not his own subjective feelings about
himself.165 Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the alleged
discriminator was actually correct in assuming an employee’s
place of origin.166
The EEOC defines “national origin discrimination broadly,
as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment
opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s,
place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural
or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”167 This
broad interpretation of national origin finds support in the judicial
system which deems national origin as “better understood by
reference to certain traits or characteristics that can be linked to
one’s place of origin, as opposed to a specific country or
nation.”168 The first clause of the EEOC’s definition of national
origin focuses on discrimination based on an individual’s or their
ancestors’ place of origin. Importantly, like the EEOC’s
definition of national origin, its definition of “place of origin” is
also broad. One’s place of origin can even include large
geographic regions such as South Asia.169 Also, as mentioned
165. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991); see also
Mobijohn v. Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 92-CV-0672, 1995 WL 574461, at *1 n.2
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1995); Almendares v. Palmer, No. 00-CV-7524, 2002 WL 31730963,
at *10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002); Huffman v. City of Conroe, No. H-07-1964, 2009 WL
361413, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009).
166. See Almendares, 2002 WL 31730963, at *10; Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85633 (Dec. 29, 1980) (“In order to have a claim
of national origin under Title VII, it is not necessary to show that the alleged discriminator
knew the particular national origin group to which the complainant belonged.”).
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2022).
168. McNaught v. Va. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 933 F. Supp. 2d 804, 817 (E.D. Va. 2013)
(quoting Kanaji v. Child.’s Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401-02 (E.D. Pa. 2003));
but see Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (explaining that national origin
discrimination under Title VII is discrimination based on “where a person was born, or, more
broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came”).
169. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2016-2, EEOC
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION.
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above, a discriminator does not need to pinpoint the employee’s
exact country of origin in order to discriminate on the basis of the
plaintiff’s place of origin. Therefore, even if a person suffering
from national origin discrimination is from the United States
instead of South Asia, the victim can still bring a Title VII claim
based on national origin discrimination.
While it is nearly impossible to distinguish certain South
Asian regions as being majority Dalit or majority Brahmin due to
the presence of all castes throughout South Asia,170 those
discriminating on the basis of caste likely have knowledge that
nearly half of India’s Dalit population resides in four Indian
states.171 Therefore, though caste can more accurately be
described as a “qualification” of one’s South Asian identity, it is
possible that a potential discriminator can learn or presume that
someone is from one of these four Indian states and discriminate
on that basis.172
Even with this in mind, a stronger argument exists in the
second clause of the EEOC’s definition as well as in definitions
of national origin existing in common law.173 These definitions
focus on discrimination based on certain objectively identifiable
“physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group,” such as South Asians.174 As discussed in Sections I.A-B,
caste has existed for centuries in South Asia, structuring
individual identities as well as intercommunity relationships that
continue to exist today.175 Therefore, caste discrimination is
inherently dictated by South Asian culture and practice.
The cultural characteristic of one’s surname is one
objectively identifiable example of how caste is inextricably
170. Priyali Sur, Under India’s Caste System, Dalits are Considered Untouchable. The
Coronavirus is Intensifying that Slur, CNN (Apr. 17, 2020, 3:04 AM), [https://perma.cc
/9TUQ-6FND] (quoting activist Paul Divakar from the National Campaign on Dalit Human
Rights, “India has 600,000 villages and almost every village a small pocket of outskirts is
meant for Dalits”).
171. B. Sivakumar, Half of India’s Dalit Population Lives in 4 States, TNN (May 2,
2013, 6:16 AM IST), [https://perma.cc/HQ3G-VGL9].
172. See Krishnamurthi & Krishnaswami, supra note 16, at 472.
173. See McNaught v. Va. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 933 F. Supp. 2d 804, 817 (E.D. Va. 2013)
(quoting Kanaji v. Child.’s Hosp. of Phila., 276 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401-02 (E.D. Pa. 2003)).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2022).
175. Madhusudan Subedi, Caste in South Asia: From Ritual Hierarchy to Politics of
Difference, POLITEJA, 320 (2016).
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intertwined with South Asia. Carrying caste surnames is the most
humiliating aspect of a Dalit’s daily life.176 Similar to how
Americans may have profession-based surnames, such as Miller
or Baker, Dalit surnames tell their own story. A Dalit’s surname
tells a story of contempt that travels back to the days of their
ancestors. On the contrary, the Brahmins flaunt their caste names
as surnames with much pride.177 Despite there being over a
billion people in India with different languages, cultures, and food
customs, a surname that reflects one’s Brahmin-status can quickly
establish a common ground between upper caste individuals.178
The power or oppression that flows from caste surnames is
not unrecognized in India. Caste surnames were even abolished
altogether in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 1929—the only
state to have ever done so.179 The caste surname has become an
“oral caste certificate” that can transcend borders and lead to
caste-discrimination in the United States.180 All an upper caste
supervisor or employer in the United States has to do in order to
find out an employee’s caste is to say, “Hello, my name is (upper
caste surname). What is yours?”
Assuming the upper caste supervisor begins to subject the
plaintiff to less pay and/or caste-based insults after learning the
plaintiff’s surname, the plaintiff may begin to mull the possibility
of bringing a Title VII claim based on national origin
discrimination. To prove his claim, the employee needs to use the
disparate treatment illustrated in Part V to demonstrate how his
surname is an objectively identifiable cultural characteristic that
falls within the protected class of national origin. To do so, the
employee would need to show that his surname would
immediately put an upper caste supervisor on notice of his Dalit
status. Then, the employee will need to tie all of the information
together for the court. At the very least, the employee needs to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,”

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Rani, supra note 117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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even if other legitimate factors also motivated the action.181
Overall, the deep ties between caste and the national origin group
of South Asians demonstrate how caste discrimination overlaps
into the protected class of national origin, thus enforcing this
Comment’s proposal that the theory of Intersectionality is the best
way for courts to understand and prohibit caste discrimination
under Title VII.

V. HOW IS A TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
BROUGHT?

Now that this Comment has demonstrated how caste
discrimination can be covered by Title VII, this Part describes
how a plaintiff would actually bring a Title VII claim based on
caste discrimination. Further, and importantly, this Part identifies
the standards of causation to be met regarding each approach.
There are “four separate legal theories under which a
plaintiff can bring a Title VII caste discrimination [claim].”182
The first approach is disparate treatment, which “refers to the
unlawful practice of treating an employee differently based on his
or her membership in a protected class.”183 Disparate treatment184
is proven by “direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by
proving a [discriminatory] pattern [] on the part of the
employer.”185 The second approach is by disparate impact, which
refers to a practice that, “while not facially discriminatory, has a
disparate impact on a particular protected class.”186 While it is
possible to bring a caste discrimination-based Title VII claim
181. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m)).
182. Donald F. Kiesling Jr., Title VII and the Temporary Employment Relationship, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
183. Id.
184. This is the most common type of claim. Id.
185. Id.; Gilbert v. MetLife, Inc., No. 09-1990, 2011 WL 183441 at *7 (D. Minn. 2011)
(quoting Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004)) (“‘direct’ refers
to the causal strength of proof . . . . A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal
discrimination motivated the employer’s adverse action does not need the three-part
McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless of whether his strong evidence is
circumstantial.”); see also Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2001) (direct
evidence “shows that the employer’s discrimination was purposeful, intentional or overt”).
186. Kiesling Jr., supra note 182, at 4.
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under the disparate impact theory, this Comment does not discuss
this approach at length due to an employee’s likely inability to
produce the requisite statistical evidence demonstrating
disparities in the “percentage of [lower caste] workers in the
employer’s work force with the percentage of qualified members
. . . in the relevant labor market.”187 Such statistics would be
difficult to produce because there are a lack of concrete numbers
of Dalit and lower caste individuals in the workforce—a difficulty
that is at least partially explained by the fact that Dalits and lower
caste individuals are usually hesitant to expose their caste
status.188
The third approach is retaliation.189 This approach protects
employees who participate in filing a discrimination charge
against an employer but then, in retaliation to this filing, suffer an
adverse employment action.190 The fourth potential approach is
harassment in a hostile work environment.191 This theory requires
that the plaintiff present evidence that his/her workplace is
permeated with “discriminatory intimidation . . . and insult” that
is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.”192 Similar to the disparate impact approach, this
Comment does not concede the impossibility of a biased
supervisor creating a hostile work environment because of one’s
caste, yet this Comment also does not discuss this approach at
length. This decision to not discuss harassment is based on the
fact that if courts agree that caste is covered by Title VII under
the disparate treatment theory, courts would likely also recognize
a caste-based Title VII claim under the harassment theory, where
the effects of the discrimination need to be even more evident, as
legally cognizable.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

MacRae v. McCormick, 458 F. Supp. 970, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
ZWICK-MAITREYI, ET AL., supra note 9.
Kiesling Jr., supra note 182, at 5.
Id.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1993).
Id. at 21 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).
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A. Disparate Treatment
If there is circumstantial or direct evidence that an individual
is being discriminated against on the basis of their caste, then the
employee may bring an unlawful discrimination suit based on
disparate treatment.193 “The cornerstone of a disparate-treatment
case is that the employee must show that discrimination was
intentional, unlike in disparate impact cases where there is only
discriminatory effect.”194 “A person suffers disparate treatment
in his employment ‘when he or she is singled out and treated less
favorably than others similarly situated’” because of a protected
characteristic.195 There are two alternative methods under which
disparate treatment can be proven.
1. Pretext or Single-Motive Analysis
In cases involving a plaintiff who attempts to prove the
employer’s defense to discrimination is pretextual, courts “use the
[] burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green”—the premier case in proving discrimination in
employment.196
A pretext analysis is an “all-or-nothing
instruction.”197
It asks the factfinder to find the one
discriminatory motive for the employment action. Under this
analysis, the complainant must first establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination.198 This may
be done by demonstrating that (1) the employee belongs to a
protected class; (2) the plaintiff “applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants;” (3) “despite
[plaintiff’s qualifications], he was rejected;” and (4) “after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
193. Maya R. Warrier, Dare To Step Out of the Fogg: Single-Motive Versus MixedMotive Analysis in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 47 LOUISVILLE L. REV.,
409, 417 n.54 (2008).
194. Id. at 409.
195. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004)).
196. Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
197. William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 213 (2003).
198. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
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to seek applicants from persons of [plaintiff’s] qualifications.”199
Next, the employer “must clearly set forth, through introduction
of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed
by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful
discrimination was not the cause of the challenged employment
action.”200 It is likely that most cases that originate from caste
discrimination will at least survive summary judgment because
“the degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case [of
discrimination] is ‘minimal and does not even need to rise to the
level of a preponderance of the evidence.’”201
If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee’s rejection.”202 If the employer shows a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions, the
employee needs only to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the employer’s asserted reasons for its actions are
a mere “pretext” for its true discriminatory motives.203
However, the McDonell Douglas framework is not the only
means of establishing a prima facie case of individual
discrimination. As the facts inevitably vary in Title VII cases, the
“prima facie proof required from [a plaintiff] is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”204
Overall, as long as the plaintiff in some way carries the “initial
burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that
an employment decision is based on a discriminatory criterion
illegal under the Act,” the McDonnell Douglas method will be set
into motion allowing a victim to possibly recover.205

199. Id.
200. Wooster, supra note 74.
201. Story v. Napolitano, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1248 (E.D. Wash. 2011) (quoting
Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)).
202. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
203. Id. at 802-05; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000).
204. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13; see, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976) (holding that it is unnecessary to make each individual of a
class action show personal monetary loss and that petitioners have carried their burden by
only demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice by the
respondents).
205. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
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2. Mixed-Motive Analysis
What the McDonnell Douglas framework failed to address
is the fact that employment decisions are usually made for
multiple reasons. Mixed motives are “usually prevalent in
employment decision-making because (1) biased decisionmaking based on social-category information can occur without
the decision maker’s awareness and (2) people are experts in
masking behavior that is often questionable or negatively viewed
by society.”206 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins first addressed the
issue of what happens when an employer has more than motive
when making an employment decision.207 However, Price
Waterhouse only brought more confusion. Lower courts were
split in deciding whether to follow Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence which stated that the employer’s discriminatory
motive must be a “substantial factor” or the plurality’s opinion
which stated that the employer’s discriminatory motive must be a
“motivating factor.”208
In response to the confusion caused by Price Waterhouse
and other Supreme Court decisions that limited the rights of
employees who sued their employers for discrimination,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“1991 Act”)—an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.209 In particular, §
107 of the 1991 Act set standards applicable to mixed motive
cases—as demonstrated in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.210 The
first provision establishes an alternative for proving that an
unlawful employment practice has occurred.211 This provision
states that “an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates [by a preponderance of the
evidence] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice,” even if other
legitimate factors also motivated the action.212 The second
206. Warrier, supra note 193, at 424.
207. See generally 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
208. Warrier, supra note 193, at 414.
209. S. 1745 (102nd): Civil Rights Act of 1991, GOVTRACK, [https://perma.cc/3RG63H5U] (last visited March 17th, 2021).
210. 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003).
211. Id. at 101.
212. Id. at 94, 99 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
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provision provides a limited affirmative defense that does not
absolve the employer of liability but instead only restricts the
remedies available to a potential plaintiff.213
Most importantly, after Desert Palace, direct evidence is not
necessary in order to submit a mixed-motive instruction to the
jury in a Title VII discrimination case.214 This is significant
because plaintiffs were previously forced to use the pretext
method when no direct evidence existed. Now that this barrier
has been lifted, employees have much more freedom to choose
the mixed-motive method, which is not burdened by the higher
standard of causation within the pretext analysis.215
The Desert Palace Court at least impliedly indicated the
irrelevance, or even impossibility, of continuing to apply
McDonnell Douglas under Title VII after the Ninth Circuit stated
that “‘an unlawful employment practice’ encompasses any
situation in which a protected characteristic was ‘a motivating
factor’ in an employment action, even if there were other
motives.”216 Essentially, as soon as the defendant illustrates a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the case becomes a mixedmotive case because there now possibly exists both
discriminatory and non-discriminatory motives.217 Despite the
Desert Palace holding, courts continue to use the McDonnell
Douglas standard in employment discrimination cases.218
To put the significance of the Desert Palace decision in
perspective for this piece, consider how an employee can now use
a mixed-motive method without producing direct evidence. For
example, a potential upper caste, discriminatory supervisor will
likely attempt to cover up the discriminatory motive behind their
employment decision regarding the Dalit employee. As is true
with numerous employers, the supervisor will likely attempt to
rationalize the adverse employment action by reasoning that they
took action for reasons that sound justifiable but, are in reality,
213. Id. at 94.
214. Id. at 98-99.
215. Corbett, supra note 197, at 212.
216. Warrier, supra note 193, at 421 (emphasis added) (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace,
Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 848 (9th Cir. 2002)).
217. Corbett, supra note 197, at 213.
218. Warrier, supra note 193, at 422.

5 WHITLEY.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

202

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

4/13/22 10:01 AM

Vol. 75:1

merely a cover-up for discrimination. The discriminatory
supervisor can explain that the Dalit employee did not get the
promotion because of non-descript reasons like he “did not have
enough experience managing others” or that the Dalit employee
was terminated for having a “lack of deference to others.”
Circumstantial evidence can expose the employer’s ill intentions
by allowing the plaintiff to show that the employer uses shifting
rationales or discriminatory remarks, giving a juror a “window
into [the employer’s] state of mind.”219 The employee can also
show workforce composition, which can demonstrate that the
upper ranks of a company are closed off to Dalit employees.220
Overall, the flexibility and less stringent causation analysis of the
mixed-motive method gives employees another weapon to
combat employment discrimination.
For instance, upper caste supervisors may develop a practice
of not promoting those who are beneficiaries of India’s system of
affirmative action—a system that commonly benefits Dalits. An
upper caste employer can easily discover that the Dalit employee
is a beneficiary by simply looking up the employee’s graduating
class to see whether the employee has “ST,” which means,
“Scheduled Tribe,” next to his name.221 “Scheduled Tribe” is a
common label for lower caste members.222 A potential employee
can point to how the supervisor promotes only those who are not
beneficiaries of India’s affirmative action system and that when
the supervisor does promote beneficiaries, he only does so when
the beneficiary does not have “ST” next to his name.
VI. WHAT ARE SOME ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS IN
PREVENTING CASTE DISCRIMINATION?
In America, “caste” is not a household word. Even if an
American has heard of the caste system, it is rare that this person
also fully appreciates caste’s complexity as well as the inequality
219. David I. Brody, “But I Can’t Prove It.” Yes You Can, with Circumstantial
Evidence, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2Y9J-Q72L].
220. Id.
221. See SAMUEL L. MYERS, JR. & VANISHREE RADHAKRISHNA, HATE CRIMES,
CRIMES OF ATROCITY, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES 22
(2017).
222. Id.
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that flows from the caste system. This lack of understanding is
reflected in the American legal system where “there are very little
[constitutional and statutory] protections for Dalits in the United
States for the discrimination that they encounter here with caste
Hindus.”223
With this in mind, many are skeptical as to whether there
exists federal law “to insulate Dalits and low caste Indians from
caste bias.”224 In this Part, this Comment proposes that, in order
to circumvent a potentially hesitant judicial system, those who see
caste discrimination as a persistent problem in employment in the
United States need to avoid molding caste into something that
satisfies how courts—which are largely unfamiliar with caste—
classify Title VII discrimination. Instead, advocates for the end
of caste discrimination need to take the issue head on. In other
words, advocates—whether they are EEOC employees, members
of Congress, or administrators at universities—need to push for
caste-centric
policy
that
explicitly
prohibits
caste
discrimination.225 For example, the EEOC can issue new
guidance to the courts and employers stating that caste
discrimination is intersectional discrimination prohibited by Title
VII. Although the courts would have to agree with this guidance,
the fact that the leading agency on Title VII, as well as other
advocates for the end of caste discrimination, have spoken up
about the issue should put the courts on notice.
Another example of advocates taking charge on this issue
comes from Brandeis University.
Brandeis’s former
nondiscrimination policy only prohibited “forms of
discrimination that are overtly described in federal and state
law.”226 However, Brandeis realized that in order to follow its
principles of equitable access and inclusion, it would have to take
steps that even federal and state laws have yet to approach.
Similar to this Comment’s intersectional proposal, Brandeis
223. Phillip Martin, Caste Bias Isn’t Illegal in the United States. But This University
is Trying to Fight It, GBH NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8B72-AB8S].
224. Id.
225. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Suraj Yengde, Assoc., Dep’t of Afr. & Afr.
Am. Stud., Harvard Univ. (Oct. 19, 2020).
226. BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, Statement on the Interpretation of Caste Within the
Brandeis Nondiscrimination Policy, BRANDEIS UNIV. (Nov. 26, 2019), [https://perma.cc
/8XGE-JQRL].
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“believes that caste identity is so inextricably intertwined with
[race, color, ancestry, religious creed, and national or ethnic
origin] that discrimination based on one’s caste is effectively
discrimination based on an amalgamation of legally protected
characteristics.”227 For these reasons, Brandeis took charge and
prohibited discrimination and harassment based on caste.228
Congress can even pass legislation that explicitly prohibits
caste discrimination under Title VII. Although it may seem that
prohibiting such intolerance should be uncontroversial, one must
not forget that the upper caste still has power and influence in the
United States. Many castes are organized into associations
preserved for members of a particular caste.229 The most
prominent and powerful Hindu advocacy organization in the
United States, the Hindu American Foundation (“HAF”), denies
that caste bias occurs in Hindu advocacy organizations,
suggesting “what some call casteism may be overblown.”230
Congress must be willing to listen to not only those Hindu
organizations like the HAF—which holds the most influence—
but also to the Dalit organizations that feel the brunt of caste
discrimination.
Lastly, the employers who have allowed caste discrimination
in the workplace can lead the fight by implementing workplace
policies that prohibit caste discrimination. These employers
would certainly include tech giants like IBM, Google, or any
other company with a large South Asian workforce. Such private
companies would have the advantage of not needing to jump
through the numerous, difficult hoops required to pass
congressional legislation. Creating these nondiscrimination
policies would also be in the best interest of these companies
because they would face less Title VII litigation and liability.
Further, taking such steps would show not only their employees,
but also the world, that the human dignity of those suffering from
caste discrimination must be respected.
Overall, the aforementioned alternatives are merely ways to
circumvent judicial interpretation. The EEOC and university227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Martin, supra note 223.
Id.
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level alternative would only attempt to persuade the courts that
caste discrimination is an issue that needs to be addressed and
then prohibited, while the congressional alternative would sternly
demand that the courts perform their duty and adhere to the new
legislation.
CONCLUSION
Just as B.R. Ambedkar, the most influential Dalit civil rights
leader, predicted in 1916, caste has become a “world problem” as
Indian migration has spread across the globe.231 In order to
combat this problem, courts need to make affirmative rulings that
caste discrimination is prohibited by Title VII. Specifically,
courts should accept the theory of Intersectionality as a means to
reach such a conclusion because caste is a unique, multidimensional form of discrimination simultaneously overlapping
into potentially all of the protected classes enumerated in Title
VII. Further, this fight should not, and cannot, be confined to the
courtroom if caste discrimination in the United States is to be
stopped. To end the harms of caste discrimination in the
workplace, legislative bodies, agencies, and employers need to
specifically identify caste discrimination as a prohibited practice.
Although caste, like an ancient poisonous tree, will not easily be
uprooted, prohibiting caste discrimination in the American
workplace is a substantial step towards equality for all.

231. ZWICK-MAITREYI ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.

